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The thesis is concerned with the international mechanism for the imposition and 
implementation of economic sanctions and the role of the European Community within 
it. 
Chapter 1 examines the classification of responses available to States to violations of 
international obligations. It deals with the conditions which must be satisfied for the 
legitimate introduction of counter-measures by States, restrictions placed upon their 
exercise, and their relationship to the law of treaties. Finally it is concerned with the 
conditions which must be met to enable the Security Council of the United Nations to 
impose sanctions against a State, and with the obligations which stem from such 
measures on Members of the UN. 
The relationship of the European Community to the UN Security Council is discussed 
in the second Chapter. The questions of whether the E C needs to seek authorisation 
from the Security Council to introduce sanctions and whether it is bound by the latter's 
resolutions are considered. The power of the E C to apply counter-measures in defence 
of its own interests and of those of its Member States is examined. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the basis in European Community law for the E C to apply 
counter-measures and to implement UN sanctions. This involves a discussion of the 
respective competences of the Community and its Member States in the field of 
external relations to determine in which of them is competent to take particular 
measures. 
Chapter 4 consists of a chronological account of the sanctions introduced by the 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Since it depends on (he willingness of each Nation to trade or 
not to trade with another, and to regulate the manner in 
which it wishes to trade, a right over commerce is evidently a 
right to be exercised at will (jus merae faculatis), a power 
without qualification, and which is therefore not subject to 
prescription. 
The exercise of sovereign economic rights to acquire advantages has long been 
a feature of international society. History is rich in illustrations of domination and 
coercion by economic strength. The dual attributes of a strong navy and economic 
leverage provided States with the means of applying pressure for securing compliance 
with their wills in both the Old and New Worlds. Following the prohibition on the use 
of force in the post-1945 era has been greater reliance placed on the exercise of 
economic power. 
Modern international law tempers the rights of States to apply pressure on 
other nations. The U N General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of 1970' 
expounds the following restriction. 
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and secure from it advantages of any kind. 
A State will be in breach of international law if it undertakes economic coercion which 
violates specific treaty commitments, is in violation of general principles of 
international law (such as freedom of the high seas), or violates the principle of non-
intervention.2 In all other circumstances the right of the State to regulate its trade with 
other States is supreme. But, in addition, measures which are illegal on one or more of 
1. General Assembly D e c l a r a t i o n on P r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Concerning F r i e n d l y R e l a t i o n s and Co-operation Among S t a t e s I n 
Accordance With The Charter Of The United Nations 1970 Gen Resn 
2625 (XXV) Oct 24 1970 (adopted without v o t e ) . 
2. Bowett "Economic Coercion and R e p r i s a l s By S t a t e s " 13 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (1972) ppl-12 a t pp2-3. 
V A T T E L . The Law of Nations, or the 
Principles of Natural Law. 




these grounds may be justified if they are economic measures of self-defence, or 
economic sanctions authorised by a competent international organ, or economic 
counter-measures.3 This thesis is concerned with the law relating to the latter two 
categories. 
Counter-measures may be employed against a State to coerce it to comply with 
international law. They consist of the breach of an obligation owed to another State 
which is justified by a previous international wrong committed by that State. The 
measures must comply with the restrictions prescribed by international law. They are 
not limited to trade or even economic obligations but the greatest level of coercion is 
likely to be achieved by the use of measures of such a nature. 
The role of sanctions has been greatly enhanced in last few years due in part to 
the end of the Cold War and the new found consensus in the UN Security Council. 
They have now acquired the importance in the maintenance of international peace and 
security provided for them in the provisions of the UN Charter. The increase in the 
frequency of their use since 19904 after a determination of a breach of or threat to 
international peace and security is testimony to their importance in law enforcement. 
The increase in the use of sanctions by the UN has had implications for the 
European Community. The E C Member States have implemented Community 
legislation to apply UN sanctions in order to minimalise the disruption to the single 
market. This poses problems in relation to the powers of the Community and to the 
relationship between E C and Member State competences. The membership in the UN 
of all E C Member States raises important questions on the relationship between the 
Community, which holds a substantial part of the Member States' economic powers, 
and the UN Security Council. 
The crisis in the former Yugoslavia has developed the role of the Community 
as an actor in foreign affairs, principally due to the location of the conflict on European 
territory. This has involved the E C in using its economic strength to coerce the Serbian 
and Montenergin governments both in concert with UN measures and independently of 
them. The central concern of this thesis is the position of the Community within 
international structures for law enforcement and the related problems outlined above. 
3. I b i d pp6-12 . 
4 . Comprehensive s a n c t i o n s have been imposed a g a i n s t I r a q (1990) and 
S e r b i a and Montenegro ( 1 9 9 2 ) , arms embargos a g a i n s t I r a q ( 1 9 9 0 ) , 
Somalia (1992) and Yugo s l a v i a ( 1991 ) , a i r s e r v i c e s r e s t r i c t i o n s 
a g a i n s t L i b y a ( 1 9 9 2 ) , and a f r e e z i n g of a s s e t s and embargo on 
s a l e and supply of petroleum and petroleum products a g a i n s t H a i t i 
( 1 9 9 3 ) . I n the preceding t h i r t y - f i v e y e a r s of the UN 
comprehensive s a n c t i o n s were imposed a g a i n s t Rhodesia (1966) and 
an arms embargo a g a i n s t South A f r i c a ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
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C H A P T E R 1 
T H E L A W OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L COUNTER-MEASURES A N D 
SANCTIONS 
I . Categories of Reaction 
Fundamental to a system of law based on the equality of its sovereign subjects is the 
absence of a central compulsory enforcement mechanism. One major characteristic of 
international law is its self-policing nature. States are permitted to take steps to seek 
compliance of a defaulting State with a norm of international law. Such a power is not 
unfettered and requirements must be met to prevent the enforcing State from acting 
outside the law. 
The prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter of 
the United Nations has done much to change the face of the enforcement of 
international law. It is only since 1945 that States have been prohibited from using 
force for any reason other than self-defence. Otherwise enforcement can only be 
undertaken by peaceful means: States are now required to use non-forcible methods in 
their search for the implementation of an international obligation. 
The categories of non-forcible measures each have precise legal meanings and 
constraints. These remedies are acts of retorsion, acts of reciprocity, counter-
measures, and sanctions. 
1. Retorsions 
'Retorsion is the technical term for retaliation for discourteous or unkind or unfair and 
inequitable acts of the same or a similar kind.'5 Such acts are not illegal under 
international law. They are distinguished by the fact that they are not taken in response 
to an internationally wrongful act. Their purpose is to retaliate by an act which does 
not breach a legal obligation, such as the severance of diplomatic relations or 
withdrawing from treaty negotiations. There is no requirement that the retaliatory 
measure bear any equivalence to the provoking act since the former is within the 
discretionary competence of the reacting State. 
2. Acts of Reciprocity 
5. Oppenheim's International Law Vol II: Disputes, War and 
Neutrality. 7th E d i t i o n ed.Lauterpacht para 29. 
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The purpose of a State temporarily not performing its legal obligations, in the form of 
either reciprocal acts or counter-measures, is to achieve the restoration of legality in its 
relationship with another State. The two remedies are closely linked in requiring the 
existence of a preceding internationally wrongful act, but they are distinct. The 
measure which constitutes the response is, in both cases, itself a breach of an 
international norm. But the difference lies in the scope of that act which itself governs 
the requirements for the legality of the response. For the wider the scope of the act, the 
more stringent the conditions are for its legal introduction. 
Where the response is to take an 'identical or equivalent'6 measure to the 
preceding wrongful act, it is an act of reciprocity. Reciprocity is the notion of re-
establishing the equality between the States. The legitimacy of the reciprocal act in 
international law is by virtue of it being an expression of the principle of the equality of 
states. The legal requirement for a State to make proper reparation for a wrongful act7 
is 'necessarily counterbalanced by a right to reparation which may or may not be 
exercised.'8 
The responding State is permitted to take action which is the same or 
equivalent to that taken by the offending State without further justification than the 
existence of the first internationally wrongful act. Reciprocity is not necessarily linked 
to obtaining payment of compensation for material damage caused by the illegality, but 
is connected to the unlawful act itself. The fact that there has been an illegal act is 
sufficient to justify the taking of a reciprocal act by the State whose rights have been 
infringed. The wrongful act has tipped the balance in the relationship between the 
States, and the State whose rights have been breached may take an equivalent measure 
to reset the balance. The existence of the illegality gives the State the right to obtain 
restitution, that is to re-acquire equality with the offending State. Reciprocity has to do 
with the nature of the legal relationship between the two rather than the mere payment 
of compensation.9 
The response to the wrongful act in the form of reciprocity is the non-
performance of the corresponding obligation of the State whose rights have been 
infringed. But that obligation must be equivalent to the breached norm. This would be 
the case in a treaty providing for the exchange of students, the nationals of each State 
having the right to pursue a year of study in the Universities of the other. If one State 
failed to permit students to take up such places, the other State would be entitled to 
refuse the reciprocal advantage to nationals of the offending States. 
6. Z o l l e r Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of 
Countermeasures pp51. 
7. chorzow Fa c t o r y Case ( M e r i t s ) P C I J Ser A, No 13, p47: as quoted 
by Z o l l e r pp 47. 
8. Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, pp47. 
9. Z o l l e r , Peacetime U n i l a t e r a l Remedies, pp63-67. 
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A measure of reciprocity involves no notion of coercion or punishment. It is 
purely the means for the wronged State to get back on equal terms with the offending 
State. Any measure going beyond pure equivalence becomes an act of coercion and so 
requires legitimisation as a counter-measure. 
3. Counter-Measures 
The circumstances of the case may mean that the taking of a reciprocal act does not or 
would not achieve equality or compliance by the offending State with the international 
norm that has been violated. Where 'the internationally wrongful act is continuous in 
character, insofar as non-performance of a reciprocal obligation may not be serious 
enough to cause the offending party to mend its ways . . . the wronged party will seek 
not only redress for the wrong suffered, but also a return by the law-breaker to 
compliance with the law.'10 The measure then becomes a method of law enforcement. 
Where the purpose of the response exceeds the search for mere reciprocity or 
equivalence, it constitutes a counter-measure. Counter-measures are introduced to 
seek the performance of the breached obligation, and may involve a compensatory 
element. They contain no element of punishment but do exceed the search for the 
restoration of equality in the legal relationship between the States and seek a change of 
behaviour on the part of the offending State. Although the effect of it may be to 
achieve this and even to act as a deterrent to future breaches, a State may not apply the 
counter-measure to any greater extent than is necessary to achieve the restoration of 
legality. A counter-measure which remains in place after performance of the norm has 
been achieved with a view to discouraging future breach is illegal. 
It is this difference between coercing States into performing the breached 
obligation and getting back on equal terms with that State by not performing one's 
obligation that lies at the root of the distinction between counter-measures and acts of 
reciprocity. The right of a State to introduce counter-measures is restricted by the 
conditions established by international law discussed below. In contrast, provided the 
responding act is truly reciprocal, the State requires no other justification than the 
preceding breach of an obligation owed to it by another State. 
The term 'counter-measures' has effectively replaced that of 'reprisals'. The 
most important restriction on the use of such measures is Article 2(4) of the U N 
Charter. It was on the remedy of reprisals that the prohibition on the use of force had 
most impact: for reprisals were generally of a forcible nature until the twentieth 
century. This proscription, of course, did nothing to affect the legality of non-forcible 
reprisals, but perhaps because of the association of reprisals with the use of force, the 
10. I b i d . pp69. 
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word 'counter-measures' has been developed. The term stems from the Air Services 
Award Tribunal (1978)," the International Court of Justice in the Hostages case 
(1980),12 and the International Law Commission in its codification of the rules 
governing state responsibility.13 
It may not always be clear whether the response to the preceding wrongful act 
is a counter-measure or an act of reciprocity. They are both breaches of international 
obligations and have no effect on the existence of the norm which is breached in their 
implementation. They are of the same nature however counter-measures are of a more 
severe form. The relationship is accurately described by Zoller: 
Both reciprocity and reprisals are without bearing on the legal existence of the non-
performed international obligation and cover all international treaty or customary 
obligations. But the main difference is that reprisals unlike reciprocity are not subject to 
equivalence. While reciprocity gives rise to non-performance of an obligation similar (by 
identity or by equivalence) to the violated obligation, reprisals consist in the non-
performance of a different rule . 1 4 
So a counter-measure to the illegal freezing of assets belonging to the nationals of the 
responding State could take the form of the non-performance of a trade treaty. But the 
difficulty in distinguishing between reciprocal acts and counter-measures arises when 
that non-performance is of the same treaty which the offending State has breached. It 
may be problematic to judge whether a particular measure is aimed at equivalence (ie 
act of reciprocity) or at coercion (ie counter-measure). However reciprocity will exist 
'when the obligation involved [is] the same as, or a counterpart of, the obligation 
breached.'15 
4. Sanctions 
There is a growing body of opinion16 which views sanctions as distinct from counter-
measures. It is the distinction between punishment and coercion which lies at the basis 
1 1 . C a s e C o n c e r n i n g t h e A i r s e r v i c e s A g r e e m e n t o f 27 M a r c h 1 9 4 6 , 
1 9 7 8 , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w R e p o r t s V o l 54 1979 p p 3 0 4 . 
1 2 . C a s e C o n c e r n i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s D i p l o m a t i c a n d C o n s u l a r S t a f f i n 
T e h r a n ( J u d g m e n t ) I C J R e p o r t s , 19 8 0 , p p 3 . 
1 3 . I L C Y e a r b o o k 1979 V o l I I P t ( i i ) p p l l 5 . 
1 4 . Z o l l e r , Peacetime unilateral Remedies, pp43 
1 5 . I L C Y e a r b o o k 1984 V o l I I P t ( i i ) pp264 p a r a 3 2 . 
1 6 . Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, p p l 0 6 ; B o w e t t " E c o n o m i c 
C o e r c i o n a n d R e p r i s a l s by s t a t e s " V i r g i n i a Law Journal of 
International Law 13 ( 1 9 7 2 ) p i ; A c e v e d o "The US M e a s u r e s A g a i n s t 
A r g e n t i n a R e s u l t i n g F r o m T h e M a l v i n a s C o n f l i c t " A m e r i c a n Journal 
of international Law 54 ( 1 9 8 4 ) p341 
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of the difference between them. Sanctions are punitive in nature, and consist of such 
measures as oil and arms embargos. Punishment is characterised by final and 
irreversible effects on the victim.17 Measures which carry such effects are not within the 
lawful power of States. For one State does not have the right to punish another. To 
contend the opposite would be to deny the basis of international law: the equality of 
states. The Declaration on the Principles of International Law 197018 proclaims that all 
States enjoy sovereign equality and that one aspect of that is that 'states are juridically 
equal.' One equal is in no legal position to punish another equal. Punishment, if it may 
be imposed at all, may be inflicted only by the international community which, in 
practice, means the United Nations. Measures of a collective nature which impose 
punishment on an individual State are labelled as 'sanctions.' 
The difference was articulated by Professor Bowett in 1972 when he wrote: 
There remains a substantial difference between individual state action by way of reprisal 
and collective organisational action conceived by sanction. The former still rests on a 
delict to the State whereas the latter involves the quite different concept of community 
action to punish delictual action of a quite specific character (ie threat to or breach of 
international peace).19 
Punishment is the sole preserve of international organisations. The most extensive 
measures available and widest competence to enforce them lie with the Security 
Council of the United Nations. It was this punitive jurisdiction which engendered the 
International Law Commission (ILC) in its commentary to Article 30 of its Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility "... to reserve the term sanction for reactive measures 
applied by virtue of a decision taken by an international organisation following a 
breach of an international obligation having serious consequences 
for the international community as a whole.'20 
II . The Legality Of Counter-Measures 
The Portuguese-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in the Naulilaa case stated in 1928: 
17. Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, pp56-59. 
18. General Assembly D e c l a r a t i o n on P r i n c i p l e s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Concerning F r i e n d l y R e l a t i o n s and Co-operation Among s t a t e s I n 
Accordance with The Charter of The United Nations 1970 Gen Resn 
2625 (XXV) Oct 24 1970 (adopted without v o t e ) . 
19. Bowett, Economic Coercion, pp9. 
20. I L C Yearbook 1979 Vol I I Pt ( i i ) ppl21 para ( 2 1 ) . 
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A reprisal is an act of self-help (selbsthifehandlung) by the injured state responding -
after an unsatisfied demand - to an act contrary to international law committed by the 
offending state. It has the effect of suspending momentarily, in relations between the two 
states, the observance of the rule of international law in question ... It would be illegal in 
the absence of a prior act contrary to international law justifying it. Its object is to effect 
reparation from the offending state for the offence or a return to legality by the 
avoidance of further offences.21 
The Tribunal also made reference to the requirement that the counter-measure be 
proportionate to the perpetrated wrong. But the case was heard before the prohibition 
on the use of force. The right of a state to introduce counter-measures is now, 
therefore, dependent on the following conditions being fulfilled: 
i) the counter-measure must be of a non-forcible nature 
ii) it must be in response to a preceding internationally wrongful act 
iii) it must be preceded by an unsatisfied demand for redress 
iv) it must comply with the requirement of proportionality. 
There are circumstances, however, in which a state is restricted in the type of counter-
measure that it may institute, which are examined later. 
1. The Counter-Measure Must Be of a Non-Forcible Nature 
Any action taken by a state, with the exception of the exercise of self-defence, must 
not involve the use of force (Art 2(4) UN Charter). The prohibition is spelt out in the 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law 1970:22 
States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisals involving the use of force. 
It is clear that economic coercion does not equate with 'force', unless perhaps it is 
extremely severe and endangers international peace. 
2. The Counter-Measure Must Be in Response to a Preceding Internationally Wrongful 
Act 
21. N a u l i l a a I n c i d e n t Case 1928 Annual Digest Vol 4, 1927-28, Case 
No 179 pp274. 
22. General Assembly D e c l a r a t i o n on P r i n c i p l e s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law 
Concerning F r i e n d l y R e l a t i o n s and co-operation Among s t a t e s I n 
Accordance w i t h The c h a r t e r Of The United Nations 197 0 Gen Resn 
2625 (XXV) Oct 24 1970 (adopted without v o t e ) . 
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The existence of a wrongful act committed against a State is the fundamental 
requirement for the legitimacy of a counter-measure introduced by that State. Since the 
counter-measure itself is a violation of an international norm, the State initiating it will 
engage international responsibility if there was no previous breach by the other State. 
The formulation of this rule was stated by the International Law Commission in Article 
30 of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility: 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an obligation of that State 
towards another State is precluded if the act constitutes a measure legitimate under 
international law against that other State, in consequence of an internationally wrongful 
act of that other State.23 
An interest of the reacting State must generally have been prejudiced by the wrongful 
act to entitle it to take counter-measures. There is no requirement as to the gravity of 
the breach. A State is permitted to react whatever the severity of the violation in 
general international law. However the breach must be 'material' within the terms of 
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties if the State proposes to 
terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty. 
The only State which may introduce counter-measures is the one whose rights 
have been infringed. On many occasions the provoking breach takes the form of the 
violation of the term of a treaty in which case Article 60 of the Vienna Convention 
applies. On other occasions it will be in breach of general international law such as the 
freezing of assets or breach of humanitarian or maritime law. The origin of the violated 
norm affects neither the right of the State to respond nor the manner in which it does 
so.24 
The nature of the harm sustained can take the form of a direct or indirect injury 
to the State. The first involves the infliction of an injury on the State per se, and so the 
injury carries with it the right to pursue the responsible State. An indirect injury is one 
suffered by an individual who is a national of the State or a corporation which that 
State may represent. The State is able to seek reparation and compliance by way of 
counter-measures from the offending State provided the rules of nationality of claims 
and exhaustion of local remedies are satisfied. For an individual there must be a 
genuine link between him and the State (Nottebohm case).25 The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) affirmed in the Barcelona Traction case26 that the right of diplomatic 
23. I L C Yearbook 1979 Vol I I Pt ( i i ) p p l l 5 . 
24. The employment of any counter-measure i s s u b j e c t to the 
r e s t r i c t i o n s examined on pages 11-13 of t h i s chapter. 
25. Nottebohm case (Second Phase) Judgment,ICJ Reports, 1955 pp4. 
26. Case Concerning The Barcelona T r a c t i o n , L i g h t and Power Company 
L i m i t e d (Second Phase, Judgment) I C J Reports 1970 pp3. 
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protection over a corporation lies with the State 'under the laws of which it is 
incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office'27. Recourse to counter-
measures can be envisaged in response to unlawful expropriation, or the freezing of 
assets of nationals or corporations of the State, or other unlawful treatment of its 
nationals by another State 
There are two notable exceptions to the requirement that the reacting State's 
rights were infringed by the previous illegal act. They are where the act is in breach of 
an erga omnes obligation and where the counter-measures are introduced following 
the passing of a resolution by the UN Security Council under Chapter VI I of the 
Charter. 
International law recognises the existence of certain obligations which a State 
owes towards the international community. 
In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive for 
example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, 
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.28 
However by drawing attention to the fact that international human rights treaties 'do 
not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights 
irrespective of their nationality,'29 the ICJ has limited the scope of reaction of States to 
breaches of these rights to the procedures under specific human rights treaties. It may 
be that action could be taken under the rules of customary international law. Where the 
preceding internationally wrongful act constitutes a breach of an obligation erga omnes 
the State introducing counter-measures does not need to have had its rights directly 
infringed. 
International law may require States to take action, which may resemble 
counter-measures, but which are not categorised as such. In regard to counter-
measures States have a discretion as to whether to introduce them, but where the UN 
Security Council imposes sanctions under the provisions of Chapter VI I of the Charter 
they are under a duty to act. By virtue of Article 25 of the Charter, States are under an 
obligation to carry out any mandatory sanctions passed in accordance with Chapter 
VII . These sanctions may or may not be in response to a breach of international law 
because the Security Council needs to determine only that there is a threat to or there 
has been a breach of the peace - not whether a State has violated international law. 
2 7 . I b i d , a t p a r a 7 0 . 
2 8 . I b i d , a t p a r a 3 3 . 
2 9 . I b i d , a t p a r a 9 1 . 
22 
There is no requirement that the State imposing the sanction should itself be the victim 
of a wrongful act since the measures are introduced by the international community as 
a whole. 
It is pertinent to note the concept of solidarity in multilateral treaties. This 
consists of two notions: solidarity stricto sensu and solidarity lato sensu.30 They cannot 
however be said to have been accepted as part of modern general international law, but 
do provide a possible means for more effective enforcement of international obligations 
since they would provide for joint actions by States. In a multilateral treaty if State A 
breaches the obligation it owes to State B, according to the notion of solidarity stricto 
sensu, the other State parties have the auxiliary right to require State A to perform its 
duty, and can apply counter-measures to coerce it to do so.31 By virtue of the notion of 
solidarity lato sensu, State A is under a secondary duty to State C to perform the 
obligation owed to State B because State C has an interest in upholding the rules of the 
treaty and in preventing misinterpretation by subsequent state practice.32 The concept 
naturally involves deeper considerations than these, but does not yet form part of 
generally accepted international law. 
3. The Counter-Measure Must Be Preceded By an Unsatisfied Demand For Redress 
The Naulilaa case* makes express reference to the requirement that a demand for 
satisfaction must be communicated to the offending State before legitimate counter-
measures can be introduced. Although the United States argued in the Air Services 
Award case34 that such a condition related only to armed reprisals, the Tribunal ruled 
that a State had a right to resort to counter-measures 'within the limits set by the 
general rules of international law pertaining to the use of armed force.'35 Under 
customary international law a prior demand used to be required before a legitimate 
armed reprisal could be launched, and so this extends to peaceful counter-measures. 
Difference of opinion has arisen over the commentary of the International Law 
Commission to Article 30 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It lists four 
requirements for the legitimacy of counter-measures including " . . . that the offence to 
which the reprisals are intended to be a response must not be such as to entail any 
consequences other than to give rise to the right of the injured party to obtain 
30. Hutchinson " S o l i d a r i t y and Breaches of M u l t i l a t e r a l T r e a t i e s " 
B r i t i s h Yearbook of International Law (1988) ppl51-215; ppl56-7. 
31. I b i d . ppl60. 
32. Hutchinson Solidarity ppl65-6. 
33. N a u l i l a a I n c i d e n t Case 1928 Annual Digest Vol 4, 1927-28, Case 
No 179 pp274. 
34. ILR 1979 Vol 54 pp320. 
35. I b i d pp337 para 81. 
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reparation; that if such is the case, the injured party must have made a prior attempt to 
obtain reparation.'36 
Zoller37 interprets this as meaning only those measures involving the search for 
equivalence require a prior demand, while those which go further carry no such 
requirement. However, Elagab38 considers that the distinction relates to delictual and 
'criminal' responsibility of States. He claims that where the counter-measure is solely in 
pursuance of a State's delictual responsibility an unsatisfied demand for redress must 
precede it. 
The question needs to be addressed of how much time can elapse between the 
making of the demand and the introduction of the counter-measures. There can be no 
rule stipulating the exact time limit because of the wide range of situations which can 
arise. The exigencies of one situation in which time is of the essence, such as 
immediate threat to human life, will differ to those in which the circumstances are less 
urgent, such as a trade treaty violation. It is submitted that the concept of 
reasonableness should be applied to each situation on the facts of the case to determine 
whether sufficient time was given for the demand to provide a solution. All the 
circumstances should be considered and, one can agree with Elagab39 that where the 
demand is unlikely to meet with success then counter-measures can be introduced 
almost immediately. 
Professor Bowett40 considers that wider requirements than a mere unsuccessful 
demand for redress are needed. For he has stated that before counter-measures are 
used 'redress by other means must be either exhausted or unavailable.'41 It can be 
appreciated that where the offending State is totally unco-operative and refuses all 
approaches on the matter that a simple demand for redress would satisfy Bowett's 
requirement. 
There are wider circumstances, however, in which it is conceivable that further 
steps have to be pursued before the initiation of counter-measure is permitted. For by 
virtue of Article 2(3) of the UN Charter, Member States 'shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered'. Article 33 commits parties to disputes which are likely to 
endanger international peace and security to seek a solution by peaceful means. This 
can be interpreted generally as a duty to negotiate, at least in the case of disputes 
3 6 . I L C Yearbook 1979 Vol I I Pt ( i i ) p p l l 8 footnote 5 9 5 . 
3 7 . Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, p p l 2 6 . 
3 8 . Elagab The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures In 
International Law p p 6 6 . 
3 9 . I b i d . p p 7 8 . 
4 0 . Bowett, Economic Coercion, p p 9 . 
4 1 . I b i d . p p l O 
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falling into this category. It needs to be asked whether the use of counter-measures is 
precluded until this duty is fulfilled. 
I f the offending State is totally unwilling to co-operate then the legitimacy of 
any counter-measures must be recognised. In the Hostages case42 the ICJ did not rule 
the US measures unlawful because the two parties failed to negotiate. 
The question of whether counter-measures may be used while negotiations for 
the resolution of the dispute are being undertaken was addressed by the Air Services 
Award Tribunal.4* Although the agreement at the source of the dispute contained an 
obligation of continuing consultation, the Tribunal still considered that general 
international law did not exclude the use of counter-measures during negotiations.44 It 
is, of course, possible that a particular agreement would preclude their use in such 
circumstances. But the lack of a more strictly defined duty to negotiate makes it 
doubtful that on its own it can exclude the use of counter-measures. This is clearly 
opposed to Bowett's assertion. 
A second means of achieving redress is the submission of the dispute to judicial 
or arbitral proceedings. Can it be said that where this has occurred the injured State is 
precluded from imposing counter-measures? For i f a matter is sub judice not all means 
of redress have been 'exhausted' or are 'unavailable'. 
The Air Services Award Tribunal was faced directly with this question. While 
acknowledging some sympathy for the assertion that resort to counter-measures is 
unlawful when arbitral or judicial proceedings are taking place, it did not accept it. The 
Tribunal stated: 
If the proceedings form part of an institutional framework ensuring some degree of 
enforcement of obligations, the justification of counter-measures will undoubtedly 
disappear, but owing to the existence of that framework rather than solely on account of 
the existence of arbitral or judicial proceedings as such.45 
Only if a framework satisfying these conditions exists is resort to counter-measures 
prohibited. Otherwise the mere presence or availability of judicial machinery is 
insufficient to deprive the injured State of its right to respond by way of counter-
measures. Until the dispute is actually submitted to that machinery for resolution, 'the 
42. Case Concerning United s t a t e s Diplomatic and Consular s t a f f i n 
Tehran (Judgment) I C J Reports, 19 80, pp3. 
43. Case Concerning the A i r S e r v i c e s Agreement of 27 March 1946, 
197 8, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Reports Vol 54 1979 pp304. 
44. I b i d . pp340 para 91. 
45. I b i d . pp340 para 94. 
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period of negotiation is not over'46 and the rules appertaining to the legitimate use of 
counter-measures apply. 
The Tribunal went on to say that different rules apply once the judicial body is 
seized of the dispute. The case becomes sub judice. It ruled that: 
To the extent that the tribunal has the necessary means to achieve the objectives 
justifying the counter-measures, it must be admitted that the right of the Parties to 
initiate such measures disappears.47 
This means that i f the arbitral or judicial body retains the power to impose interim 
measures of protection on the parties that competence removes the right to implement 
counter-measures and 'may lead to an elimination of existing counter-measures to the 
extent that the tribunal so provides as an interim measure of protection.'48 The Tribunal 
countenanced the possibility that the right to introduce or maintain counter-measures 
would not be removed completely where the power of the arbitral body to grant 
interim measures is narrowly defined.49 
Professor Stein draws the conclusion from the Hostages case that where the 
order for interim measures has been 'flouted by the addressee of the order, the right to 
initiate new non-forcible counter-measures revives.'50 Although the ICJ did expressly 
disapprove of the attempted rescue attempt by the US to free the hostages, it did not 
criticise the non-forcible measures also taken while the Court was preparing its 
judgment, such as a prohibition on Iranian exports. These were taken in contravention 
of the judicial order not to take any action which 'may aggravate the tension between 
the two countries or render the existing dispute more difficult of solution,'51 but were 
not condemned. Iran breached the order by continuing to hold the hostages, and Stein 
suggests that the 'implied condition of reciprocity in every interim measures order' was 
acknowledged by the Court.52 He continues that a State cannot be required to suffer 
on-going prejudice to its interests in the interim, and so [mjeasures not involving the 
use of force are permissible when judicial remedies have been employed and have 
proved unavailing.'53 
46. I b i d . pp340 para 95. 
47. I b i d . pp340 para 96. 
48. I b i d . pp341 para 96. 
49. I b i d . pp341 para 96. 
50. S t e i n "Contempt, C r i s i s and the Court: The world c o u r t and the 
Hostage Rescue Attempt" American Journal of International Law 
(1982) pp499-531. 
51. Case Concerning u n i t e d s t a t e s Diplomatic and Consular s t a f f i n 
Tehran, P r o v i s i o n a l Measures, Order of 15 December 1979, I C J 
Reports 1979 pp7. 
52. S t e i n , Contempt, crisis and the Court, pp517, footnote 79. 
53. I b i d , pp517. 
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It can be concluded that the right to introduce counter-measures is unaffected 
by any duty to negotiate or by the existence of arbitral or judicial machinery. It is only 
when the dispute is submitted to such a body which has effective means of imposing 
interim measures of protection that the right is lost completely. It would, therefore, 
depend on the facts and on the competence of the judicial machinery whether a State is 
lawfully placed to initiate counter-measures. 
4. The Counter-Measure Must Comply with the Requirement of Proportionality 
What was acknowledged by the Tribunal in 1928 in the Naulilaa case54 as a tendency 
'to limit the notion of lawful reprisals and to prohibit excesses' has now developed into 
a general principle of international law. A measure taken in response to an unlawful act 
must 'have some degree of equivalence with the alleged breach.'55 The Air Services 
Award Tribunal recognised this as a 'well-known rule.'56 
Proportionality differs from equivalence. Equivalence can only be achieved 
where the wrongful act and counter-measure have a relationship which is capable of 
exact evaluation.57 This would usually be expressed in terms of money or monetary 
value. So where the reacting State has an obligation which is the same as the obligation 
breached by the offending State equivalence can be achieved by non-performance of 
that duty as a response. This is the essence of the act of reciprocity. 
Proportionality is the requirement where either equivalence cannot be achieved 
or the State decides to react by way of counter-measure rather than by reciprocity. It 
does not require a response exactly the same as the violated obligation, but the 
counter-measure must bear some correlation to the violation.58 Proportionality applies 
where the wrongful act and the response are violations of obligations which are not in 
a relationship which is capable of exact evaluation. As the Air Services Award 
Tribunal stated the task of assessing proportionality can at best be accomplished by 
'approximation.'59 
The requirement can also be stated in terms that the response must not be 
disproportionate to the wrongful act. The concept of proportionality, like that of 
reasonableness, is fairly wide in scope. This means that there may be a band of 
measures which may all be proportionate varying in degrees of consequences. 
Compared to equivalence, in the case of proportionality there is a wider scope of what 
54. N a u l i l a a I n c i d e n t Case 1928 Annual Digest Vol 4, 1927-28, Case 
No 179 pp274. 
55. ILR 1979 Vol 54 pp338 para 83. 
56. I b i d , pp338 para 83. 
57. Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, pp49. 
58. Elagab, Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures, pp94. 
59. ICR 1979 Vol 54 pp338 para 83. 
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is acceptable since one can only approximate. In other words it is only when a measure 
is clearly disproportionate that the rule of proportionality has been breached. 
There can be no fail-safe list of criteria to be applied when judging the 
proportionality of a measure. It is clear that proportionality can be qualitative as well 
as quantitative. This distinction was drawn by Professor Riphagen in the work of the 
ILC. 6 0 Quantitative proportionality relates to the substance of the counter-measure, 
while qualitative proportionality concerns types of behaviour.61 
While normally the concept of proportionality is attributed to the substance of 
the wrongful act and counter-measure, the Air Services Award Tribunal initiated 
another way of looking at it. This is illustrative of the wide scope of the notion of 
proportionality for it can be examined from different angles to ensure the presence of 
correlation: 
In the Tribunal's view it is essential, in a dispute between States, to take into account not 
only the injuries suffered by the companies concerned but also the importance of 
questions of principle arising from the alleged breach. The Tribunal thinks that it will 
not suffice, in the present case, to compare the losses suffered by Pan Am on account of 
the suspension of the projected services with the losses which the French companies 
would have suffered as a result of the counter-measures; it will also be necessary to take 
into account the importance of the positions of principle which were taken when the 
French authorities prohibited changes of gauge in third countries.62 
The effect of this is to look at not just the losses incurred because of the breach and 
counter-measures as they affect the loss of business to the airlines, but also at the 
wider results of the measures on how they affect the States concerned.63 So with 
regard to the general air transport policy of the United States and its implementation, 
the Tribunal concluded that the American counter-measures were not disproportionate 
to the wrongful act of France. This gives rise to a wider appreciation of the dispute and 
to a wider perspective in deciding on the issue of proportionality. 
III . Restrictions On Counter-Measures 
The legitimacy of counter-measures is subject to other rules of international law. These 
forbid the use of certain types of counter-measures, and their use generally in certain 
60. Fourth Report on P a r t 2 & 3 of D r a f t A r t i c l e s on S t a t e 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ppl5 para 41. 
61. Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, ppl31. 
62. ILR 1979 Vol 54 pp338 para 83. 
63. Elagab, Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures, pp91. 
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circumstances. For reprisals which violate a rule of jus cogens, or which violate a norm 
of a humanitarian treaty or which offend against the rules of diplomatic relations are 
illegal. Other constraints exist but those mentioned constitute the most important. 
1. Jus Cogens 
The recognition of the existence of rules of jus cogens establishes a hierarchy 
of international legal norms. International obligations of States of both treaty and 
customary origin may not conflict with peremptory norms. Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 defines a peremptory norm as one 'accepted 
and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character.' The work of the 
International Law Commission indicates that the idea of jus cogens is part of the 
general law of state responsibility and is not restricted to the law of treaties. 
The exact content of the rules of jus cogens is still being evolved, but there is 
general recognition of certain rules having the status of peremptory norms. Examples 
offered during the contemplations of the International Law Commission included the 
illegal use of force, genocide, piracy, and the slave trade.64 Professor Brownlie65 quotes 
the section of judgment of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case66 referring to 
obligations owed 'towards the international community as a whole' - ie not to engage in 
acts of aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination - as examples of rules of 
jus cogens.67 He also adds the principle of sovereignty over natural resources and that 
of self-determination.68 
The effect of the supremacy of such rules is that counter-measures which 
violate them are unlawful, and the State which does so engages international 
responsibility. In addition counter-measures cannot be introduced to obtain 
performance of an international obligation which violates a rule of jus cogens. 
2. Human Rights Norms 
64. I L C Yearbook 1966 Vol I I pp248. 
65. Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 4th E d i t i o n 
pp513. 
66. Barcelona T r a c t i o n Company Case I C J Reports 1970, ppl8. 
67. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e used such norms as examples 
of o b l i g a t i o n s erga omnes, and i t i s important to recognise the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between them and r u l e s of j u s cogens. 
68. Brownlie, P r i n c i p l e s . , pp513. 
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Despite the lack of clarity as to the content of the rules of jus cogens, certain 
fundamental human rights, eg freedom from genocide and slavery, constitute 
peremptory norms. But even beyond these norms, human rights obligations act as a 
restriction on the legitimacy of counter-measures. This is because of their exceptional 
standing. Meron expresses this succinctly: 
Conceptually, counter-measures are based on the principle of interstate reciprocity, 
which, generally speaking, is foreign to human rights.69 
The 'application of the obligations by one party does not depend on the application of 
the obligations by another party.'70 The increased awareness of the need to protect 
human rights has led to the evolution of the principle that they cannot be breached by a 
State as a form of counter-measure. The rule found expression in Article 60 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. It states that the rules governing the 
termination or suspension of a treaty 'do not apply to provisions relating to the 
protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in 
particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by 
such treaties'. This is also a rule of customary international law since the provisions of 
Article 60 'may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary 
law of the subject.'71 
In his dissenting opinion to the South West Africa Cases,72 Judge Tanaka said 
that 'the principle of the protection of human rights has received recognition as a legal 
norm under three main sources of international law, namely (1) international 
conventions, (2) international custom, (3) the general principles of law.'73 It is in these 
that the rule has its origin. The result of its application is that no State may violate 
human rights norms under any circumstances. So, rightly, one State may not respond 
to the torture of its nationals by torturing nationals of the offending State. Human 
rights may not be suspended or temporarily breached. The fundamental human rights 
are obligations erga omnes, and so any State can respond to their breach by taking 
counter-measures which do not themselves violate a humanitarian norm. 
3. Rules of Diplomatic Relations 
69. Meron "Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law" 
pp238-239. 
70. Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, pp90. 
71. L e g a l Consequences f o r S t a t e s of the Continued Presence of South 
A f r i c a i n Namibia (South West A f r i c a ) I C J Reports 1971 pp47. 
72. south west A f r i c a , Second Phase, Judgment, I C J Reports 1966, 
pp6, pp300. 
73. I b i d pp300, quoted by Elagab, op. c i t . , p plOl. 
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The law relating to diplomatic immunities and privileges, as enounced in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations 1963, has been ruled to constitute a self-contained legal regime. In the 
Hostages case.14 the ICJ addressed the question of whether the actions of Iran 
constituted a response to alleged crimes of which the latter accused the United States 
in a letter to the Court, such as conspiracy by the CIA in a coup d'etat in 1953 and the 
restoration of the Shah in Iran. The ICJ stated that even if the crimes had been 
committed by the United States (no proof was proffered), the act of Iran in supporting 
the holding of the American embassy staff could not be regarded as a legitimate 
counter-measure to the American actions. 'This is because diplomatic law itself 
provides the necessary means of defence against, and sanction for, illicit activities by 
members of diplomatic or consular missions.'75 
The existence of these means precludes the legality of counter-measures which 
are violations of diplomatic law. The inviolability of the diplomatic agent and premises, 
inter alia, cannot be departed from in the form of a counter-measure. Any breach of 
diplomatic law has to be dealt with in accordance with that legal regime, and its rules 
cannot be violated in response. 
Some scholars have questioned the conclusion reached by the Court. But 
Professor Riphagen, Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility to the ILC, included 
the following Draft Article 12 in Part Two of the Draft Articles:76 
Articles 8 and 9 do not apply to the suspension of obligations 
a) of the receiving State regarding the immunities to be accorded to diplomatic and 
consular missions and staff77 
Draft Articles 8 and 9 relate to the right of States to take reciprocal acts or counter-
measures in response to a wrongful act. Mr Riphagen stated that it was due to the 
ICJ's judgment in the Hostages case was the reason for including subparagraph (a) of 
Draft Article 12.78 In answer, Mr Reuter did not consider that the only response to a 
breach of diplomatic privileges and immunities is the breaking off of diplomatic 
relations or to declare certain individuals persona non grata. He took the view that 'in 
so far as more general obligations such as humanitarian obligations were not involved, 
the injured State could respond in kind to a manifest violation of the rules on privileges 
74. Case Concerning United s t a t e s Diplomatic and Consular S t a f f i n 
Tehran (Judgment) I C J Reports, 1980, pp3. 
75. I b i d . pp38 para 83. 
76. ILC Yearbook 1984 Vol I p260. 
77. I b i d . pp260. 
78. I L C Yearbook 1984 Vol I pp263 para 27 & 28. 
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and immunities. For instance, in the event of the violation of a unanimously accepted 
rule concerning the diplomatic bag, the injured State should be entitled to act in the 
same way as the State responsible for the violation. In such circumstances, the regime 
of privileges and immunities did not seem to be particularly self-contained.'79 
Professor Simma80 subscribes to the same view and considered the 
categorisation of the rules of diplomatic immunity as a self-contained regime to be 
'jurisprudential overkill.'81 This is because that system falls back on general 
international law in allowing the temporary detention of a diplomatic agent caught in 
flagrante delicto, in the non-exclusion of self-defence; or, in exceptional 
circumstances, in the permissibility of the taking of measures to prevent the diplomatic 
agent from committing offences. 
The judgment of the ICJ that diplomatic privileges and immunities can be 
abused as a form of counter-measure has not been universally accepted. Within the 
International Law Commission itself members differed on the accuracy of the ruling. In 
its report to the General Assembly on the work of its thirty-sixth session82 the 
Commission stated that some members 'questioned the rule as proposed in too general 
a way.83 As written in the report of the following year, the suggestion was later made 
that its scope should be limited to such immunities as were essential for the 
continuance of smooth international relations.84 
IV. Counter-Measures And The Law Of Treaties 
The preceding discussion has concerned the customary international law which 
governs the legitimacy of counter-measures. The obligations which are often breached 
as a form of response are, however, treaty provisions. The law of treaties was codified 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. This constitutes a separate 
legal regime and so it becomes important to consider the relationship between these 
rules and the customary law of counter-measures. 
Article 60 of the Convention is the provision governing the 'termination or 
suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach.' Discussion is 
facilitated by examining termination and suspension separately in a comparison with 
counter-measures. 
79. I b i d . pp264 para 30. 
80. Simma "Sel f - C o n t a i n e d Regimes" Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 1984 p p l l l . 
81. I b i d . ppl21. 
82. I L C Yearbook 1984 Vol I I Pt ( i i ) pp99. 
83. I b i d . ppl03 para 374. 
84. I L C Yearbook 1985 Vol I I Pt ( i i ) p23 para 142. 
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1. Termination 
One of the effects of the termination of a treaty carried out in accordance with the 
Convention is that it 'releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the 
treaty' (Art 70(1)). In other words neither party is any longer under a legal duty to 
perform the treaty term, and so cannot be forced to comply with it. This then makes 
impossible the classification of the termination of a treaty as a counter-measure. For 
the precise purpose of the latter is to attempt to obtain compliance with an 
international norm. I f the response to a breach of a treaty is to terminate that 
agreement then the offending State is released from its obligations under the 
instrument, and so compliance cannot be achieved. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, termination of a treaty under Article 60 is not a 
counter-measure. Zoller reaches the same conclusion by invoking the idea of 
punishment and its incompatibility with the concept of counter-measures85. 
Termination is of a different legal regime to that of counter-measures. 
2. Suspension 
The same clear-cut distinction cannot be drawn between the suspension of treaties and 
counter-measures. It needs to be asked whether the provisions of Article 60 of the 
Convention are to be classified as counter-measures or whether they too under a 
different legal regime. 
The two concepts are, at least, closely related because they both involve the 
temporary non-application of a legal obligation. Article 72 states that, unless otherwise 
is stipulated by the agreement or is agreed by the parties, the suspension of a treaty: 
a) releases the parties between which the operation of the treaty is suspended from the 
obligation to perform the treaty in their mutual relations during the period of 
suspension. 
b) does not otherwise affect the legal relations between the parties established by the 
treaty. 
This means that in the cases of both the suspension of a treaty - in whole or in part -
and a counter-measure, there is a temporary dispensation from fulfilling the legal norm 
in question. But the legal effects are different. 
The suspension of a treaty under Article 60 has effect on the very existence of 
the treaty. The suspended provisions are temporarily denied any legal force and the 
85. Zol-ler, Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures, p73. 
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States are released for the period of suspension from complying with them. However 
during that time they must 'refrain from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the 
operation of the treaty' (Art 72(2)). 
Counter-measures do not release the parties - temporarily or otherwise - from 
the binding nature of the norm violated in response to the unlawful act. Whereas above 
the provisions are suspended, here they are merely non-performed. The offending State 
must continue to apply the treaty or norm which has been breached in the form of 
response; and so must the injured State outside of the strict limits of the counter-
measure. 
The legal effects are different, but when is the non-application of a treaty a 
suspension and when is it a counter-measure? The answer lies in the concept of 
'material breach' in Article 60 of the Convention. Under this provision, the operation in 
whole or in part of a treaty may be terminated or suspended only i f there has been a 
'material breach' by the other State (or another in the case of multilateral treaties). 
'Material breach' is defined in Article 60(3) as: 
a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention 
or 
b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of 
the treaty. 
It is only in the case of a serious breach that the innocent party is entitled to suspend 
the treaty. This differs from counter-measures which, as stated, can be initiated in 
response to any breach however minor. 
A prima facie answer to the question would then be that suspension of a treaty 
under Article 60 applies only to material breaches, whereas counter-measures apply to 
both material and non-material breaches. There would seem to be an overlap of 
operation whereby in the case of material breaches non-application of the treaty could 
either be a counter-measure or suspension within the meaning of Article 60. This gives 
rise to an interesting debate the result of which is not clear. 
It is established, however, that where the international wrongful act consists in 
the violation of a term of a treaty which does not fall within the definition of 'material 
breach', the victim State can legitimately introduce counter-measures. 
The problems arise with regard to material breaches. Professor Harris86 states 
the view that the Vex specialis in the customary international law of treaties' replaces 
the law of counter-measures. But he recognises that the International Law Commission 
86. H a r r i s Cases and Materials on International Law 4th E d i t i o n 
ppl5. 
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(responsible for the draft Vienna Convention) may have intended the two legal regimes 
should exist side by side. 
Elagab justifies his assertion for their co-existence on the basis that Article 73 
ensures that the provisions of the Convention have not superseded the law of counter-
measures.87 That Article states that the Convention's provisions 'shall not prejudice any 
question that may arise from international responsibility of a State'. According to 
Elagab, by interpreting Article 60(3 )(a) to conform with the limitation of Article 73, 
'the non-performance of a treaty obligation as a lawful counter-measure can never 
constitute a material breach for the purposes of Article 60.188 
Zoller also takes the view that the Convention left the right to invoke the 
principle of reciprocity in the law of treaties untouched.89 She refers to the Hostages 
case.90 'The Court firmly refused to conclude that the counter-measures taken by the 
United States in response to "what the United States believed to be grave and manifest 
violations of the 1955 Treaty itself could have "in any effect" affected the legal 
existence of the treaty between the parties.'91 Accordingly Zoller sees no need in 
distinguishing between material and non-material breaches because reciprocity is of 
'general application.'92 
The Vienna Convention, in its preamble, states that 'the rules of customary 
international law will continue to govern questions not regulated by the provisions of 
the present Convention'. It can, therefore, be properly said that where a State is faced 
with the 'material' breach (within the definition of Article 60) of a given treaty it has a 
choice of suspending that treaty or of initiating counter-measures. Legitimate 
suspension will only take place if the procedural requirements of the Vienna 
Convention (Art 65-68) are complied with, which is a lengthy operation (minimum of 
three months, except in special emergency). But, as Sinclair points out, 'the aggrieved 
party must continue compliance with a treaty which the other party is violating, while 
the protracted procedure of dispute settlement is in progress.'93 Sinclair refers to the 
possibility illustrated by Jimenez de Arechaga94 that the principle of inadimplenti non 
est adimplentwn would permit the responding State to 'suspend provisionally its own 
performance of the treaty.' The latter goes on that the injured State puts itself in danger 
of engaging international responsibility i f the dispute settlement procedure ends in the 
87. Elagab, Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures, ppl57. 
88. I b i d . ppl57. 
89. Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, ppl8. 
90. Case Concerning United S t a t e s Diplomatic and Consular S t a f f i n 
Tehran (Judgment) I C J Reports, 1980, pp3. 
91. Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, ppl8. 
92. I b i d . ppl8. 
93. S i n c l a i r The Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties 2nd 
E d i t i o n ppl89. 
94. o f f i c i a l Records F i r s t s e s s i o n 49th Meeting. 
35 
conclusion that there was no material breach by the other State. This respectfully 
cannot be so. For legitimate counter-measures can be taken even in the case of non-
material breaches by the other party. 
The State faced with the choice of suspending the treaty which has been 
'materially' breached and of introducing counter-measures needs also to consider the 
scope of both. This is in addition to the different legal consequences. For a State has 
more scope for action with counter-measures. The reprisal taken can be breach of a 
treaty which is separate from the one violated. It is conceivable that this could amount 
to the suspension of the second treaty. But the procedural requirements of the 
Convention would not apply because it would be undertaken under the law of counter-
measures. Article 60 only relates to the suspension of the treaty of which there has 
been a material breach.95 
This invites the question of whether the breach of one treaty justifies the 
termination of a different treaty by the responding State. This is a different question to 
the termination of the breached treaty because in the present scenario the breached 
obligation remains in existence and the purpose of obtaining due performance of it is 
still open. By analogy, according to Zoller's argument,96 because such a termination 
would have final effects on the offending State such a measure would constitute 
punishment and would be impermissible as a counter-measure. The issue cannot, 
however, be regarded as closed. 
Suspension in accordance with Article 60 has, like counter-measures, no 
requirement of equivalence, but it must be proportionate to the material breach in 
compliance with the general rules of international law. 
V. The Standing Of Third Parties 
A counter-measure is only lawful i f it is introduced against a State which has 
previously breached an international obligation. I f the imposing State aims its measure 
against a State which has not breached a norm, the former will engage international 
responsibility.97 But the situation is more likely to arise where the counter-measure is 
not intended to affect an innocent State, but does so. The question to be addressed is 
what duty, if any, does the reacting State owe to that third State. 
95. Elagab, Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures, pl58: where 
he quotes Mr de Luna of the I L C commenting on D r a f t A r t i c l e 20 
"Termination or Suspension of a Treaty Following upon i t s 
Breach." 
96. Z o l l e r , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies, pp56-59. 
97. The Cysne Case 1930 Annual Di g e s t Vol V 1929-30 Case No 287 487. 
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In its commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,98 the 
International Law Commission (ILC) did not consider whether the injury caused to a 
third State invalidated the legitimacy of a counter-measure. But given the complex 
inter-state relations and inter-dependence which exist today it is not reasonable to 
contend that injury to a third parties should render an otherwise legitimate counter-
measure as illegal. Reed" suggests that a distinction should be drawn between 'severe' 
and 'non-severe' injuries along the lines of 'material breach' within the meaning of 
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.100 According to her 
counter-measures which result in 'severe' injuries on a third State should be rendered 
invalid. 
In any case the responding State has inflicted injury on an innocent State and 
thus engages an obligation of reparation towards it. The ELC stated in its commentary 
that 'the legitimate application of a sanction against a given State can in no event 
constitute per se a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of an infringement of a 
subjective international right of a third State against which no sanction was justified.'101 
The imposing State has a duty to compensate the third State for any injuries caused. I f 
it fails to do so the injured third party may introduce counter-measures of its own. 1 0 2 
V I . Sanctions and the UN Security CounciE 
The nearest that the international community has come to centralising reaction to 
internationally wrongful acts is the Security Council of the United Nations. The right 
of the individual State to introduce counter-measures and the competence of the 
Security Council to implement sanctions co-exist. The conditions of legality differ 
greatly. 
The Security Council possesses a recommendatory and a mandatory role. 
These powers are examined in the context of its ability to initiate sanctions. 
1. Chapter V I of the UN Charter 
The binding nature of resolutions of the Security Council taken under Chapter V I has 
been the subject of academic discussion and judicial pronouncement for some time. 
98. I L C Yearbook 1979 Vol I I Pt ( i i ) p87 
99. Reed "Reviewing the Doctrine of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures: 
R e s o l v i n g the E f f e c t of T h i r d - P a r t y I n j u r i e s " 29 Virginia Journal 
of International Law (1988) ppl75-209. 
100. I b i d . ppl82-83. 
101. ILC Yearbook 1979 Vol I I Pt ( i i ) ppl20 para 18. 
102. Elagab, Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures, p p l l 3 . 
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The practice of the Security Council has led to the view that they are not binding on 
Member States. But the Charter is not couched in such terms. 
The question revolves around Article 25 by virtue of which Member States are 
bound 'to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.' In the context of 
sanctions the Council may act under Chapter V I (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or 
Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression). It is generally recognised that resolutions under Chapter VII are 
mandatory, but questions surround those taken under Chapter VI . 
The advisory opinion of the ICJ in the Namibia casem provides authority that 
Article 25 applies to Chapter VI . 
It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement 
measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. It is not possible to find in the 
Charter any support for this view. Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to 
enforcement action but applies to 'the decisions of the Security Council' adopted in 
accordance with the Charter. Moreover that Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, but 
immediately after Article 24 in that part of the Charter which deals with the functions 
and powers of the Security Council.104 
As a result it is possible for Article 36 (1) to be used as the basis for a resolution 
which the Member States are bound to implement. That Article, placed within Chapter 
VI , empowers the Security Council to 'recommend appropriate procedures or methods 
of adjustment' to resolve disputes between Member States the continuance of which 'is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security' (Art 33). This 
would be the basis in Chapter V I on which sanctions would be recommended or 
imposed. The Article is set in terms of 'recommendation' and so how is it to be 
determined whether the resolution is a 'decision' within the meaning of Article 25? 
The ICJ adopted a teleological approach in the Namibia case and stated: 
The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before 
a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers 
under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be 
determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, 
103. L e g a l Consequences f o r s t a t e s of the continued Presence i n 
Namibia (South West A f r i c a ) notwithstanding S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l 
R e s o l u t i o n 276 (1971), Advisory Opinion, I C J Reports, 1971, ppl6. 
104. L e g a l Consequences f o r s t a t e s of the continued Presence i n 
Namibia (South West A f r i c a ) notwithstanding S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l 
R e s o l u t i o n 276 (1971), Advisory Opinion, I C J Reports, 1971, ppl6, 
pp52 T53. 
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the discussion leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all 
circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of 
the Security Council.'05 
Thus a resolution under which the Council 'solemnly calls upon all Member States'106 or 
'recommends' would be purely recommendatory, whereas those in which it 'requires' or 
'demands' would be mandatory. It is important to ensure that the Council is not acting 
under Chapter VII since it has used language such as 'calls upon' having determined the 
existence of a threat to the peace in which case the resolution is binding.107 
The ICJ decided that the Security Council resolution which it was concerned 
with in the Namibia case had as its legal basis neither Chapter V I or VII but Article 
24. The Court approvingly cited the statement of the Secretary General to the 
Security Council of 10 January 1947 that 'the powers of the Council under 24 are not 
restricted to the specific grants of authority contained in Chapters VI , VII , VI I I and 
X I I . . . the Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council 
powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. The only limitations are the fundamental principles and purposes found in 
Chapter I of the Charter.'108 The method of interpretation stated above apply to 
resolutions based on this article as much as any other. 
The legal consequences of a Security Council resolution will differ according to 
whether that resolution is binding or recommendatory. I f sanctions are introduced in 
terms of a mandatory resolution, the State is required to apply them, even though this 
may involve breaching obligations owed to the State against which the sanctions have 
been imposed. The consequences are the same as those examined under Chapter V I I 
resolutions below, and involve no international responsibility. 
I f the sanctions are merely recommended it remains within the discretion of 
each Member State whether to implement them. But a question remains over its 
international responsibility to the State which is the subject of the recommendation. 
The sanction has only been recommended and not authorised. The State is under no 
'obligation' within the terms of Article 103, and so the resolution would take 
precedence. This means that i f the implementing State owes a treaty obligation to 
supply weapons to the State against which an arms embargo has been recommended it 
would engage international responsibility i f it did not fulfil the terms of the treaty. 
However in its commentary to the draft articles on state responsibility the ILC stated 
105. I b i d . pp53. 
106. R e s o l u t i o n 181 (1963) Doc S/5386. 
107. R e s o l u t i o n 221 (1986) imposing o i l s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t Southern 
Rhodesia. 
108. Namibia case I C J Reports (1971) pp52. 
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that compulsory sanctions are not wrongful since they are adopted in accordance with 
the Charter and that '[t]his view would moreover, seem to be valid not only where the 
duly adopted decision of the Organisation authorising the application of a sanction is 
mandatory for the Member States but also where the taking of such measures is merely 
recommended.M09 The matter would then still seem to be open to debate, but it is of 
great practical importance to States considering the application of sanctions 
recommended by the Security Council. The better view would be that such States 
would not avoid international responsibility where the sanctions are merely 
recommended. 
2. Chapter VI I of the UN Charter 
The UN Charter endows the Security Council with the power to bind Member States 
where there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The 
Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security (Art 24) and is given the means to perform that function in the provisions of 
Chapter VII . The positioning of Article 48 within that Chapter strengthens the 
provision in Article 25. 1 1 0 The obligation of Article 48 to carry out the decision of the 
Security Council applies only when the resolution includes 'required action.' The 
essence of this concept is the difference between mandatory and authoritative 
resolutions. In discussing the role of the provision in the Security Council resolutions 
on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Oscar Schacter states: 
[T]he sanctions not involving the use of force imposed by Resolution 661 under Article 
41 are given obligatory effect by Article 48 . . . [It] was not applicable, however, to the 
use of armed force authorised by the Council in Resolution 678 . . . Hence, by its own 
terms Article 48 did not apply to such permissive action, whereas it did apply to the 
mandatory economic and transportation embargoes required of all members.111 
The Council may not take any action until it has made a determination under 
Article 39. The organ has to 'determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace or act of aggression' before it is permitted to impose measures under the 
terms of Chapter VI I . 
109. I L C Yearbook 1979 Vol I I Pt ( i i ) p p l l 9 para 14. 
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Article 39 states that once the Security Council has done this it shall 'make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42 to maintain international peace and security.' Such recommendations do not 
bind States, but the Council can continue with a search for peaceful resolution of the 
dispute, even alongside enforcement action taken under Chapter V I I . 1 1 2 
The Charter enables measures to be taken which do not involve the use of 
force. Article 41 is the basis for the introduction of non-forcible measures such as 
economic sanctions. The sole conditions for their introduction are compliance with 
Article 39 and fulfilment of the voting provisions of the Charter. The requirements for 
the valid introduction of counter-measures have no relevance. States are under an 
obligation to implement such measures as are agreed by the Security Council. Article 
41 includes a non-exhaustive list of possible measures which are the complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
The implementation of Security Council resolutions under Chapter VI I is 
through the Member States. The obligation to give effect to the resolutions means that 
Member States must accommodate their internal law to be able to do so."3 Through 
their constitutional process States must apply the decisions even though that may 
involve breaching existing agreements or duties owed to the State against which the 
Security Council has imposed the sanctions. There is no question of responsibility 
arising to that State for breach of the obligations because the duty to implement the 
sanctions will take precedence over the obligation owed to the offending State. This 
was reaffirmed in the ruling of the ICJ in the request by Libya for the indication of 
provisional measures against the United States and United Kingdom in relation to the 
latter's demand for Libya to hand over two individuals suspected of involvement in the 
bombing of Flight 103 over Lockerbie.114 The Court was faced with the question of 
whether the provisions of the Montreal Convention115 under which Libya had 
jurisdiction to deal with the accused or whether a Security Council mandatory 
resolution requiring Libya to hand the individuals to the USA or UK should take 
precedence. The ICJ stated that 'in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the 
obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other 
international agreement including the Montreal Convention.'116 
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Article 41 gives examples of the substance of sanctions that can be introduced, 
but it needs to be asked if there are any limits to the power of the Security Council. 
Article 39 provides that the measures to be imposed have the purpose 'to maintain 
international peace and security.' The Council is constrained by this purpose and 
cannot act outside it. It has been argued that this does not confer on the Security 
Council the power to punish States because the measure it imposes can be terminated 
or lifted. Zoller states that '[A]s the Charter of the United Nations stands, the 
contention that the organs of the United Nations may resort to sanctions has no sound 
legal base.'"7 She accepts that it may introduce counter-measures, but not sanctions in 
their true punitive nature. 
It is true that the Security Council is limited by the Charter of the UN. But the 
constituent treaty gives the organ the power to take measures to maintain international 
peace and security. This can conceivably include the punishment of States. It is correct 
to say: 
Although compulsive measures may be purely remedial, ie limited to the restoration of 
the status quo ante, they need not be so. They may be in the nature of a penal sanction. 
Thus conceived they give expression to the correct view that certain manifestations of 
unlawful conduct on the part of sovereign States are liable both to repression and to 
punishment by the collective efforts of the general international organisation.118 
It is within the competence of the Security Council to impose measures which inflict 
final effects upon States, which is Zoller's view of punishment.119 
The exercise of this penal competence is evident in such recent resolution as 
Resolution 687 (1991). Acting under Chapter VI I , the Security Council decided, inter 
alia, that 'Iraq shall unconditionally agree' not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-
weapons-usable-material; to place such under effective control of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency; to provide details of their location; and to accept on-site 
inspection and destruction of such materials. The resolution refers to Iraq's breaches of 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968. The measures taken 
under this resolution are of a punitive character and are legitimate because the Security 
Council had 'its objective of restoring international peace and security.'120 
VII. Conclusion!] 
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The regulation of the use of counter-measures is now clearly defined and is a relatively 
well developed area of international law. The unsatisfactory nature of the enforcement 
of the law left in the hands of States is the potential for greater exertion of this right by 
those in a stronger economic position at the expense of poorer States. A centralised 
method of enforcement would have to be developed for the inequality to be eliminated. 
This Chapter has concentrated on the right of States to enforce international 
law, but international organisations are equally entitled to protect their own interests 
within the terms of their constituent treaty. They are restricted by the same conditions 
of application of counter-measures to which States are subjected. The European 
Community is a particular and unique international body. The economic interests of the 
Member States and the methods available to protect those interests are closely tied to 
the organisation. This engenders particular problems when the interests of an individual 
Member State are infringed and in the relationship between the EC and the UN 
Security Council when the latter exercises its sanction-imposing competence. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND T H E APPLICATION OF COUNTER-
MEASURES AND SANCTIONS BY T H E EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
L Sanctions 
The competence to impose sanctions lies in the hands of the United Nations Security 
Council on the basis of the Charter but the EC may not do so because its constitutive 
treaties do not provide it with the power to initiate them. The nature of the UN system 
requires implementation of its decisions by its members and by other international 
organisations. The purpose of this section is to examine whether the Community may 
be required or authorised under international law to implement United Nations 
sanctions. This raises two major questions: 
i) Can the EC introduce measures of the nature of those listed in Article 41 of the UN 
Charter without the authorisation of the Security Council? 
ii) Is the EC bound by Security Council resolutions? 
The need to consider these questions stems from the precedence of the UN 
Charter over the EC constituent treaties secured by Article 103 of the Charter and by 
Article 234 of the EEC treaty. The obligations owed by the Member States to the UN 
supersede those owed to the EC. 
1. Prior Authorisation of the Security Council 
Article 53 of the Charter permits the use of'regional arrangements or agencies' by the 
Security Council for the 'enforcement action.' It also provides that: 
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or 
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of 
the Security Council. 
The prohibition in the second sentence of the Article raises the question whether the 
EC as a potential 'regional arrangement or agency1 is prevented from taking economic 
measures against a third State without Security Council authorisation. For it to be so 
restricted, the Community would have to fall within the definition of 'regional 
arrangement or agency' and the economic measures would have to be considered to 
constitute 'enforcement action' within the terms of the Charter. 
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i) Enforcement Action 
'Enforcement action' is not defined in the Charter, but a comparison of the use of the 
phrase in other provisions provides some light on its true meaning. The same 
terminology is used in Articles 2(5), 5 and 45. The first two Articles merely deal with 
obligations and rights of States against which the UN is taking 'preventative or 
enforcement action.' Article 45 requires Member States to 'hold immediately available 
national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action.' This 
clearly aimed at Article 42 measures, but it does not exclude non-forcible enforcement 
action falling under Article 53. 
The Charter uses the phrase 'enforcement measures' in Articles 2(7) and 50, 
and probably bears the same meaning as 'enforcement action.'121 Article 2(7) provides 
that the principle of non-interference by the UN in the domestic jurisdiction of any 
State 'shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VI I . ' 
This again is inconclusive. More illuminating is the drafting of Article 50 which enables 
States confronted with 'special economic problems' due to carrying out 'prevention or 
enforcement measures' taken against another State by the Security Council to consult 
the Council with regard to a solution. A request for such consultation was received 
from Jordan and from Bulgaria following the adoption of Resolution 661 (1990)122 
which imposed economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait. These were considered 
before any measures falling under Article 42 were adopted by the Security Council. In 
this context economic sanctions were treated as 'enforcement measures.' 
The terms of the Charter are not totally conclusive, but there is some indication 
that economic sanctions were intended to fall within the definition of 'enforcement 
action.' However Security Council practice has not borne this out. 
In 1960 the Security Council discussed, at the request of the Soviet Union, 
whether it should authorise the sanctions imposed by the Organisation of American 
States against the Dominican Republic.1 2 3 The USSR argued that the sanctions 
constituted 'enforcement action' within in the meaning of Article 53. The Security 
Council, however, approved a draft resolution proposed by the United States by which 
it merely 'took note' of the OAS measures. The US, supported by the majority of the 
Security Council, considered that 'enforcement action* only related to military action. 
121 Akehurst "Enforcement A c t i o n By Regional Agencies with s p e c i a l 
Reference To The O r g a n i s a t i o n Of American S t a t e s " 42 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1967) ppl75-227; ppl85. 
122. Adopted 6 August 1990. 
123. Akehurst, Enforcement Action, ppl90-192. 
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In 1962 Cuba asked the Security Council to refer to the International Court of 
Justice seven questions on the legality of sanctions imposed against it by the OAS. 
There was a separate vote on the meaning of 'enforcement action' and a number of 
members of the Council used the Dominican Republic affair as a precedent. The 
majority again considered that Security Council authorisation is only required for 
action involving the use of force, and defeated the contrary draft meaning by 7 votes to 
4. 
The results of these Security Council votes and debates show that it is 
extremely unlikely that in the future it will regard 'enforcement action' to include 
economic sanctions. This is due more to the practice of the majority of the then 
members of the Security Council than to a universally expressed interpretation of the 
provision. Considerations in the votes were as much, if not more, political as legal, but 
these incidents are likely now to be established as firm precedents for the assertion that 
'enforcement action' only relates to military activities. 
ii). Regional Arrangement or Agency 
The concept of 'regional arrangement or agency' is partially defined in the Charter. 
Article 52(1) provides that a regional arrangement or agency i) must be concerned with 
the maintenance of international peace and security, ii) must be consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations and iii) must in some way be regional.124 
There is little ground for denying that the European Community satisfies the 
latter two conditions. It is not, however, so clear-cut that it deals with 'such matters 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for 
regional action.'125 The Treaty of Rome makes no reference to such activities in Part 
One dealing with Principles. Yet it is undeniable that the Member States have used the 
common commercial policy for reacting to events not directly related to treaty-defined 
concerns of the Community, such as the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands. 
The development of the extra-treaty mechanism of the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) has added to the involvement of the Twelve in common foreign 
policy consultations and actions. But the decisive legal distinction is that the EPC is 
not a European Community activity. European Political Cooperation was formulated 
into a conventional framework by the Single European Act 1986 (SEA). Its provisions 
are set out in a sole article comprising of twelve paragraphs. Article 30(1) of the SEA 
provides: 
124. Akehurst, Enforcement Action, ppl77. 
125. A r t i c l e 52(1) United Nations C h a r t e r . 
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The High Contracting Parties, being members of the European Community, shall 
endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy. 
The consultations and common positions provided for are those of the Member States 
not of the European Community. This separation of activities is acknowledged in 
Article 30(5) by which 'the external policies of the European Community and the 
policies of the European Political Cooperation must be consistent.' Activities which 
could rightly be categorised as dealing with international peace and security lie outside 
the ambit of the EC and belong to the EPC. This is so at least in terms of the 
constituent treaties. But the correct picture is not seen by stopping at this point in the 
examination. 
The result of consultations by the individual Member States can be the 
adoption by the European Community of economic measures on a motive of 
maintaining international peace and security such as those imposed against Yugoslavia 
in November 1991. The institution of such measures itself by the EC points to it being 
involved in matters of international peace and security. The terms of the Decision of 
the Council126 to suspend the Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia provide 
evidence of the concern of the EC with such matters. The preambular paragraphs refer 
both to the EPC statements of 5 and 28 October 1991, which dealt with the situation in 
Yugoslavia and expressed the principles on which a solution should be sought, and to 
Security Council Resolution 713 (1991), which inter alia determined that the situation 
in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security. The political 
reason for the measure was the non-observance of the cease-fire concluded on 4 
October 1991. It was clearly the aim of the EC to have some impact in this case on the 
restoration of peace in a conflict which had already been determined to be a threat to 
international and security. 
This increased activity by the Community in non-economic foreign affairs 
establishes it more as a 'regional arrangement' within the meaning of Article 52. This is 
particularly true in the case of the former Yugoslav States since its measures are 
introduced against European nations and so has an even more regional element to its 
activities. The Community has also developed more of a peace-brokering role in the 
Yugoslav crisis which has included the convening of the Peace Conference in 
September 1991. Although undertaken within the framework of the EPC, the 
Community is undeniably involved, evidenced by the reference to the 'Community and 
its Member States' in EPC statements. The convening of the Conference, high level of 
involvement in the in-going crisis and cease-fire monitoring were not agreed under 
126. D e c i s i o n 91/586/ECSC,EEC of 11 November 1991, OJ L315/47 of 
15.11.91. 
47 
institutionalised Community procedure, but the Member States clearly consider the 
organisation to be involved in the search for peace.127 
It must be concluded that by extending its purview into non-Community affairs 
and by making express reference to the maintenance of international and security when 
imposing counter-measures that the EC has become a 'regional arrangement or agency' 
within the meaning of Article 52. 
iii) Article 53 and the European Community 
The potential for the application of Article 53 resulting from the terms of the Charter is 
not reflected in the practice of the Security Council and of the EC. The Community 
regulations make reference to the Security Council resolutions and do tend 
chronologically to follow such resolutions, but no authorisation is seen as necessary by 
either body. 
The main reason for this is probably the position adopted by most members of 
the Security Council that 'enforcement action' does not relate to non-military sanctions. 
Such an interpretation may gain support from the doctrine of subsequent state practice. 
Despite disagreement over the Dominican Republic sanctions, there has been no 
dispute aired publicly of the need for authorisation for sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro and Iraq. Indeed the Dominican Republic decision in the Security Council 
is seen as a precedent for the non-requirement of Council authorisation. 
One approach to the problem is that adopted by Dr Akehurst when he stated: 
It is commonly supposed by writers that an arrangement which meets the requirements 
of a regional arrangement, whatever they may be, must automatically be regarded as a 
regional arrangement governed by the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, 
whether the parties to the arrangement desire this result or not. There might be some 
truth in this view if the Charter laid down a precise definition of regional arrangement. 
But the Charter does not, nor has any United Nations organ ever given us such a 
definition, so the only way in which one can be certain that an arrangement is covered 
by Chapter VIII of the Charter is to see whether the parties to the arrangement have 
claimed that it is a regional arrangement and whether this claim has been accepted in 
practice by the United Nations.128 
No such claim has been made or accepted as regards the European Community. 
127. For e l a b o r a t i o n on these a c t i v i t i e s see chapter 4. 
128. Alcehurst, Enforcement Action, ppl78. 
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In any case it may be that the Security Council does not consider the European 
Community to be a regional arrangement or agency. This would have been a valid 
interpretation in the early days of the Community, but is now open to question as the 
EC's involvement in peace considerations expands. The entry into force of the Treaty 
on European Union will require a radical rethinking of this attitude. For its objectives 
include 'the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the 
eventual forming of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defence,'129 and it provides for the potential institutionalisation within the EC of foreign 
policy decisions. 
2. Binding Nature of Security Council Resolutions on the European Community 
The compulsory nature of Security Council resolutions on Member States has already 
been discussed. An added complication is the effect of these resolutions on the 
European Community. I f the Council adopts a resolution which is binding on the 
Member States, is the EC bound by it too? 
The operative provision of the Charter is Article 25 by which 'Members of the 
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.' The European Community is however not a 
member of the United Nations. The EC possesses its own legal personality distinct 
from those of its Member States (Art 210 EEC Treaty; Art 6 ECSC Treaty; Art 184 
Euratom). The Community is recognised as a distinct entity having been granted 
observer status at the UN and in some of its specialised organisations. But it is not a 
member and so accordingly is not bound to comply with Security Council resolutions. 
The Member States of the EC are under the obligation to implement the 
resolutions. Where sanctions are imposed by the Security Council, they must be 
transposed into national legislation and implemented in full. This obligation overrides 
all others by virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter. This includes European 
Community law which is otherwise the supreme law in matters within EC 
competences. Since all Community Member States are also members of the UN, it 
follows that mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council must be 
implemented across the whole territory of the Community. I f this is not done the 
international responsibility of the State which fails to implement it will engaged. But 
the members of the EC have transferred their competences in the field of external 
commercial policy to the Community. Thus the legal entity in whose sole hands the 
method of implementation lies is seemingly under no legal obligation to apply the 
sanctions. However all Member States of the EC would be in breach of their 
129. T r e a t y on European union, T i t l e 1, A r t i c l e B. 
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obligations if they did not introduce the measures. They could apply national legislation 
by virtue of Article 224 of the E E C Treaty,1 3 0 but with the need to maintain the 
workings of the single market and to prevent distortions to it, E E C Regulations have 
been employed in the most recent cases to achieve uniform application. 
The use of Community legislation could be seen as a tool of the Member States 
rather than as a true Community measure. The lack of provision in its constituent 
treaties for the E C to initiate sanctions in the situation when its interests have not been 
breached makes for an unusual situation. The Member States have to use Community 
legislation if the counter-measures they want to take or UN sanctions they have to 
implement fall within the common commercial policy. The question arises as to 
whether the measures are genuine Community action or Member States action clothed 
in Community colours, in other words, whether the Community is merely acting as an 
'agent d'execution' of the Member States. This is not the case for the measures are 
taken in the exercise of Community exclusive competences. Rene Milas expounds the 
correct position: 
On ne peut que partager l'avis de C D Ehlermann pour qui la Commission n'est pas 
l'agent d'execution des oeuvres des Etats. En effet, ce sont les Etats membres qui sont a 
la fois les initiateurs de Taction de la Communaute et en meme temps, les executants, le 
bras seculier de celui-ci. Elle leur donne sa couverture spintuelle , meme si sa volonte 
est formee par le consensus etabli au niveau des representants des Etats membres et 
executee par le Conseil et/ou la Commission sous forme de legislation 
communautaire.131 
The action taken consists of Community measures. The legal basis is declared to be 
Article 113 of the E E C Treaty and the measure is taken in compliance with the due 
procedure (Council decision acting by qualified majority on proposal of the 
Commission). In form and content they are Community measures. 
International law, and more particularly the UN Security Council, only requires 
the application of the mandatory sanctions in the territory of all UN Member States. 
The method of implementation is within the discretion of the States subject to their 
constitutional procedures, and the Security Council is not in the practice of 
determining the agency through which the trade sanctions are implemented. The 
Community can be used to apply them, but if they are not applied in full it is the 
Member States whose international responsibility is engaged. The question posed is 
130. For the r o l e of A r t i c l e 224 see Chapter 3. 
131. R. Milas, Au Norn de I'Europe, pp238. 
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whether that of the E C would also be engaged if the sanctions are not applied 
properly.132 
Where the Member States use Community legislation to apply Security Council 
resolutions an important legal question arises. The problem is best explained by way of 
illustration. The Security Council determines a threat to or breach of the peace133 
without an illegal act committed by State A and it requires all UN Members to 
introduce comprehensive trade sanctions against that State. The E C Member States are 
more likely to use E C measures since the substance of the sanctions falls within the 
exclusive competence of the Community.134 If the sanctions entail the breach of a trade 
treaty between the E C and State A, the E C must show some basis in international law 
permitting it to violate the terms of the agreement. Such justification appears hard to 
find since the treaty was not with the Member States (which are permitted, indeed 
required to breach it by the Security Council resolution), but with the E C itself. There 
would seem to be no lawful basis for the E C to have violated the trade agreement: no 
internationally wrongful act and no legitimate authorisation by the UN Security 
Council. The international responsibility of the E C would seem to be engaged towards 
State A by the breach of the trade agreement in purporting to apply UN sanctions. 
This would create a legal nonsense whereby the sanctions imposed by the 
Security Council cause an organisation to act illegally when all its Member States are 
bound to apply them. It would be indefensible for international law to impose sanctions 
against a State and requiring UN members to 'give the United Nations every assistance 
in any action it takes in accordance with the . . . Charter,'135 and yet place the E C , 
which possesses the economic means to impose the measures, in the position of itself 
breaching international obligations by applying the sanctions. 
Additionally suppose that the E C was not bound to implement the decision. If 
the resolution is not binding then neither would it be authoritative. If the E C were not 
permitted to base its measures on a determination of the Security Council in 
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, it would only be able to initiate counter-
measures in response to an unlawful act. It would not be able rely on the Security 
Council resolution itself for that resolution may not be based on an illegality. I f the 
132. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Community and i t s Member S t a t e s 
w i t h regard to competence to introduce counter-measures under EC 
law i s d i s c u s s e d i n chapter 3. 
133. The problem would not a r i s e s i f the determination i s of an a c t 
of aggression s i n c e the EC would be j u s t i f i e d i n i n i t i a t i n g 
counter-measures f o r the breach of an o b l i g a t i o n erga omnes. 
134. Or a l l twelve s t a t e s could invoke A r t i c l e 224 and introduce the 
same measures: such a s c e n a r i o i s u n l i k e l y to occur given the 
re c e n t p r a c t i c e of adopting an EEC Regulation to implement 
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l s a n c t i o n s and t h e i r more e f f e c t i v e 
implementation by v i r t u e of the uniform a p p l i c a t i o n of EC law. 
135. A r t i c l e 2(5) United Nations C h a r t e r . 
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Council makes a determination under Article 39 of an act of aggression, then the 
Community may initiate counter-measures on the basis of a breach of an obligation 
erga omnes. But the determination of a threat to or breach of the peace is not 
necessarily a declaration of a violation of international law - it will depend on the facts 
of each incident. Even if there is an illegal act the Community will only have the right 
to react if its rights are directly infringed or it is an obligation erga omnes. In any case 
the E C measures would technically be based on the illegality behind the Security 
Council resolution and not on the resolution itself. If such were the case there would 
be an inconsistency in the application of the mandatory sanctions. Their obligatory 
effect on the E C would be dependent on which determination is made by the Security 
Council under Article 39 of the Charter. 
The need for consistency in the international legal order demands that the 
Community is bound by Security Council resolutions The ground on which this 
subordination is founded is expounded after other proposed bases are discussed. 
Article 234 of the E E C Treaty provides one possible ground. This provision states: 
The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the entry into 
force of this Treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or 
more third countries on die other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this treaty. 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC) has interpreted this 
provision to mean 'rights' of third States and 'obligations' of Member States.136 This 
Article is set in terms of the States' obligations when it is those of the independent legal 
person of the European Community that are under discussion. The objection may be 
raised that in truth it is the Member States who are the Community and that their 
obligations are the Community's obligations. But this makes no sense when it is 
accepted that the E C is a distinct legal entity which is provided for by Article 210 
E E C . 
The C J E C has held that the purpose of Article 234 is to lay down that the 
application of the E E C Treaty does not affect the duty of the Member State concerned 
to respect the rights of non-member countries under a prior agreement and to perform 
its obligations thereunder, viz the UN Charter. 1 3 7 In the case of Attorney General v 
Burgoa™ the Court considered the consequence of the provision on the Community 
itself: 
136. commission v I t a l y Case No 10/61 [1962] ECR ppl, pplO. 
137. I b i d pplO. 
138. Case No 812/79 [1980] ECR pp2787. 
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Although the first paragraph of Article 234 makes mention only of the obligations of 
the Member States, it would not achieve its purpose if it did not imply a duty on the 
part of the institutions of the Community not to impede the performance of the 
obligations of Member States which stem form a prior agreement. However, that duty 
of the Community institutions is directed only to permitting the Member State 
concerned to perform its obligations under the prior agreement and does not bind the 
Community as regards the non-member country in question.139 
This confirms the view stated above that the Twelve are required to apply UN 
mandatory sanctions, but the institutions of the Community are not bound by virtue of 
Article 234 and so may not use it as the legal basis on which to implement them. The 
argument is not over whether the Member States may use the Community to fulfil its 
UN obligations, but over the consequences for the Community of being the tool of 
implementation. 
Article 234 relates to 'agreements concluded before the entry into force' of the 
E E C Treaty. This raises the additional problem that Security Council resolutions 
passed after 1 January 1958 are not covered in any case by the terms of the Article. 
Lauwaars favours an analogical application of Article 234 such that the decision is 
binding on the States.140 Kuyper argues that Security Council resolutions passed after 
that date must be regarded as antecedent to the E E C Treaty because they are based on 
a treaty that predates that Treaty.1 4 1 
P.J. Kuyper argues that the E C is bound by virtue of Article on Article 48(2) of 
the UN Charter.1 4 2 This states that mandatory resolutions of the Security Council 'shall 
be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action 
in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.' He asserts that 
the Community's duty to implement Security Council sanctions is founded on the 
classification of the E C as an 'appropriate international agency' within the terms of 
Article 48(2). But this argument has the same problem in that the provision is directed 
at the obligations of the States. The duty contained in the Article is for States to apply 
the resolutions 'through their action' in the appropriate agency. The terms of the 
provision do not relate to the direct obligations of the international organisation and so 
does not provide a justification for it to breach its obligations owed to the State which 
is subject to the sanctions. 
139. Case No 812/79 [1980] ECR pp2787, pp2803. 
140. Lauwaars, "The I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p Between United Nations Law and 
the Law of other I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i s a t i o n s " 82 Michigan Law 
Review ppl604, ppl610. 
141. Kuyper The Implementation of International Sanctions ppl90. 
142. I b i d . ppl87. 
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Kuyper puts forward a further, and yet not unproblematic, legal approach 
based on the decision of the C J E C in Internationa/ Fruit Company v Produktschap 
Voor Groenten En Fruit.143 The case concerned a referral under Article 177 E E C 
requesting, inter alia, a ruling on whether the institutions of the E C are bound by the 
terms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Court stated: 
Since the entry into force of the EEC Treaty and more particularly, since the setting up 
of the common external tariff, the transfer of powers which has occurred in the 
relations between Member States and the Community has been put into concrete form 
in different ways within the framework of the General Agreement and has been 
recognised by the other contracting parties . . . It therefore appears that in so far as 
under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the powers previously exercised by 
the Member States in the area governed by the General Agreement, the provisions of 
that agreement have the effect of binding the Community . 1 4 4 
The Court also referred in its reasoning to the appearance of the Community as a 
partner in tariff negotiations and as a party to agreements concluded within the 
framework of the G A T T by virtue of Article 114 E E C . The easy compatibility of the 
nature and objectives of the E C with the workings and framework of the General 
Agreement makes the conclusion of the case more difficult to apply to the less direct 
relations between the functions of the UN Security Council and the E C . 
This centres on the concept of the transfer of powers of the Member States to 
the E C . In the terms of the judgment 'in so far as under the E E C Treaty the 
Community has assumed then powers previously exercised by the Member States' in 
the area of UN mandatory sanctions, the term of the resolutions have the effect of 
binding the Community. This is expressed by Kuyper: 
It may be argued, in line with the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Third 
International Fruit Company Case, that by transferring their powers in the field of 
commercial policy to the Community, the member States have also transferred their 
collective obligations in that field. Thus the Community as such is bound by the 
provisions concerning trade and current payments of the Security Council resolutions 
ordering sanctions against Rhodesia. In this view, the Community not only could, but 
143. J o i n e d C a s e s 21-24/72 [ 1 9 7 2 ] ECR p p l 2 2 1 . 
144. I b i d . p p l 2 2 7 . 
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should take the necessary measures in the framework of the common commercial 
policy.145 
The French version of the judgment adds strength to the acceptability of the transfer of 
obligations when States so desire. The translation reads: 'les Etats membres, en 
conferant ces competences a la Communaute, marquaient leur volonte de la lier par 
obligations contractees en vertue de l'Accord general.'146 In this way the E C has 
become the successor to the Member States' rights and obligations in the field of 
commercial policy.147 
The true ground by which the E C is bound by Security Council resolutions be 
found in Article 103 of the UN Charter. This provision states: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. 
The obligations covered by Article 103 are both those imposed by the Charter 
itself and binding decisions of the Security Council (which are obligatory by virtue of 
the Charter). 1 4 8 The International Court of Justice ruled that mandatory Security 
Council resolutions are to be regarded as 'obligations under the . . . Charter' in the 
Lockerbie case.U9 Lauwaars maintains that overriding respect for these obligations is 
not merely required of States who have ratified the UN Charter: 
The obligation [to resolve any conflict in favour of Charter commitments] also applies 
to other international organisations. Not only must the treaty establishing the 
organisation between Member States be accordance with the Charter and the 
obligations imposed upon the Member States by the Charter, but the decisions of the 
new organisation itself must comply with the Charter.150 
145. Kuyper Sanctions Against Rhodesia: The EEC and the 
Implementation of General International Legal Rules 12 Community 
Law Review pp231; pp238. 
146. R e c u e i l de l a Jurispr u d e n c e de l a Cour (1972) ppl219, ppl228, 
para 15. 
147. Kapteyn I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Law of the European Communities 
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148. Lauwaars, The Interrelationship, ppl606. 
149. Questions of I n t e r p r e t a t i o n and A p p l i c a t i o n of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention a r i s i n g from the A e r i a l I n c i d e n t a t Lock e r b i e (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya v u n i t e d s t a t e s of America) P r o v i s i o n a l Measures 
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It is not good enough to say that because the States are bound, the organisations of 
which they are a part are also bound, however a attractive proposition it may seem. 
Article 103 is after all, in its own terms, directed at the 'obligations of 
o the Members of the United Nations.'™ The Member States have transferred their 
ability to implement trade sanctions, in the form of the commercial policy, to the 
European Community which is not a Member. 
The conflict to which Article 103 addresses itself in this instance is between the 
obligation on the Member States to execute the decisions of the E C institutions (under 
the E E C Treaty) and to implement the Security Council resolution (under the UN 
Charter). But the direct application of this provision to the obligation of the States 
does not resolve the problem posed concerning the international responsibility of the 
Community itself for the treaty breach. Article 103 does not apply directly to the duties 
of international organisations, and so provides no legal justification for the breach. The 
answer to the problem is found in its indirect application through the law of treaties. 
Article 103 establishes a hierarchy of treaties by qualifying the treaty-making 
power of the Members of the United Nations. Professor Dowrick expressed the 
relationship, when discussing how one treaty can affect the ability of a State to 
conclude a subsequent agreement, in the following way: 
If the treaty in question is a "constitutive" treaty purporting to lay down a universal 
regime (e.g., the Charter of the United Nations), States are disabled from entering into 
other treaties which derogate from its imperative provisions.152 
After 1946 the UN Members are prevented from entering agreements which conflict 
with their obligations in the Charter. These obligations are paramount and Article 103 
imposes an implicit subordination of subsequent treaties to these obligations. This 
applies equally to treaties establishing international organisations. Since an 
international organisation is no greater than its constituent treaties, they too are 
subjected to this subordination and so are bound to follow the UN obligations. A State 
may not transfer to an international body more rights than the State enjoys, and so the 
disability is transferred to the new body. The organisation becomes subject to the same 
restriction in both the workings of its institutions and in the treaties which itself 
concludes. It is incorrect to say that Article 103 is directly addressed to international 
organisations. It is the conditioned ability of States to conclude treaties which ensures 
the submission of the E C to the restriction of non-derogation from the Charter's 
151. Emphasis added. 
152. Dowrick overlapping international and European Law 31 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l and Comparative Law Qu a r t e r l y [1982] pp59, pp67-
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'imperative provisions', which as stated include mandatory Security Council 
resolutions. 
The full force of Article 103 is maintained by Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which provides that: 
Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations 
of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be 
determined in accordance with the following paragraphs. 
The UN Charter and its obligations (to the extent that they are not rules of 
customary international law) are naturally only binding on those States which have 
ratified the Charter. This poses the problem that the Federal Republic of Germany did 
not join the UN until 1973. This causes problems to the effect of Article 103 on the 
E E C Treaty since not all the Contracting Parties were members of the UN in 1958. It 
may not be argued that the F R G was bound to respect the Charter obligations at that 
time and equally it is wrong to contest that its later membership retrospectively 
effected such a commitment. But the treaty which it concluded with the five UN 
members was still subject for the effects of Article 103 for the reasons stated by Lord 
McNair: 
[A]s regards future treaties [ie those concluded after 1946] no member can create any 
valid obligation inconsistent with the Charter; moreover, a co-contracting non-member 
is aware of that fact, because the Charter must be regarded as what an English lawyer 
would call a 'notorious' instrument; and a non-member State must be deemed to know 
whether a State with which it is about to contract is member or not.153 
The FRG must be taken to have acquiesced in the subordination of the new EEC to the 
obligations in the Charter since it was cognisant of the limitation of the treaty-making capacity 
of its contracting parties.154 The same would be true for any non-member of the UN acceding to 
the E E C Treaty. 
The Community is bound to implement mandatory sanctions imposed by the 
Security Council by virtue of the conditional ability of the Member States to conclude 
the E E C Treaty. The resolution is the legal basis for the measures the E C introduces to 
apply the mandatory sanctions. This means that the position of the E C is exactly the 
same as for members of the UN in their responsibility to apply the decision. The duty 
153. McNair, Law of Treaties, pp218. 
154. McNair, Law of Treaties, pp218. 
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also provides the E C with legal justification and authority to breach any trade treaty to 
implement the sanctions. 
It is important to consider the nature of this obligation on the European 
Community to honour the decisions of the Security Council. It consists of the duty to 
restrain from acts preventing the Member States complying with their UN 
obligations155 and 'where the Community's competence is exclusive, as in the field of 
the common commercial policy, it is the Community that has to implement the 
obligations under the Charter.'156 
I I . European! Commaiinioity Coowrateir-IVIeasures 
The European Community has to rely on general international law for its right to 
implement economic measures against a third State. This means that it may take acts of 
retorsion, reciprocity and counter-measures within the limits set by international law. It 
is in the same position as a sovereign State, but there are extra factors to be 
considered. These are examined in relation firstly to prejudice caused to Community 
interest and, secondly, to Member States' interests. 
1. European Community Interests 
The E C enjoys independent legal personality and, due to the transfer of certain aspects 
of state sovereignty to it, has a large number of economic interests to protect. 
International law recognises such transfers and so it would be illogical if it did not also 
provide, in accordance with its self-policing approach, for a method for their 
protection. An international organisation may legitimately introduce counter-measures 
in response to the infringement of its own rights. In the case of the E C the measures 
would also act to protect the interests of the Member States which are closely 
associated with those of the Community. 
It follows from the nature of the counter-measures themselves that the 
response does not have to be of the same subject-matter as the violation. Thus if the 
breach committed by the third State is in an area of competence of the Community, eg 
fisheries, then the E C may respond by breaching an obligation owed to that State in 
another field of its competence, eg commercial policy. However this could not occur 
between the interests of the three European Communities. If a third State breaches a 
coal agreement signed with the European Coal and Steel Community, counter-
measures may only be taken by that Community within the field of its competences. It 
155. Attorney General Caae No. 812/79 p r e c i t e d . 
156. Lauwaars, The Interrelationship p p l 6 1 0 - l l . 
58 
is not open to the European Economic Community to initiate counter-measures by 
violating a commercial agreement that it has with that State because the rights of the 
E E C have not been breached. 
2. Member States' Interests 
If the right which has been breached is of a Member State, and not of the E C , a more 
complicated question arises. That State is no longer in control of all measures 
traditionally available to it with which to respond. A plurality of means of response 
have been transferred to the E C in the form of the common commercial policy. The 
State is less able to coerce compliance with the breached obligation. Since the E C is 
placed to fill that lacuna, can it take counter-measures in response to a breach of the 
rights of its Member States? 
Where international law permits third-party counter-measures such as when the 
norm which has been violated constitutes an obligation erga omnes, the European 
Community may introduce them in the same way as States. But it may not be 
concluded from current practice that the E C is entitled to take counter-measures on 
behalf of one or more of its Member States. 
The assignment to a central organisation of the economic powers which a State 
is entitled to use to coerce another to perform its legal obligations or to desist from 
wrongful acts does not imply the right for that organisation to use these powers to 
protect the individual rights of the transferring State. The E C must be regarded as not 
entitled to use its competences to impose counter-measures against a State which 
infringes the rights of an individual Member State in the same way that the latter could 
previously have done. This conclusion denies the Member States of a major part of 
their resources to enforce compliance with an obligation owed to them. 
A powerful trading organisation entitled to use its economic strength to ensure 
fulfilment of obligations owed to its Member States, in addition to those owed to itself, 
would raise and accentuate the expressed concern of the inequality of ability of States 
to coerce compliance. The answer to such a problem would lie in the strict application 
of the principle of proportionality. Dr Ehlermann correctly states that any counter-
measures introduced by the E C on behalf of a Member State would have to ensure 
close observance of the requirements of the principle.157 The effects of the measure 
would have to be proportional to those of the offence of the State against which it is 
introduced. 
157. Ehlermann "Communautes Europ6ennes e t Sanctions I n t e r n a t i o n a l e s 
- Une Rgponse a J . Verhoeven" 18 Revue Beige De Droit International 
(1984-85) pp96-112; ppl07-108. 
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L'organisation internationale doit des lors moduler sa reaction en fonction de la gravite 
de la violation et du potentiel de represailles que comporte une mesure applicable a 
l'ensemble de son territoire.158 
The collective strength of the E C would be far greater than that of a single Member 
State and so particularly close attention would have to be paid to the proportionality of 
the counter-measure. But it is far from established that the E C is entitled to introduce 
counter-measures on behalf of its Member States when its own rights have not been 
infringed. 
158. I b i d . p p l 0 8 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMMUNITY LAW AND T H E APPLICATION OF COUNTER-MEASURES 
AND SANCTIONS BY T H E EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
I. Legal Basis in CommuEity Law 
The legal basis in Community law of counter-measures introduced by the E C has been 
the subject of development and debate. These have centred on the relationship between 
Articles 113 and 224 of the E E C Treaty. The constituent treaty provides no express 
power for the E C to apply counter-measures. Article 113, as the foundation provision 
of the common commercial policy, has been used as authority when the Community 
has acted. 
The increased employment of counter-measures by the E C in recent years has 
led to a more uniform approach between the Commission and Council, but initially the 
debate involved a difference of opinion between the two institutions. The consequence 
of the choice of the legal basis is the determination of whether the Community or the 
Member States are competent to act. The difference stems from the application of 
Security Council imposed sanctions against Rhodesia in 1966. Although on that 
occasion both recognised that the Member States had the legal power to take action, 
their approaches to Community competence under other circumstances differed. 
The Council adopted what has been termed 'la doctrine rhodesienne.'159 In 
response to a written question from a member of the European Parliament160 in 1976, 
the Council stated that the measures decided on by the UN Security Council 'were 
taken for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security and therefore do 
not fall within the scope of Article 113.' The doctrine has been abandoned over the 
years and the potential breach of international peace and security appeared as one of 
the visas in Regulation 1432/92161 which imposed counter-measures against Serbia and 
Montenegro. 
In contrast to this the Commission has advocated an 'instrumental approach.'162 
This concentrates on the legal instrument to be used rather than on categorising the 
1. J . w i l l a e r t "Les Sanctions Centre La Rhod6sie" 18 .Revue Beige De 
Droit International 1984/85 pp216, pp235; J-L Dewost "La 
Communaute, Les Dix, e t Les Sanctions Economiques: De La C r i s e 
i r a n i e n n e a La C r i s e des Malouines" Annuaire Francais De Droit 
International 1982 pp215, pp217. 
160. P a t j i n Written Question No 526/75, OJ C89/7, 16th A p r i l 1976. 
161. OJ L151/4, 1st June 1992. 
162. P.J. Kuyper "Community Sanctions Against Argentina: Lawfulness 
under community and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law" i n Essays in European Law 
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counter-measures as having a commercial or political objective. This has emerged as 
the prominent approach in recent E C practice. As P.J. Kuyper has stated the 
Community is able to impose trade measures against a State for they constitute 'one 
instrument from a whole arsenal which could be employed to conduct a common 
commercial policy.'163 This approach means that even if the measures are taken for 
political ends the E C is competent to act if the instrument employed falls within the 
range of methods used to pursue the common commercial policy. The immediate 
ramification of the Rhodesian doctrine was that the Community was only able to act 
under Article 113 if the measures were motivated by commercial or trade 
considerations. Recent practice in respect of Iraq, Libya and Serbia and Montenegro 
proves that this distinction is no longer valid. The assertion164 that this is still the 
governing basis for determining Community competence is unacceptable and takes no 
account of these developments. The common commercial policy competence of the E C 
has advanced and expanded to allow for it to be used to apply measures concerned 
with international peace and security. 
There are, however, contrasting opinions on the precise relationship between 
Articles 113 and 224. The latter provision states: 
Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed 
to prevent the functioning of the common market being affected by measures which a 
Member State may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances 
affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war or serious international 
tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted 
for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
The relationship is capable of three interpretations which have been expounded by 
writers on the subject. 
The first puts greatest emphasis on the exclusive competence of the 
Community in the commercial sector. As enunciated by Professor Verhoeven165, 
Article 224 permits a temporary derogation by Member States faced with the 
conditions mentioned in that Article. It could for example impose an embargo against a 
and Integration ed D. O'Keeffe and H. Schermers 1982 ppl41, 
ppl44. 
163. I b i d . ppl44 
164. Redleaf, "The D i v i s i o n of Foreign P o l i c y A u t h o r i t y Between the 
European Community and the Member s t a t e s : A Survey of Economic 
Sanctions Against South A f r i c a 12 Boston College of Third World 
Law Journal (1992) 1 97-119. p p l l 5 . 
165. J . Verhoeven "Communautis Europ§ennes e t Sanctions 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l e s " 18 Revue Beige De Droit International 1984/85 
p80; 93. 
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third State. But once the Community acts in that regard, the exercise of its 
competences supersedes any measures implemented by the Member State. The State is 
then required to adhere to the Community measures. There is nothing in the E E C 
Treaty to support this argument. The power of derogation under Article 224 is not 
qualified by a requirement of inaction on the part of the E C institutions. The Member 
State retains an absolute right of dispensation from E C measures when the 
circumstances stated in Article 224 are present. 
A more satisfactory interpretation is that Article 224 maintains for the Member 
States a reserve of sovereignty.166 The provision constitutes a general derogation from 
the exclusive competence of Article 113 „ 1 6 7 
[LJ'article 113 C E E ne fonde pas une competence exclusive lorsque les conditions de 
l'article 224 sont reunies. De meme aucun Etat membre ne peut etre contraint 
d'appliquer une mesure decidee en vertu de l'article 113 CEE, s'il peut se prevaloir des 
conditions de 1'article 224 C E E . 1 6 8 
If faced with such conditions, the Member State is still under the obligation to consult 
its partners in the framework of the European Political Cooperation. Such an 
interpretation is closest to the terms of the E C Treaty. It is one of the provisions which 
permit Member States to abstain from applying E C law without the need for prior 
authorisation of the Commission. As with most exceptions, Article 224 is likely to be 
interpreted in a restrictive manner since its application disrupts the workings of the 
single market. 
The third interpretation, which is favoured by P.J. Kuyper, is stated by him as 
follows: 
It seems that, if trade sanctions are imposed for political ends, Article 224 does not 
constitute the exception to Article 113, but Article 113 finds itself, as it were inside 
Article 224, as one of the possible options for the implementation of those 
sanctions.169 
In this way Article 113 becomes one of the methods of application of counter-
measures decided by the Member States in the European Political Cooperation (EPC). 
This corresponds to the realities of the E E C Treaty and Single European Act. Kuyper 
166. C-D Ehlermann "Communaut6s Europeennes e t s a n c t i o n s 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l e s - Une Reponse a J . Verhoeven" 18 Revue Beige De 
Droit International (1984/85) pp96, ppl09. 
167. W i l l a e r t , Les Sanctions pp236 
168. Ehlermann, Communautes Europeennes ppl09 
169. Kuyper, Community Sanctions ppl48 
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goes on to say that Article 113 may only be used to implement counter-measures after 
a decision has been reached under the E P C or consultations have taken place under 
Article 224 . 1 7 0 
The best approach is to interpret the relationship in the manner put forward by 
Kuyper coupled with the rider that Article 224 may act as an exception to Article 113. 
The implementation of counter-measures is an element of foreign policy and as such 
falls under the E P C provisions of the Single European Act. This requires consultation 
between the Member States and coordination of the external policies of the E C and 
those of the E P C . Thus the decision to apply counter-measures under Article 113 must 
be preceded by these consultations. 
Where the circumstances of a situation constitute one of the alternatives set out 
in Article 224, the Member States are able to decide to take Community action under 
Article 113 or to derogate from the E C exclusive competence to implement the 
counter-measures by way of adoption of a national measure. On this basis it is quite 
true that Article 113 is one means of action available alongside others. But this 
presupposes that the Member States are sufficiently in agreement on the appropriate 
action to be taken. Exercise of the common commercial policy under Article 113 
requires qualified majority voting. Those Member States wanting Community 
implementation of counter-measures must be sure from E P C or Article 224 
consultations that the required 54 votes can be marshalled to ensure their adoption. If, 
however, there is insufficient support for the proposition, then the relationship between 
Articles 113 and 224 changes to one of exception. For provided the conditions in 
Article 224 are satisfied, a Member State determined to apply counter-measures may 
not be prevented from doing so by reason of the non-support of the other Member 
States. 
An example best illustrates the situation. The E C signs a trade agreement with 
State A in exercise of its competences under Article 113. If a situation were to develop 
in which State A invaded State B in breach of the obligation erga omnes to refrain 
from acts of aggression, the Member States and the E C would be entitled under 
international law to apply counter-measures. The conditions set out in Article 224 are 
thereby fulfilled. They consult under the auspices of the E P C (which would also satisfy 
the Article 224 consultation requirement). If a sufficient number of Member States are 
in favour of suspending the trade agreement with Turkey, then Article 113 may be 
used as a means of action under Article 224. But if there is not adequate support, a 
Member State would be entitled unilaterally to suspend application of the agreement. 
In this way Article 224 is a veritable exception to Article 113. 
170. I b i d . ppl48 . 
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Provided that Article 224 conditions are satisfied a Member State may as a last 
resort always rely on the reserve of sovereignty to derogate from any common 
commercial policy measures of the E C . There is nothing in the terms of Article 30 of 
the Single European Act (SEA) to require compliance with the majority view of the 
E P C partners. It demands close cooperation, but Article 224 enables ultimate non-
compliance with Article 113 decisions or agreements. 
The E E C Treaty and SE A attempt to a large degree to restrain the exercise of 
this power. Fundamentally this is to prevent disruption to the workings of the single 
market. The use of Article 113 for common counter-measures is based on this 
reasoning. However in the past uniform application has not always been achieved even 
when Article 113 has been invoked. When Regulation 887/82171 imposing counter-
measures against Argentina was extended by Regulations 1176/82172 and 1254/82,173 
Ireland and Italy invoked Article 224 and no longer suspended imports from Argentina. 
This invocation of Article 224 was a derogation from Regulations imposing counter-
measures. Its effect was to enable the two States to continue normal trade with 
Argentina. This can barely be interpreted as measures which a Member State 'may be 
called upon to take in the event of. . . war or serious international tension constituting 
a threat of war.' In other words Article 224 was used as a means of maintaining the 
economic status quo, instead of being the basis for taking exceptional action in 
response to a serious situation which is how it is designed and termed to be used. 
Kuyper seeks to explain this invocation by Italy and Ireland by applying his 
interpretation of Article 224. He states that according to this approach it could be 
argued that Member States 'are free to take the measures they fael 'called upon' to take 
(in the case of Italy and Ireland , only a weapons embargo) under Article 224, but may 
not wish or may not be able to block the decision-making procedure, which leads to 
the adoption of a Regulation based on Article 113. Their application of their measures 
short of the Article 113 measures would then not be contrary to their obligations under 
the E E C Treaty.'1 7 4 With respect, this is a somewhat forced interpretation to attempt to 
make the law fit the facts. It must surely be admitted that Italy and Ireland were in 
breach of their obligations under Community law. There is no provision for authorised 
derogation from such obligations after the end of the transition period. 
II. The Scope of Action Available to The Community 
171. OJ L102/1, 16th A p r i l 1982 
172. OJ L136/1 18th May 1982. 
173. OJ L146/1 25th May 1982. 
174. Kuyper, Community Sanctions ppl49. 
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The European Community is only permitted to introduce counter-measures where their 
subject-matter falls within a field of its competence. This will usually be the common 
commercial policy However the EC has external competences in other fields, and 
agreements made on the basis of such powers may also be breached as counter-
measures. 
The conduct of foreign trade relations with third States is largely, but not solely 
in the hands of the European Community. The areas in which it has competence to 
conclude international agreements has been enhanced by a series of decisions of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities. The present study does not permit a 
detailed examination of the jurisprudence,175 but the conclusions which it provides are 
most pertinent. It is important to determine the differentiation of economic 
competences between the Community and its Member States in order to appreciate the 
measures which lay within the ambit of each, which may be employed as counter-
measures. 
In addition to the external competences explicitly provided for by the E E C 
Treaty, the CJEC has developed the concept of implied external powers.176 Express or 
implied external powers are not necessarily exclusive. The exclusivity of express 
powers depends on the terms of the Treaty. However for implied competences, this is 
naturally more difficult to determine. The Community gains exclusive external power if 
competence has been ceded to it in the internal sphere. Two possibilities have been put 
forward for deciding when this has occurred.177 
Treaty provisions may confer an exclusive character on internal competence with effect 
from a particular time and thereby also form the hallmark of exclusivity for external 
powers derived from them.178 The exercise of internal competences may also lead to the 
exclusivity of the derived external competence linked to it, viz if and in so far as the 
internal measures taken contain a cession of competence to the Community in the 
matter concerned.179 
The development of the concept of implied powers gives the Community an even 
wider scope for potential counter-measures 
175. Simmonds "The European Economic Community and the New Law of the 
Sea" Hague Recueil VI 1989, ppl5-166, ppl9-40. 
176. Cases 22/70 [1971] ECR pp263; Cases 3, 4, and 6/76 [1976] ECR 
ppl279; Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR ppl362; Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 
2871. 
177. P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. V e r l o r e n Van Themaat I n t r o d u c t i o n To The 
Law of the European Communities pp773-4. 
178. Kramer e t a l Cases 3, 4, and 6/76 [1976] ECR ppl279. 
179. Commission v Co u n c i l case 22/70 [1971] ECR pp263, pp275. 
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The E E C Treaty also empowers the Community to conclude association 
agreements with other States (Art 238). Such treaties are susceptible to breach as 
legitimate counter-measures. 
1. The Common Commercial Policy 
No definition of 'commercial policy' is contained in the E E C Treaty. This has enabled 
the concept to be kept fluid rather than set with a definition which may be incapable of 
adapting to the changing face of international trade. Article 113 enumerates a non-
exhaustive180 list of 'uniform principles' on which the commercial policy is based: 
changes to tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement 
of uniformity in measures of liberalisation , export policy and measures to protect trade 
such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies. 
The external and internal exclusive competence of the EC in commercial policy 
is beyond doubt.181 But the substance of that policy is not so clear. The CJEC has 
stressed the wide scope of application of Article 113 in that 'commercial policy' has 'the 
same content whether it is applied in the context of the international action of a State 
or to that of the Community.'182 
The common commercial policy . . . embraces all measures (autonomous or 
conventional) which serve to regulate economic relations with third countries and 
concern free movement of goods and related traffic in services and payments.183 
The commercial policy relates to all nature of goods except for those dealt with 
specifically by the E E C Treaty (eg fisheries). This gives great potential to the 
Community for more effective counter-measures since it is not restricted to particular 
types of goods. The external and implied powers permit the Community to effect 
counter-measures in one of two ways when acting on the basis of Article 113. It is able 
to adopt measures concerning autonomous commercial policy or conventional 
commercial policy.184 
The autonomous commercial policy is the direction of economic relations by 
unilateral measures concerning imports and exports. Thus embargos and boycotts are 
180. Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871 a t 2913; Kapteyn pp778. 
181. Case 41/76 C r i e l , n€e Donckerwolcke e t a l v Procureur de l a 
R6publique au T r i b u n a l de Grande I n s t a n c e , L i l l e e t a l [1976] ECR 
1921 a t 1937. 
182. Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR ppl362. 
183. Kapteyn I n t r o d u c t i o n To The Law of the Eurcpean communities, 
pp790. 
184. Kapteyn introduction To The Law of the European Communities, 
pp788. 
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within the hands of the Community. The EC has laid down the principles on which the 
policy in relation to importation and exportation in a series of Regulations with two 
bedrock pieces of legislation. Regulation 288/82185 sets out common rules for imports 
and Regulation 2603/69186 prescribes those for exports. 
The basis of Regulation 288/82 is that importation into the Community of the 
products covered by the legislation shall be 'free and therefore not subject to any 
quantitative restriction.' The Regulation is of general application with the exception of 
textile products, imports from China and Cuba, imports from State- trading countries, 
and products specified in the Annex. It also provides for protective measures to be 
taken where substantial injury is likely to be caused to Community producers or where 
immediate intervention is required to safeguard the interests of the Community. Article 
21(a) of the Regulation permits Member States to adopt 'prohibitions, quantitative 
restrictions or measures of surveillance' on the ground, inter alia, of public security. 
This exception could be employed as the legal basis for counter-measures to prevent 
imports from an offending State if the ground can be made out. 
The fundamental provision of Regulation 2603/69 is that exports from the 
Community are equally free and so unimpaired by quantitative restrictions. Products 
specified in the Annex to the Regulation are excepted from this freedom. Exceptions 
are also made for protective measures and for the adoption of measures required to 
protect certain interests including public health and public security. 
It has been argued that once the Council has adopted a Regulation establishing 
general rules that they cannot be waived in individual circumstances.187 The case of 
NTW Toyo Bearing Co v Council1'* is quoted in support in which the CJEC stated: 
'The Council, having adopted a general regulation with a view to implementing one of 
the objectives laid down in Article 113 of the Treaty, cannot derogate from the rules 
laid down in applying these rules to specific cases without interfering with the 
legislative system of the Community and destroying the equality before the law of 
those to whom that law applies.'189 The argument runs that counter-measures 
implemented by way of derogation from the Regulations providing for freedom of 
importation and exportation are illegal under Community law. 
This argument cannot be accepted as correct. Dewost provides the proper 
explanation when discussing Regulation 877/82 which suspended imports from 
Argentina. 
185. OJ 1982 L35/1 (as amended). 
186. OJ E n g l i s h S p e c i a l E d i t i o n 1969 ( I I ) p590 (as amended). 
187. Dewost, La Communaute, Les Dix, et Les Sanctions Economiques 
p229. 
188. Case 113/77 [1979] ECR p p l l 8 5 . 
189. I b i d . ppl209. 
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[L]e reglement 877/82 ne constitue pas une 'application a un cas particulier' de regies 
differentes de celles posees par le reglement general 926/79 relatif au regime commun 
applicable aux importations mais bien une derogation a I'ensemble du systeme de 
liberation des importations . . . Le reglement . . . etant fondee sur l'article 113 comme 
le reglement 926/79 dont il ecarte 1'application, il s'agit simplement de la mise en 
oeuvre de l'adage 'lex specialis derogat. . .'19° 
The existence of the general measure does not render illegal its non-application in the 
form of a legitimate counter-measure. 
The prohibition on imports and/or exports as a method of imposing counter-
measures has the obvious effect of disrupting private law transactions. Such measures 
have effects on a huge amount of trade, and so are more likely to prove effective than 
an institutional Community measure, eg cancellation of a food aid programme. 
Because of this the autonomous commercial policy approach has been widely 
employed in the instances of use of counter-measures by the EC. In 1982, all imports 
originating in Argentina were suspended for a month, and then extended on two 
further occasions. The EC prohibited the introduction into the Community of all 
commodities or products originating in or coming from Iraq and Kuwait (in 1990)191 
and from Serbia and Montenegro (in 1992).192 The export to the same countries of 
such products from the Communities was equally forbidden. These restrictions were 
subject to medicinal and humanitarian exceptions. 
The common commercial policy also covers 'services'. The provision of such 
services to the government or nationals of a third State or to companies incorporated 
under the law of that State may also be prohibited as a form of counter-measure. It is 
probable that the definition of 'services' in this area is the same as that defined in 
Article 60 E E C on the freedom to provide services provisions of the E E C Treaty (Arts 
59-66).193 Activities falling within this definition are at least susceptible to be prohibited 
to be provided to natural and legal persons of a State by reason of EC counter-
measures. 
The conventional commercial policy is the exercise of the power to conclude 
agreements with third States which is granted by Articles 113(3) and 114. These have 
190. Dewost, La CommunautS, Les Dix, et Les sanctions Economiques 
pp229 . 
191. OJ L213/1, Reg No 2340/90, 9th August 1990. 
192. OJ L151/4, Reg No 1432/92, 1 s t June 1992. 
193. A r t i c l e 60 EEC s t a t e s : 
' S e r v i c e s ' s h a l l i n p a r t i c u l a r i n c l u d e 
(a) a c t i v i t i e s of an i n d u s t r i a l c h a r a c t e r 
(b) a c t i v i t i e s of a commercial c h a r a c t e r 
( c ) a c t i v i t i e s of craftsmen 
(d) a c t i v i t i e s of the p r o f e s s i o n s 
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taken the form of trade agreements and increasingly cooperation agreements which 
cover areas beyond trade in the strict sense of the word, but provide for consultation 
and cooperation in such fields as science and technology. The breach of such 
agreements involves merely (inter-) governmental action and does not prevent trade 
between private parties. It would have effects on their transactions if the provisions of 
the agreement provided for a favourable tariff rate. This would thus increase the price 
of the import, but leaves the transaction and the possibility of further transactions in 
tact. 
The conventional commercial policy was the basis for the first batch of 
measures imposed by the Community against Yugoslavia on 8 November 1991. They 
included the 'immediate suspension of the application of the trade and cooperation 
agreement with Yugoslavia and a decision to terminate the agreement.1,94 The 
consequences of this measures were the cessation of cooperation in the fields of 
industry, science, technology, agriculture, transport, tourism, living conditions, 
fisheries and finance. The agreement also provided for the elimination of import duties 
on specified goods and for the reduction of those on others. This suspension was 
followed by the denunciation of the agreement in accordance with its provisions and so 
did not breach the treaty. Article 60 states that either party may denounce the 
agreement by giving notice to the other side, denunciation taking effect six months 
after such notification. The denunciation legally puts an end to the treaty's existence. 
The range of benefits to third States and of activities included in such agreements, of 
which the EC-Yugoslavia cooperation agreement is typical, places the EC in a 
powerful position to implement a wide scope of counter-measures. 
The prohibition on importation and exportation of products in and out of the 
Community is technically only a counter-measure when it is pronounced in violation of 
a treaty with the third States whose goods are affected. Otherwise it is an act of 
retorsion since free trade is not a legal requirement. The existence of GATT means that 
in most cases the prohibition of trade is in breach of treaty obligations. Such was the 
case with the banning of imports from Argentina, which were justified under Article 
XXI of the Agreement. 
2. Other Community Competences 
The principal instrument for effecting counter-measures is the common commercial 
policy, but the Community's other fields of competence lend themselves as such tools. 
The EC could use its external competences (exclusive or mixed) in a manner similar to 
the conventional commercial policy. Thus its ability to utilise these areas in the 
194. EC B u l l e t i n 11-91 p91 
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application of counter-measures is dependent on the pre-existence of a treaty with the 
offending State. 
External Community competences exist in varying degrees in the following 
fields: transport, fisheries, competition, free movement of capital, environment, 
research and development, freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment, 
and free movement of workers.195 Agreements are likely to take the form of the 
granting and acceptance of reciprocal rights and obligations. There is neither space nor 
need for a detailed survey of existing or potential agreements. By way of illustration 
the EC signed an agreement on the basis of Article 130 q (2) of the E E C Treaty on a 
'programme plan to stimulate the international cooperation and interchange by 
European research scientists' with Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and Norway. 
The agreements were to last the length of the programme (1988-92) and provided for 
bursaries, grants, twinning of laboratories and mobility of researchers. One could 
imagine the suspension of the programme as a counter-measure, designed as a nominal 
gesture of disapproval, at least, even if the practical effect in securing compliance with 
an international norm might be limited. 
Article 238 provides the Community with the power to conclude 'agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action 
and special procedures' with other States, union of States or international 
organisations. The Lome Conventions have been concluded by virtue of this provision. 
The Fourth Lome Convention,196 signed with the ACP States, enables, inter alia, 
products from those States to enter the Community free of customs duties and 
establishes a system to guarantee the stabilisation of export earnings derived from ACP 
States exports to the Community and other specified destinations. Such agreements are 
potential material for counter-measures, and can indeed be effective given the 
economic superiority of the EC over its developing contracting partners. Their use 
would exacerbate the differentiation in economic strength between developed and 
developing States and would set back the search for practical equality in the field of 
enforcement of international law. Employment of such agreements as counter-
measures is less conceivable given the public and political reaction that it is likely to 
arouse. 
III. The Scope of Action Available To Member States 
Member States are competent under European Community law to introduce counter-
measures in three situations, namely when: 
195. Kapteyn introduction To The Law of the European Communities, 
pp780-787 
196. ILM- 1990 pp783. 
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i) the circumstances stated in Article 224 are satisfied 
ii) the subject-matter of the proposed counter-measures does not fall within a field of 
competence of the EC 
iii) the treaty to be breached as a counter-measure was concluded between the 
Member State and the offending State before the former joined the EC. 
Whenever a Member State may pursue counter-measures it is under an obligation of 
close consultation and cooperation established in Article 30 of the Single European 
Act. 
1. Article 224 
The significance of Article 224 is explained above. The use of the provision has 
declined significantly since its first emphatic invocation by the Member States in the 
matter of the UN sanctions against Rhodesia in 1966. No mention of Article 224 is 
made in either of the main Regulations implementing the UN sanctions against Iraq1 9 7 
or Serbia and Montenegro.198 Community action is replacing individual government 
measures so that the EC presents a united economic and political approach. The 
decline in the use of Article 224 is welcome on the basis that it prevents distortion to 
the single market, but its availability ensures that Member States retain the ultimate 
right to protect their interests when the relevant conditions in the Article are satisfied. 
2. Extra-Community Competences 
This gives the Member States the widest scope of action. The Community is naturally 
limited to the powers conferred on it by the Member States in its constituent treaties. 
Whatever falls outside E C competences is in the hands of the individual Member 
States. But their freedom of action in the field of international relations is subject to the 
obligation to 'inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general 
interest'199 before deciding on their final position, 2 0 0 and 'to take full account of the 
positions of the other partners and . . . give due consideration to the desirability of 
adopting and implementing common European positions.'201 
197. OJ L213/1, Reg No 2340/90, 9th August 1990. 
198. OJ L151/4, Reg No 1432/92, 1 s t June 1992. 
199. A r t i c l e 30 (2) (a) S i n g l e European Act 1986 (SEA). 
200. A r t i c l e 30 (2) (b) SEA. 
201. A r t i c l e 30 (2) (c) SEA. 
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The EC is not competent to impose counter-measures in several important areas 
including diplomatic relations, culture and sport. The two fields which can be 
highlighted for special treatment are arms exports and financial matters. 
i) Arms Exports 
Article 223(b) excludes arms and war materials from the scope of the EEC Treaty. 
Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection 
of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or 
trade in arms, munitions and war material, such measures shall not adversely affect the 
conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are intended 
for specifically military purposes. 
The Member States drew up a list of products within the first year of operation of the 
E E C Treaty to which this provision relates. Article 223 must be interpreted in a 
restrictive manner. 2 0 2 This does not detract from the fact that the products mentioned 
in this list are subject to Member States' competence. This enables the Member States 
to regulate arms exports by means of export licences, and counter-measures can be 
applied by the simple refusal of a licence by the exercise of governmental discretion. 
For example, the Member States of the E C effected an arms embargo against 
Argentina. The Member States issued a joint declaration203 under the auspices of the 
EPC announcing an embargo of the exportation of arms and military equipment to 
Argentina. This was unsupported by a mandatory Security Council resolution, but was 
justified by the unlawful use of force by Argentina breaching an obligation erga omnes 
or on the ground of collective self-defence. The Member States operated their own 
embargo. This was achieved in the United Kingdom by an amendment dated 16 April 
1982 to the Open General Transhipment Licence of 19 March 1979 to control the 
export of arms and strategic goods to Argentina.204 
One area which gives rise to practical difficulties is that of 'dual-use goods' -
goods which could be used for either military or non-military purposes. The Council of 
Ministers has adopted a draft regulation on strategic exports. 2 0 5 The purpose is to 
ensure that Member States apply the necessary control measures in accordance with 
common standards. Export licences will be required for goods named in a list published 
202. (1986) ECR 1651; Kuyper Trade Sanctions, Security and Human 
Rights Policy in the European Communities pplO. 
203. 10th A p r i l 1982, EC B u l l e t i n 4-1982 pp7 note 1.1.3. 
204. British Yearbook of International Law 1982 pp514. 
205. [1992] 3 CMLR 221. 
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in a complementary regulation. The draft regulation will not apply to goods covered by 
Article 223 (ie those goods named in the 1958 list). This centralisation of the 
regulation of the exportation of goods which are often the prime subject-matter of 
counter-measures will provide for even closer coordination of such measures when 
they are introduced. 
ii) Financial Assets 
The Member States retain potent powers in the field of the regulation of financial 
assets located within their jurisdiction. Where the aim of counter-measures is to 
prevent legal persons having access to financial assets in a Member State national 
measures are required since the EC is not competent in this area. 
Typically the legislation prevents the Government and nationals of the offending 
State and bodies incorporated under its laws or bodies controlled by legal persons in 
that State from having access to its financial assets. It usually prohibits any dealing in 
gold with or transfer of economic resources to such persons. 
The measures taken in relation to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia are studied in 
the final chapter, but their aim is to prevent the withdrawal of assets from the 
jurisdiction. Iraqi206 and Kuwaiti207 assets were also frozen by the UK in compliance 
with the UN Security Council Resolution 661. The mechanism of freezing assets has 
most recently been used in response to such resolutions, but it is also available for 
application as a standard counter-measure outside of the UN system. 
The competence of Member States in relation to arms embargos and asset freezing 
means that there is potential for non-uniform application of measures and gives rise to 
the potential of less effective counter-measures than are possible to achieve. 
Consultation through the EPC does provide for some coordination of Member State 
action. Closer cooperation in the application of counter-measures is to be welcomed by 
reason of the beneficial results on the effectiveness of the measures and on the 
lessening of distortion to the single market. 
iii) Treaties Existing Prior To Membership of the E C 
The situation under consideration is where a Member State has an agreement with a 
third State which was concluded prior to that State's membership of the European 
206. The Control of Gold, S e c u r i t i e s , Payments and c r e d i t s (Republic 
of I r a q ) D i r e c t i o n s 4th August 1990, S I 1990 No 1616. 
207. The Con t r o l of Gold, S e c u r i t i e s , Payments and c r e d i t s (Kuwait) 
D i r e c t i o n s 2nd August 1990, S I 1990 No 1591. 
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Community. It falls to be considered whether that Member State could use that treaty 
as an instrument for applying counter-measures independently of any Community 
measures. 
Article 234(1) provides: 
The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the entry into 
force of this treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or 
more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty. 
The same Article states that Member States shall 'take all appropriate steps' to 
eliminate any incompatibilities between the agreement and the EC Treaty. It also 
stipulates that when applying the agreement the Member States must be mindful that 
the advantages conferred by the EC Treaty ' form an integral part of the establishment 
of the Community and are thereby inseparably linked with the creation of common 
institutions, the conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same 
advantages by all the other Member States.' 
Subject to these duties of reconciliation of obligations, the application of pre-
existing treaties is permitted under Community law. It follows that the Member States 
are entitled to bring them to an end, suspend or denounce them in accordance with 
international law. Those treaties which would most readily serve as counter-measures, 
eg trade agreements, have been subsumed by treaties concluded between the EC and 
the third State. 
A problem is unlikely to arise given that most agreements between Member States 
and third States which are still in force will have no bearing on European Community 
matters. The use of treaties as counter-measures which have no relation to the EC are 
unaffected by Community law. A problem may arise where the E C refuses to introduce 
counter-measures against a third State but a particular Member State wishes to do so 
and it has a pre-existing treaty with the third State. If the agreement has some effect on 
Community matters, Article 234(1) would appear to enable the Member State to 
proceed with such action. One hypothetical example would be a fisheries agreement 
between UK and Norway concluded before 1973 (the year of the UK's accession to the 
EC) providing for Norwegian fishing rights in UK waters. Fisheries falls within the 
EC's competence, but Article 234(1) ensures the continuing validity of the agreement 
and so the potential for unilateral counter-measures by the UK against Norway by the 
non-application of the agreement, so preventing Norwegian vessels from fishing in its 
waters. 
IV. Member States and E C Agreements 
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A Member State is prima facie not party to an agreement concluded by the European 
Community in the exercise of its exclusive competences. However by virtue of Article 
228(2) E E C agreements concluded in accordance with the terms and procedure set out 
in paragraph 1 of that Article are binding on the institutions of the Community and on 
the Member States. As a matter of Community law and treaty law, the Member States 
are bound by its terms. 
If the other contracting State(s) to the agreement were to breach that treaty or 
another international obligation owed to a particular Member State, international law 
permits the latter to take counter-measures. In compliance with the conditions 
examined in Chapter One, the Member State may temporarily release itself from 
obligations owed to that State. The Member State may then temporarily refrain from 
observing the terms of the Community-third State treaty. This is the position in 
international law. 
However if the Member State ceased to observe the treaty, it would be in 
breach of its Community obligations. If, say, the treaty concerned the importation into 
the Community of sugar beet from a third State and the UK acted to prevent such 
importation into British territory as a form of legitimate counter-measure, it would be 
in violation of its obligations in relation to the single market by distorting the free 
movement of goods within the Community. The action would be sanctionable by the 
CJEC under Article 169 and 170 proceedings. 
This is more complicated than the issue of failure of Member States to fulfil 
obligations between each other which was faced by the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (CJEC) in the cases of Commission v Luxembourg and 
Commission v Belgium. 2 0 8 But the Court's judgment does provide useful dicta on the 
present situation. 
In fact the [EEC] Treaty is not limited to creating reciprocal obligations between the 
different natural and legal persons to whom it is applicable, but establishes a new legal 
order which governs the powers, rights and obligations of the said persons, as well as 
the necessary procedures for taking cognizance of and penalizing any breach of it. 
Therefore, except where otherwise expressly provided, the basic concept of the treaty 
requires that die Member States shall not take the law into their own hands.209 
The crux of the problem is in deciding whether the rights of the Member State in 
international law or its obligations under Community law are to take priority. The 
208. Cases 90 and 91/63 [1964] ECR pp625. 
209. I b i d . 631 (emphasis added). 
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objective of the single market requires Community obligations to be observed, but the 
scenario is not concerned merely with intra-Community factors. In international law 
the Member State may take counter-measures, but in doing so it would be in breach of 
its obligation to 'abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives' of the EC Treaty (Art 5). 
The answer to the problem lies in the very notion on which the Community is 
founded by which the 'Member States have limited their sovereign rights.'210 Within the 
scope of Article 113 they have transferred the legal power to take acts which fall 
within the terms of the common commercial policy. 
As full responsibility in the matter of commercial policy was transferred to the 
Community by means of Article 113(1) measures of commercial policy of a national 
character are only permissible . . . by virtue of specific authorisation by the 
Community.2" 
International law recognises that the Member States are no longer in a legal position to 
apply measures which breach the common commercial policy without authorisation 
(subject to Article 224), they having ceded that competence to the European 
Community. If a Member State purported to exercise such competence, a corporation 
whose contract was affected by the measures would be able to rely on the direct effect 
either of the EC-Third State agreement or of any Council Regulation adopted to 
implement the treaty. 
V. Judicial Control of CoimraoimSty and Member State Action 
The attribution of competence between the E C and its Member States is not always 
easy to determine. In the case of dispute, the CJEC is placed to review both 
Community and national counter-measures where the latter fall within a field of 
competence of the E C 
It is unlikely that the Court would be petitioned on such a political decision as 
the imposition of counter-measures. However Articles 169 and 170 could conceivably 
be used by the Commission or a Member State to challenge the legality or scope of a 
regulation which imposed counter-measures against a third State. Such proceedings 
could also be used to sanction Member States which fail properly to implement 
decisions reached at Community level. This could prove important to ensure that the 
210. Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR pp585, pp593. 
211. Case 41/76 C r i e l , n6e Donckerwolke e t a l v Procureur de l a 
R6publique au T r i b u n a l de Grande I n s t a n c e , L i l l e e t a l [1976] ECR 
ppl937. 
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measures are applied uniformly and that no loopholes appear in Member State 
implementation. 
Where Member State(s) take national counter-measures in exercise of retained 
sovereignty the CJEC is still competent. For if the Member State acts under either 
Article 223 or 224, then Article 225 provides: 
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 169 and 170 the 
Commission or any Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of 
Justice if it considers that another Member State is making improper use of the powers 
provided for in Articles 223 and 224. 
Where the Member State acts by way of application of the exception to Regulation 
288/82 (Art 21(a)), the Court is competent to judge the validity and scope of its use. 
Although judicial competence is thus provided for by the E E C Treaty, control 
of Member State action is more likely to be of a political nature exercised by the other 
Member States, since they might not be keen to expose political and security matters 
to judicial scrutiny. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN T H E CONTEXT OF 
T H E CRISIS IN T H E F O R M E R YUGOSLAVIA 
The use of sanctions212 by the United Nations and the European Community in the 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia has to be seen in the context of its other activities and 
objectives and overall aim of achieving peace.213 This was emphasised by the 
Community in the European Political Cooperation (EPC) statement issued on 1 June 
1992 welcoming the UN Security Council Resolution 757 (1992) and pledging to 
enforce the sanctions imposed under it against Serbia and Montenegro: 
The European Community and its Member States express the view that those measures 
should be considered in the light of their untiring efforts to achieve a lasting and 
peaceful solution for the problems of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, namely through the Conference on Yugoslavia and through the talks of the 
three communities of Bosnia-Hercegovina on constitutional arrangements.214 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six republics -
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia - and of 
two autonomous regions - Kosovo and Vojvodina. The constitutional crisis came to a 
head in May 1991 when Serbia blocked the annual rotation of the chairmanship of the 
Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia among the republics and autonomous provinces.215 
Negotiations during the spring of 1991 on the terms of a newly structured federation 
failed and the parliaments of the republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared their 
independence from the Yugoslav federation on 25 June. The declarations were 
declared 'null and void' and 'illegal' by the federal government.216 The US and EC had 
212. 'Sanctions' r a t h e r than 'counter-measures' because f o r the most 
p a r t the r e s t r i c t i o n s were introduced pursuant to S e c u r i t y 
C o u n c i l mandatory r e s o l u t i o n s . 
213. T h i s account of the c r i s i s i n the r e p u b l i c s of the former 
Y u g o s l a v i a does not attempt to r e l a t e the f a c t s of the c i v i l war, 
nor d e t a i l s of the peace e f f o r t s , nor the f u l l r o l e of other 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s due to p r e s s u r e of space. I t i s taken 
up to the adoption of R e s o l u t i o n 820 (1993). 
214. EC B u l l e t i n 6-1992 ppl07 a t 1.5.2. 
215. The F e d e r a l Presidency c o n s i s t e d of one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from 
each of the s i x r e p u b l i c s - Bosnia-Hercegovina, C r o a t i a , 
Macedonia, Montenegro, S l o v e n i a and S e r b i a - and from both the 
autonomous provinces - Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
216. The Times, 27 June 1991, p p l . 
79 
previously warned the republics that they would not recognise their independence. This 
reflected the EC's initial policy of maintaining the federation.217 
Federal troops and tanks moved out of barracks in Slovenia to assert the 
control of the federal government on 27 July.218 The EC decided the following day219 to 
send a troika consisting of the foreign ministers of the current President of the Council 
of Ministers, the previous occupant and next in line to the position to chair peace 
talks.220 The troika proposed a peace plan consisting of the implementation of a 
ceasefire and return of forces to barracks; suspension of the declarations of 
independence for three months; and restoration of constitutional order including the 
appointment of a federal president. But Slovenia rejected the federal conditions for a 
ceasefire. A meeting was then held between the federal prime minister and the 
President of Slovenia and an agreement was reached on 31 June and tanks began to 
withdraw from the republic, but remained in Croatia.221 
The conclusions of a meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were discussed by E C 
foreign ministers on 5 July222 in The Hague.223 It was agreed to send another troika to 
make practical arrangements for a mission to be sent to monitor the implementation of 
the previously agreed ceasefire. It simultaneously declared an embargo on armaments 
and military equipment on all of Yugoslavia. The EC also suspended the second and 
third financial protocols with the federation thereby freezing £600 million of aid due to 
go to Yugoslavia, but expressed the hope that the normalisation of the situation would 
soon permit their restoration.224 
The Community constantly condemned the use of force. In the EPC declaration 
of 5 July 1991, it stated that a dialogue between the parties should be based on 
. . . the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe, in particular respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities 
and rights of peoples to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United 
217. The Times, 24 June 1991, p p l . 
218. The Times, 28 June 1 9 9 1 , p p l . 
219. The Times, 29 June 1991, p p l . 
220. The i n i t i a l t r o i k a c o n s i s t e d of the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s of I t a l y , 
Luxembourg and The Netherlands. The presidency of the C o u n c i l of 
M i n i s t e r s r o t a t e d on 1 J u l y and subsequent t r o i k a s were composed 
of o f f i c i a l s from Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Po r t u g a l . 
221. The Times, 1 J u l y 1 9 9 1 , p p l . 
222. The Times, 5 J u l y 1991, ppl4. 
223. The Committee of Senior O f f i c i a l s met i n Prague on 3 J u l y having 
only been e s t a b l i s h e d by the Conference a few weeks before. 
224. EC B u l l e t i n 7/8-1991 ppl08 a t 1.4.3. 
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Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to 
territorial integrity of States (Charter of Paris).225 
The troika brokered a truce on 7 July after talks on the Adriatic island of Brioni 
between the EC delegation, the federal government and the presidents of the republics. 
The agreement included a three month moratorium on further moves by Slovenia and 
Croatia to implement their independence declarations so that round-table talks could 
begin on 1 August and a CSCE mission would monitor certain areas in Slovenia.226 
The federal presidency voted on 18 July to withdraw the JNA from Slovenia 
within three months.227 But a second round of talks subsequent to those at Brioni broke 
down. EC foreign ministers agreed on the dispatch of a third troika to Yugoslavia to 
try to reach a ceasefire in Croatia, and to extend the monitoring mission's work to that 
republic. The E C troika failed in its effort to secure peace and blamed Serbia for the 
failure to agree to an extension of the E C monitoring mission's work to Croatia.228 EC 
foreign ministers requested the Commission to examine the possible use of sanctions.229 
On 29 August the E C issued a deadline of 1 September to accept a monitored 
ceasefire and a peace conference.230 Following the signing of a ceasefire on 1 
September and a Memorandum of Understanding on the extension of the E C 
monitoring mission, and agreement of all the parties to its goals and instruments, the 
Conference on Yugoslavia was convened on 7 September in the Peace Palace in The 
Hague under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. 
The aim of the Conference was to 'adopt arrangements to ensure peaceful 
accommodation of the conflicting aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples on the basis of 
the following principles: no unilateral change of borders by force, protection of the 
rights of all in Yugoslavia and full account to be taken of all legitimate concerns and 
legitimate expectations.'231 A joint declaration was adopted on the opening day, 
specifying the aims of the Conference and stating in particular that no recognition 
would be given to changes in frontiers other than those achieved by peaceful means 
and with the agreement of the parties concerned.232 The Conference provided the 
framework for on-going talks, including plenary discussions between the parties. 
The UK, France and Belgium presented a draft text to the UN Security 
Council. On 25 September, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council 
225. EC B u l l e t i n 7/8-1991 ppl07 a t 1.4.3. 
226. The Times, 8 J u l y 1991. 
227. The Times, 19 J u l y 1991. 
228. The Times, 5 August 1991, p p l . 
229. The Times, 7 August 1991, pp7. 
230. EC B u l l e t i n 7/8-1991 p p l l 6 a t 1.4.25. 
231. EC B u l l e t i n 9-1991 pp63 a t 1.4.2. 
232. ILM' XXXI No 6 November 1992 ppl431. 
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adopted Resolution 713 (1991), which determined a threat to international peace and 
security and imposed 'a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise 
following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of 
Yugoslavia.'233 It requested the Secretary-General to offer his assistance and to report 
as soon as possible to the Security Council. It supported the ceasefire arrangements of 
17 and 22 September, and urged the resolution of disputes through the Conference on 
Yugoslavia. The Resolution was backed by the Yugoslav federal government in a letter 
to the UN, thus removing any objection by Council members on the basis of 
interference in the internal affairs of a Member State. 
The EC foreign ministers issued an important EPC statement after their 
meeting at Haarzuilens on 6 October. It threatened that if an agreement of 4 October, 
which included a ceasefire and military arrangements, was not respected by midnight it 
would impose: 
restrictive measures against those parties continuing to flout the desire of the other 
Yugoslav parties as well as the international community for a successful outcome of 
the Conference on Yugoslavia. [The EC] will then terminate the Cooperation and 
Trade Agreement with Yugoslavia and only renew it with those parties which are 
contributing to the peace process. Ministers have asked the Political Committee and the 
Commission to identify immediately further measures, including in the economic 
field.234 
It also stated that a solution to the issue of recognition for those republics wishing it 
should be sought 'at the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith and 
involving all parties.' Despite this declared approach, Croatia and Slovenia declared 
their independence from the Yugoslav federation on 8 October.235 This took place on 
the expiry of the three month EC-imposed moratorium on declarations of 
independence agreed at the Brioni talks. 
The EC issued a warning to Serbia on 28 October that unless it lifted by 5 
November its reservations to the peace plan236 unveiled by Lord Carrington ten days 
earlier linking the six republics in a looser association of 'sovereign and independent 
republics,' 
2 3 3 . UN DOC S / R E S / 7 1 3 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
2 3 4 . E C B u l l e t i n 1 0 - 1 9 9 1 pp86 a t 1 . 4 . 7 . 
2 3 5 . The Times, 9 October 1 9 9 1 , p p l . 
2 3 6 . Weller, "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Response to the < D i s s o l u t i o n of the 
S o c i a l i s t F e d e r a l Republic of Yugo s l a v i a " 86 American Journal of 
International- Law p p 5 6 9 , p p 5 8 2 - 5 8 3 . 
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the Conference [on Yugoslavia] will proceed with the cooperative republics to obtain a 
political solution, in the perspective of recognition of the independence of those 
republics wishing it, at the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith, as set 
out in Haarzuilens on 6 October. Non-cooperative parties can then expect restrictive 
measures to be taken against them by the European Community and its Member 
States.237 
EC foreign ministers met on 4 November in Brussels and agreed a contingency 
plan on imposing sanctions against republics which opposed the EC peace plan put 
forward by Lord Carrington. The EC extended the 5 November deadline until Serbian 
views had been heard on the ultimatum for political negotiations. Serbia did not want 
Serb-populated enclaves in Croatia to remain in that republic, and was unwilling to 
give up its demand that a solution be found on a federal basis.238 This approach led to 
the announcement on 8 November, following a meeting of EC foreign ministers in 
Rome, that 'the basic elements of the proposals on behalf of the Twelve put forward by 
Lord Carrington, aimed at a comprehensive political solution, have not been put 
forward by all the parties' and as a consequence the negotiating process had been put in 
jeopardy and so the EC had decided to take the following measures: 
i) the immediate suspension of the trade and cooperation agreement with Yugoslavia 
and a decision to terminate the agreement 
ii) the restoration of the quantitative limits for textiles 
iii) the removal of Yugoslavia from the list of beneficiaries of the Generalized System 
of Preferences 
iv) the formal suspension of benefits under the Phare programme.239 
The Community promised to enact 'positive compensatory measures' to those republics 
which co-operated in the peace process to find a solution. But the Peace Conference 
was effectively suspended by the announcement of sanctions. The EPC statement 
notified that Yugoslavia had not been invited to the G-24 ministerial meeting on 11 
November. The EC also called for the implementation of a UN oil embargo and for the 
arms embargo to be strengthened, but the search for agreement among members of the 
Security Council on an oil embargo was abandoned in the face of objections of non-
aligned States.240 
237. EC B u l l e t i n 10-1991 p89 a t 1.4.15. 
238. The Times, 5 November 1 9 9 1 , p p l l . 
239. EC B u l l e t i n 11-1991 pp91 a t 1.4.3. 
240. EC B u l l e t i n 1 1 - 1 9 9 1 pp92 a t 1.4.3. 
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On 2 December the EC Council of Ministers re-established as from 15 
November the trade concessions provided for by the Cooperation Agreement between 
the Community and Yugoslavia for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and 
Macedonia.241 It also called on the Commission to restore the Phare programme to 
cover these republics. These measures fitted into the framework of providing 
incentives to parties contributing to the peaceful search for a solution. They also 
signalled that the Community now considered that these republics had lost their ties 
with Belgrade, and so led the way to possible recognition.242 
Acting under Chapter VI I of the Charter the Security Council established a 
Committee of the Security Council ('the Committee') to monitor the implementation of 
the arms embargo as part of Resolution 724 (1991). 
The EC agreed on 16 December to recognise the independence of all the 
Yugoslav republics which fulfilled specified conditions, and said that the 
implementation of the decision would take place on 15 January 1992. It invited all the 
republics to state by 23 December whether: 
i) they wished to be recognised as independent States; 
ii) they accepted the commitments contained in the EC Guidelines on the recognition 
of new States in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union;243 
iii) they accepted the provisions laid down in the draft Convention - especially those 
in Chapter II on human rights and rights of national or ethnic groups - under 
consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia; 
iv) they continued to support 
2 4 1 . Regulation (EEC) No 3 5 6 7 / 9 1 of 2 December 1 9 9 1 , O J No L 1 4 2 / 1 of 
1 2 . 1 2 . 9 1 . 
2 4 2 . The Times, 3 December 1991, p p l l . 
2 4 3 . The G u i d e l i n e s were i s s u e d on 17 December and contained the 
f o l l o w i n g commitments 
• i ) r e s p e c t f o r the p r o v i s i o n s of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the commitments s u b s c r i b e d to i n the F i n a l Act of H e l s i n k i 
and i n the Ch a r t e r of P a r i s , e s p e c i a l l y with regard to the r u l e 
of law, democracy and human r i g h t s ; 
i i ) guarantees f o r the r i g h t s of e t h n i c and n a t i o n a l groups and 
m i n o r i t i e s i n accordance w i t h commitments s u b s c r i b e d to i n the 
framework of the CSCE; 
i i i ) r e s p e c t f o r the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of a l l f r o n t i e r s which can only 
change by p e a c e f u l means and by common agreement; 
i v ) acceptance of a l l r e l e v a n t commitments with regard to disarmament 
and n u c l e a r n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n as w e l l as to s e c u r i t y and r e g i o n a l 
s t a b i l i t y ; 
v) commitment to s e t t l e by agreement, i n c l u d i n g where appropriate by 
rec o u r s e to a r b i t r a t i o n , a l l questions concerning S t a t e 
s u c c e s s i o n and r e g i o n a l d i s p u t e s . ' 
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a) the efforts of the Secretary-General and Security Council of the United 
Nations 
b) the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia.244 
The EC also required any republic prior to recognition 'to adopt constitutional and 
political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighbouring 
Community state and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a 
neighbouring Community State, including the use of a denomination which implies 
territorial claims.' This later point had clear connotations for the Macedonian problem. 
Lord Carrington warned the Member States that recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 
might lead to demands for the recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and to the outbreak 
of hostilities in that republic. The US also warned that recognition could damage the 
prospects for peace.245 
In response to the contribution of Montenegro to 'creating the necessary 
conditions for the continuation of the [peace] Conference' the EC suspended, on 10 
January, the application of certain quantitative restrictions which had been applied 
against that republic and Serbia.246 This then put Montenegro in line with measures 
adopted for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia.247 
On 15 January the Member States of the EC 2 4 8 formally recognised Croatia and 
Slovenia.249 This followed fulfilment of the conditions of the declaration of 16 
December 1991 and the advice of the Arbitration Commission. The EC had received 
applications for recognition from Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia 
(which voted in a referendum for independence on 8 September), and from the self-
proclaimed 'Republic of Krajina' (composed of Serb-held ares of Croatia), and from the 
Albanian population of the 'Republic of Kosovo.' But Serbia announced that it would 
not seek recognition because Serbia had been an internationally recognised State 
before the founding of Yugoslavia. The statement issued by the EC declared that for 
other republics which desired recognition 'there are still important matters to be 
addressed before a similar step by the Community and its Member States can be 
taken.'250 EC recognition was followed by other States the following day. Germany had 
proceeded with recognition in December 1991 but had delayed its implementation until 
the Community recognised the republics. Recognition by the EC Member States was in 
244. EC B u l l e t i n 12-1991 p p l l 9 a t 1.4.6. 
245. The Times, 17 December 1991, p p l l . 
246. EC B u l l e t i n 1/2-1992 ppl07 a t 1.5.8. 
247. I b i d ppl08 a t 1.5.8. 
248. Germany had recognised the Rep u b l i c s i n December 1991, and t h a t 
d e c i s i o n became e f f e c t i v e on 15 January 1992. 
249. EC B u l l e t i n 1/2-1991 ppl08 a t 1.5.20. 
250. I b i d ppl08 a t 1.5.20. 
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accordance with the boundaries of the republics finalised by Marshal Tito in 1945, but 
the de facto situation was that one third of Croatia was under Serbian control.251 
On 3 February the EC Council of Ministers adopted Regulation (EEC) No 
545/92252 fully restoring to Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia all 
the trade concessions granted to Yugoslavia which were not covered by Regulation 
3567/91 of 2 December 1991, namely certain industrial products subject to tariff 
ceilings, agricultural products or ECSE products. In accordance with the conclusions 
reached on 10 January at the EPC, Montenegro was added to the list of qualifying 
republics. The same day the Council adopted the Commission proposal to restore the 
benefit of generalised preferences for agricultural products for the same republics, 
which were deemed to be cooperating in the peace process.253 
The EC Member States formally recognised the Republic of Bosnia-
Hercegovina on 7 April following popular approval of independence in a referendum 
held on 29 February and 1 March.2 5 4 The United States announced the following day 
its recognition of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. This followed the issuing 
of a joint statement on recognition of Yugoslav republics by the EC and US on 10 
March in which a 'dual track approach' was agreed, and the US promised to give 'rapid 
and positive consideration' to recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.255 
The authorisation by the Security Council of the deployment of a UN 
Protection Force was followed on 27 April by a joint session of the rump 
Parliamentary Assembly of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
National Assembly of the republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of 
Montenegro which adopted a declaration proclaiming the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, continuing the State, international legal and political personality of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'.256 
The EC offered on 7 April to extend to Serbia the benefit of similar positive 
measures to those granted to the other republics on 2 December 1991 and 10 January 
1992.257 This appeared to be on condition that Serbia implemented its promise to 
continue giving 'a positive response to EC sponsored peace efforts.1258 But in a 
European Political Cooperation statement, the EC and Member States condemned the 
violence in Bosnia 'at the hands of various armed elements with the support of regular 
forces, and in particular of the JNA.' It called upon all parties to abide by the agreed 
251. The Times, 16 January 1992, p p l . 
252. OJ No L63/1 of 7.3.92. 
253. Regulation 548/92 of 3 February 1992, OJ 1992.L63/49. 
254. EC B u l l e t i n 4-1992 pp81 at 1.5.4. 
255. EC B u l l e t i n 3-1992 pplOl a t 1.4.5. 
256. Weller pp595. 
257. EC B u l l e t i n 4-1992 pp81 a t 1.5.4. 
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ceasefire of 12 April and stated that they had brought the situation in Bosnia-
Hercegovina to the attention of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE).259 
On 11 May an EPC statement was issued placing the 'greatest share of the 
blame . . . on the JNA and the authorities in Belgrade which are in control of the army 
both directly and indirectly by supporting Serbian irregulars.'260 It demanded the 
complete withdrawal of the JNA and its armaments from Bosnia-Hercegovina or its 
disbanding and placing of armaments under effective international monitoring, and the 
reopening of Sarajevo airport for the distribution of humanitarian aid. The EC and its 
Member States requested the Belgrade authorities to commit themselves to respect the 
integrity of all the borders of the republics, to respect the rights of minorities, to 
promote the conclusion of an agreement on the status of Krajina ensuring the respect 
of the territorial integrity of Croatia, and to cooperate fully with all parties at the Peace 
Conference. In the same statement the Community and Member States also stated their 
decision to: 
i) recall their Ambassadors in Belgrade for consultations 
ii) demand the suspension of the delegation of Yugoslavia at the CSCE from taking 
part in the proceedings for the present; the situation would be reviewed on 29 June 
iii) further pursue, should the situation remain unchanged, the increasing isolation of 
the Yugoslav delegation in international forums, bearing in mind in particular, the 
impending OECD ministerial meeting 
iv) ask tiie Commission to study the modalities of possible economic sanctions. 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina were formally admitted to the 
United Nations261 on 22 May. 2 6 2 The UN had previously considered the three republics 
as part of Yugoslavia, which precluded the application of sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro alone. The formal recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
its admission to the United Nations were important developments leading to the 
imposition of sanctions against the Serbia and Montenegro. The EC no longer had to 
cling to the legal contradiction of having normal trade relations with one part of a State 
(Bosnia-Hercegovina) and restricted relations with another part (Serbia). The 
259. EC B u l l e t i n 4-1992 pp84 a t 1.5.14. 
260. EC B u l l e t i n 5-92 ppl04 a t 1.3.5. 
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reception of the new States into the international community paved the way for 
sanctions to be imposed without making Bosnia a direct victim of the measures. 
Deliberations took place within the UN and EC over the introduction of oil and 
trade sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. A mortar attack on people queuing for 
bread which killed sixteen hardened the resolve of the UK and its Western allies. The 
US, UK, France and Belgium requested the Security Council to adopt oil and trade 
sanctions in one go rather than in two stages as had been tentative agreed before the 
attack.263 
The Security Council adopted Resolution 757 (1992)264 on 30 May acting 
under Chapter VI I of the UN Charter. The measures adopted were to remain in place 
until the Council decided that the Federal Republic, including the JNA, fulfilled the 
requirements of Resolution 752 (1992), which demanded the withdrawal of Yugoslav 
federal troops and Croatian army units from Bosnia-Hercegovina and the disbanding of 
all irregular forces. 
The Resolution required States to impose a prohibition on the introduction to 
their territories of all products originating in Serbia and Montenegro and the 
exportation of any goods to those Republics; on any dealings in any goods originating 
there which were exported from the Republics after the date of the resolution; on the 
sale and supply of any products, except for those required for strictly medical purposes 
notified to the Committee, to any person or body in Serbia and Montenegro or for any 
business carried on in or operated from the Republics. States were to prevent the 
provision of financial and economic resources to the authorities of the Republics or to 
businesses there and the removal from their territory of any funds, except payments 
exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs. The 
transshipment through Serbia and Montenegro of goods originating outside of them in 
accordance with guidelines established by the Committee was permitted. Permission to 
any aircraft to take off from, land in or fly over their territory i f it was destined to land 
in or had taken off from the territory of the Republics was to be denied unless the 
Committee had approved the particular flight for humanitarian or other purposes 
consistent with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The provision of engineering 
and maintenance services to aircraft registered in the Federal Republic or operated by 
or on behalf of entities in Serbia and Montenegro, or the provision of components, 
airworthiness certificates, payment of new claims against exiting insurance contracts or 
new direct insurance for such aircraft were prohibited. All States had to reduce the 
level of their diplomatic representation in the Republics, prevent the participation in 
sporting events on their territories of groups or persons representing Serbia and 
263. The Times, 29 May 1992, pplO. 
264. UN Doc S/RES/757 (1992). 
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Montenegro and suspend scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges 
with the Republics. All States, including Serbia and Montenegro, were required to 
ensure that no claim lay at the instance of those authorities or of any person or body in 
the Republics in connection with any contract or other transaction where its 
performance was affected by reason of the measures imposed by this and related 
resolutions. None of these measures applied to activities related to UNPROFOR, to 
the Conference on Yugoslavia and the European Community Monitor Mission. The 
Security Council decided to keep the measures under continuous review with a view to 
considering their suspension or termination following compliance with the demands of 
Resolution 752. 
The European Community adopted Regulation (EEC) No 1432/92 on 1 June to 
implement the UN measures falling within EC competences.263 It also withdrew the 
trade concessions from Montenegro which had been granted on 10 January and 3 
February 1992.266 
On 18 June, the Security Council267 acting under Chapter VI I voted that 
commodities and products essential for humanitarian need would no longer be subject 
to the prohibition on sale or supply to Serbia and Montenegro or that on financial 
transactions related thereto subject to the consent of the Committee of the Security 
Council.268 
The communique issued on 27 June at the end of the Lisbon European Council 
stated: 
The European Community and its Member States will not recognise the new federal 
entity comprising Serbia and Montenegro as the successor state to the former 
Yugoslavia until the moment that decision has been taken by the qualified international 
institutions. They have decided to demand the suspension of the delegation of 
Yugoslavia in the proceedings at the CSCE and other international forums and 
organisations.269 
The European Council also expressed its willingness to recognise Macedonia 'within its 
existing borders according to [the] Declaration of 16 December 1991 under a name 
2 6 5 . The p r o v i s i o n s of the Regulation a r e examined i n Chapter 5 . 
2 6 6 . Regulation (EEC) No 1 4 3 3 / 9 2 and D e c i s i o n 9 2 / 2 8 6/ECSC, OJ L 1 5 1 of 
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which does not include the term Macedonia.' It considered its borders inviolable and 
guaranteed by the principles of the UN Charter and the Charter of Paris. 
The Western European Union (WEU) and NATO launched joint naval 
operations to monitor the implementation of sanctions in the Adriatic on 10 July. 
On 20 July the EC issued an EPC statement announcing that the EC States 
would actively seek the exclusion of Yugoslavia from international bodies because it 
did not recognise the new Yugoslav state comprising Serbia and Montenegro as the 
sole successor to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.270 
The peace efforts of the EC and UN were brought into one framework in the 
form of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia which opened in 
London on 22 August. The Conference established a Steering Committee consisting of 
a representative of the Secretary-General of the UN (Cyrus Vance) and a 
representative of the presidency of the EC (Lord Owen replacing Lord Carrington), 
who were to act as co-chairmen, representatives of the EC troika and of a CSCE 
troika, one representative of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and two 
representatives of neighbouring States. Six working groups were established to operate 
in continuous session in Geneva under the direction of the co-chairmen of the Steering 
Committee. These consisted of the working groups on Bosnia-Hercegovina (to 
promote a cessation of hostilities and a constitutional settlement in the republic); on 
Humanitarian Issues (to promote humanitarian relief including refugees); on Ethnic and 
National Communities and Minorities (to recommend initiatives for resolving ethnic 
questions); on Succession Issues (to resolve succession issues arising from the 
emergence of new States); on Economic Issues; and on Confidence and Security-
Building and Verification Measures (to develop confidence-building measures covering 
military movements, arms control, and arms transfers and limitations, and measures for 
their monitoring and verification). 
On 8 September the EC Council of Ministers decided271 to subject exports 
destined for the States of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav 
republic of Macedonia to prior authorisation by the relevant Member State authorities. 
This would in turn be dependent on the prior issue of import licences by the authorities 
of the republics in question and on a commitment by them to acknowledge the safe 
receipt of exports. This three-tiered control mechanism was designed to ensure the 
exports to former Yugoslav republics or territories bordering on Serbia and 
Montenegro were not diverted. Slovenia was excluded because it does not border 
Serbia or Montenegro.272 These licences do not apply to exports comprising foodstuffs 
270. EC B u l l e t i n 7/8-1992 ppl08 a t 1.5.5. 
271. Regulation (EEC) No 2656/92 of 8 September 1992, OJ No L 226/27 
of 12.9.92, and D e c i s i o n 92/470/ECSC, OJ No L 266/29 of 12.9.92. 
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or products intended strictly for medical purposes, for essential humanitarian need or 
for activities related to UNPROFOR, the Conference on Yugoslavia or the EC 
Monitor Mission, and those consignments worth less than ECU 1000. Between 19 
September and 1 November 1992 exports pursuant to contracts concluded before 19 
September 1992 were also exempt provided execution of the contract began before 
that date. 
On the same day the Council adopted a Regulation273 to prevent goods being 
diverted to Serbia and Montenegro by confining use of the TIR carnet to consignments 
sent via these territories either under the Community transit procedure for intra-
Community trade or the common transit procedure for trade between the Community 
and EFT A. Community or common transit procedures were more sophisticated and 
watertight than TIR procedures so that the simultaneous use of transit and TIR carnet 
procedures would ensure that the embargo was more effective. 
On 23 September, following a recommendation by the Security Council, the 
General Assembly voted by 127-6 to prevent the delegation of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia from taking up its seat in the Assembly until it reapplied for 
membership.274 On 24 August Yugoslavia was also barred form the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
Lord Owen and Mr Vance presented their proposals for the shape of the future 
of Bosnia on 27 October.275 The Vance-Owen plan consisted of constitutional 
proposals, military arrangements and a map dividing Bosnia-Hercegovina into ten 
ethnic regions. The Republic would retain a central government but give considerable 
autonomy to up to ten regional authorities. The central government would consist of a 
ceremonial president and a prime minister whose cabinet would be ethnically balanced, 
A constitutional court and a human rights court composed of five foreign judges would 
be established; and ombudsmen from all groups would deal with the reversal of ethnic 
cleansing. 
On 16 November the UN Security Council passed Resolution 787 (1992).276 It 
prohibited the transshipment of crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy- related 
equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tyres, vehicles, aircraft and 
motors of all types unless specifically authorised by the Committee. All States were 
called on to take all steps necessary to ensure that none of their exports are diverted to 
Serbia and Montenegro. All States were required to use such measures commensurate 
with the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security 
273. Regulation (EEC) No 2655/92 of 8 September 1992, OJ No 1 266/26 
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Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify 
their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of 
resolutions 713 and 757. The Security Council reaffirmed the responsibility of riparian 
States to measures necessary to ensure that shipping on the Danube is in accordance 
with resolutions 713 and 757, including the halting of such shipping in order to inspect 
and verify their cargoes and destinations.277 
NATO and the WEU agreed on 20 November to enforce the trade embargo 
and so gave its vessels in the Adriatic and on the Danube the power to stop and search 
merchant ships suspected of violating the arms and trade sanctions. 
The EC discontinued the double control procedure, introduced on 8 September 
1992, in relation to trade with Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.278 It was made redundant in these territories by the establishment of 
Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMS) by the CSCE which enabled the competent 
authorities to control effectively the exports from or through its territory to Serbia and 
Montenegro. The original procedure was maintained for Bosnia-Hercegovina because 
the conflict made it difficult to set up a Sanctions Assistance Mission in the Republic. 
Additional SAMS were established in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Ukraine to 
provide assistance to local customs officers and other personnel both with advice and 
manpower.279 
It was announced on 14 January 1993 that the EC would make its first 
deliveries of aid to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia in February to 
compensate it for the adverse effects of sanctions. Twenty million ECUs worth of aid 
(out of the 100 ECU package decided in Edinburgh) would be sent and a second 
tranche prepared.280 
The persistent refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan 
and their prolonged siege of eastern Bosnian towns preventing aid reaching those 
towns led to the adoption of Resolution 820 (1993)281 by the UN Security Council on 
17 April. The measures adopted under the resolution were set to come into force nine 
days after its adoption 'unless the Secretary-General has reported to the Council that 
the Bosnian Serb party has joined the other parties in signing the peace plan and in 
implementing it and that the Bosnian Serbs have ceased their military attacks.' This 
277. The R e s o l u t i o n was implemented by the EC i n Regulation (EEC) No 
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demand was not met within the stated deadline, and so they came into force on 26 
April 1993. But the resolution had provided that if the Secretary-General reported that 
such attacks resumed or that the Serbs failed to comply with the peace plan, then the 
measures would immediately have come into force. 
The import to, export from and transshipment through the United Nations 
Protected Areas in Croatia and those areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina under the control of 
Serb forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies including medical 
supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian agencies, were 
prohibited unless proper authorisation was obtained from the Government of Croatia 
or of Bosnia-Hercegovina respectively. States were to prevent the diversion to Serbia 
and Montenegro of products said to be destined for other places, particularly the 
UNPAs and areas of Bosnia controlled by Serb forces. The transshipment of goods 
through the Federal Republic on the Danube was permitted only on the specific 
authorisation of the Committee. It confirmed that no vessels connected with Serbia or 
Montenegro or suspected of having violated or being in violation of Security Council 
sanctions were to be permitted to pass through waterways in the territories of 
members. States in which funds of the authorities in Serbia and Montenegro, of 
businesses in the Republics, or those controlled directly or indirectly by such 
authorities or by Serbian or Montenegrin businesses were compelled to require all 
persons and entities holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that were not made 
available, directly or indirectly, to the authorities in the Federal Republic or to 
businesses in Serbia and Montenegro. The transport of goods across the land borders 
or to or from the ports of the Republics was prohibited subject to certain exceptions. 
States neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro were required to prevent the passage of 
all freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of the Republics, except at certain 
crossings. All States were to impound all Serbian or Montenegrin vessels, freight 
vehicles, rolling stock, and aircraft found in their territories and such carriers could be 
forfeited i f they violated the UN sanctions. These and cargoes had to be detained, 
pending investigation and, where appropriate the cargo forfeited to the detaining State. 
The provision of financial and non-financial services to any person or business in 
Serbia and Montenegro was prohibited, with the exception of telecommunications, 
postal services and legal services, those services approved by the Committee, and 
services whose supply may have been necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional 
purposes. All commercial maritime traffic was prohibited from entering the territorial 
sea of the Federal Republic, except when authorised by the Committee or in case of 
force majeure. None of the above measures applied to the activities related to 
UNPROFOR, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia or the European 
Community Monitor Mission. 
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The Resolution stated that the Security Council was ready 'after all three 
Bosnian parties have accepted the peace plan and on the basis of verified evidence, 
provided by the Secretary-General, that the Bosnian Serb party is cooperating in good 
faith in effective implementation of the plan, to review all the measures in the present 
resolution and its other relevant resolutions with a view to gradually lifting them.' 
The complete economic isolation of Serbia and Montenegro was set in place. 
But the application of the measures required State legislation and commitment to 
effective implementation and monitoring. 
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CHAPTER 5 
T H E INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IMPOSED AGAINST SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO 
L The Emropeami Commnnmimotty Measures of November 1991 
The first economic measures282 taken by the European Community in response to the 
situation in Yugoslavia were those taken in November 1991. These consisted of: 
- the immediate suspension of the trade and cooperation agreement with Yugoslavia 
and a decision to terminate the agreement. 
- the restoration of the quantitative limits for textiles 
- the removal of Yugoslavia from the list of beneficiaries of the Generalized System of 
Preferences 
- the formal suspension of benefits under the Phare programme 
The final three listed are acts of retorsion for they do not breach contractual 
obligations owed to Yugoslavia. But the suspension and denunciation of the 
Cooperation and Trade Agreements (the Agreements) are difficult to classify. Their 
purpose was clearly to show disapproval at the situation then prevailing in Yugoslavia 
and particularly at the non-observance of the cease-fire agreement of 4 October 1991. 
They are not counter-measures for no internationally wrongful act was committed or 
alleged to have been committed. Neither are they strictly acts of retorsion since the 
grounds invoked are concerned with justification in treaty law rather than as merely 
unfriendly acts. 
1. Denunciation and Suspension of the Cooperation and Trade Agreements 
The denunciation of the two Cooperation and Trade Agreements was effected in 
accordance with their terms. Article 60 of the EEC-Yugoslavia Agreement provided 
that the treaty could be denounced by either side by giving six months notice to the 
other contracting party.283 The effect of this provision is that no reasons need be given 
or procedure observed other than notification. The Council of Ministers denounced the 
Agreements on 25 November 1991. The Regulation284 effecting denunciation was 
based on Article 238 EEC since this was the provision which gave the European 
Community competence to conclude the EEC-Yugoslavia Agreement. The result was 
2 8 2 . I n the summer of 1991 the EC d i d not approve the t h i r d 
F i n a n c i a l P r o t o c o l or the Transport Agreement with Y u g o s l a v i a , 
2 8 3 . A r t i c l e 15 of the ECSC-Yugoslavia Agreement was worded to have 
s i m i l a r e f f e c t . 
2 8 4 . D e c i s i o n 91/602/EEC of 25 January 1 9 9 1 , OJ 1991 L 3 2 5 / 2 3 . 
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that the approval of the European Parliament was required, and this was achieved by 
use of the parliamentary emergency procedure. 
Denunciation would have had no effect on the application of the Agreements 
until the expiry of the six month period. So the European Community had to suspend 
their operation to achieve instant implementation of the measure. This eventuality was 
not provided for by the terms of the Agreements and so the European Community had 
to find justification in the law of treaties. The Community suspended both the 
Agreements and the trade concessions granted under them on 11 November 1991.285 
The grounds stated in the preamble to the Decision suspending the treaties were:286 
Whereas the pursuit of hostilities and their consequences on economic and trade 
relations, both between the Republics of Yugoslavia and with the Community, 
constitute a radical change in the conditions under which the Cooperation Agreement . 
. . and its Protocols, as well as the Agreement on ECSC products, were concluded; 
whereas they call into question the application of such Agreements and Protocols. 
The grounds invoked to justify the suspension were, seemingly, the clausula rebus sic 
stantibus and supervening impossibility of performance.287 The use of such claims for 
the legal justification for such an overtly political act must be examined carefully since 
they are not founded on the wrongdoing of the other party. As with national law, strict 
conditions are imposed on the invocation of such grounds. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines the circumstances in 
which these grounds may be used to excuse States from their international obligations. 
The first problem faced when referring to the Convention is that the European 
Community is not party to it. However its relevant terms are binding on it since they 
are rules of customary international law. 2 8 8 The procedural requirements are merely 
conventional and so are not binding on the European Community. 
Article 61(1) of the Vienna Convention states: 
A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for 
terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent 
285. D e c i s i o n of the C o u n c i l 91/586/ECSC, EEC of 25 November 1991, 
OJ 1991 L325/23, and Reg u l a t i o n (EEC) No 3300/91 of 11 November 
1991. T h i s l a t t e r l e g i s l a t i o n was based on A r t i c l e 113 EEC, see 
Kuyper Trade Sanctions, Security and Human Rights Policy in the 
European Communities p24, footnote 74. 
286. D e c i s i o n 91/586/ECSC, EEC of 25 November 1991, OJ 1991 L325/23. 
287. Kuyper Trade Sanctions, Security and Human Rights Policy in the 
European communities p25. 
288. I c e l a n d i c F i s h e r i e s J u r i s d i c t i o n case (UK v I c e l a n d ) I C J 
Reports '1973, ppl8 (rebus sic stantibus). 
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disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. 
If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending 
the operation of the treaty. 
The restriction of the application of this Article to the disappearance or destruction of 
'an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty' has been judged by some to be 
too narrow.289 Reuter maintained that beyond the scope of material impossibility a 
State could rely on the doctrine offorce majeure™ There is no material destruction on 
which the European Community could base justification under Article 61(1). It is 
equally doubtful that it could find a satisfactory basis in force majeure. For it is highly 
dubious that the obligations imposed by the Cooperation and Trade Agreements could 
not be carried out. The doctrine requires that 'impossibility of performance must be 
absolute'.291 In November 1991 the Yugoslav crisis was restricted to the north of the 
Federation (in Croatia), but this would not have practically prevented the application 
of the provisions of the Agreements to the rest of Yugoslavia. It would have been 
more plausible to claim impossibility of performance of the obligations in part of the 
territory, but not for the whole State. The transparency of the Community's reasoning 
is shown by its decisions of 2 December 1991 and 3 February 1992 to restore the 
benefits of the Cooperation and Trade Agreement to the individual republics except to 
Serbia and Montenegro. The beneficiaries included Croatia where the continuing 
conflict was the very ground for the purported suspension of the Agreements. 
The wide ranging obligations of the Agreements also make it difficult to justify 
the invocation of Article 61(1). The doctrine contained in that provision and that of 
force majeure require that all obligations are impossible to perform before the whole of 
the treaty may be suspended.292 The principle of pacta sunt servanda is stronger than 
the claim of the European Community to be justified to suspend the Agreements on the 
ground of supervening impossibility of performance. 'L'imagination juridique'293 of the 
Community was lacking in convincing arguments to use this ground in its search for a 
legal basis to show its political disapproval at the events in the former Yugoslavia. 
The invocation of the clausula rebus sic stantibus is on a more solid 
foundation and, from the wording of the Decision, this appears to be the main reason 
given by the Community. It is reference to an implied clause conditioning the validity 
289. S i n c l a i r The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pl91-92. 
290. Reuter Introduction to the Law of Treaties pl45 para 284 
291. Reuter pl45 para 248. 
292. Reuter pl46 para 286. 
293. Dusko Lopandic Un Exemple de Sanctions Economiques de la CEE: 
Suspension/ dSnonciation de 1'accord de cooperation entre la CEE 
et la Yougoslavie Revue D1 A f f a i r e s Europ6ennes (1992) Vol 2 pp67; 
pp7 0. 
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of the treaty upon the continuance of the circumstances existing at the time when it is 
made. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention lays down the requirements for the proper 
invocation of the clausula. 
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those 
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty and which was not foreseen by the 
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty 
unless 
a) the existence of these circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of 
the parties to be bound by the treaty 
and 
b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of the obligations still to 
be performed under the treaty. 
Article 62(3) provides that where the above conditions are fulfilled the treaty may be 
suspended. It is doubtful whether the suspension of the Agreements clears this two 
stage test. The first leg may well be satisfied in that the European Community would 
have been unlikely to conclude the Agreements with a disintegrating federal state 
which was plagued by civil war in one of its republics and with another on the verge of 
internal conflict. However the extent of the obligations under these Agreements can 
barely be said to be radically transformed. 
Illustrations of the obligations contained in the Agreements prove the 
inappropriateness of the invocation of these two grounds by the European Community 
purporting to justify the suspension of those treaties. The EEC-Yugoslavia 
Agreement294 instituted a framework for cooperation in economic, technical, financial, 
trade and social fields: 
a) the establishment of the exchange of information on agricultural policies (Art 7(2)), 
on transport policy (Art 8(3)), on environmental matters (Art 9), on financial policy 
(Art 12(1)) 
b) Article 15 stipulated that, subject to specified exceptions, products originating in 
Yugoslavia shall be imported into the Community free of quantitative restrictions and 
measures having equivalent effect, and of customs duties and charges having 
equivalent effect. 
c) Article 27 stated that in the field of trade Yugoslavia shall grant the Community 
treatment no less favourable than most-favoured-nation treatment. 
2 9 4 . Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the S o c i a l i s t F e d e r a l Republic of Yug o s l a v i a OJ 1983 L 4 1 / 2 of 
1 4 . 2 . 1 9 8 3 . 
98 
It is difficult to see how such obligations were rendered impossible to perform or 
radically transformed in scope by the hostilities which were at the time of the 
suspension of the Agreements restricted to Croatia. The operation of the customs duty 
regime applicable to products entering the European Community originating in 
Yugoslavia was hardly made impossible or radically transformed in its scope by the 
fighting in Croatia. The legal justification for the suspension of the Agreements is at 
best inadequate. 
The procedural requirements of the Vienna Convention set out in Article 65 are 
not, as previously noted, binding on the Community. The rules of customary 
international law do prescribe that a reasonable period of notice has to be given before 
the suspension of a treaty can validly take effect. The announcement in the European 
Political Cooperation statement of 6 October 1991 could be seen as such notice.295 I f 
this is accepted as an adequate means of giving notice, rather than direct 
communication of the intention to Yugoslavia, then the period of one month may be 
regarded as reasonable.296 
2. Further Measures 
The consequences of the suspension and denunciation of the Agreements required 
additional measures to be taken to effect the results desired by the Community. For 
otherwise Yugoslavia would have profited from other beneficial European Community 
trade concessions. 
The European Community negotiated an Additional Protocol to the 
Cooperation Agreement in 1986 covering trade in textiles. The fate of the textiles 
agreement was, thus, directly related to that of the Cooperation Agreement. The 
Protocol placed quantitative restrictions on the import into the European Community 
of textiles originating in Yugoslavia. The effect of the demise of the Cooperation 
Agreement would have been for such products to fall under the regime of the common 
rules for imports.297 There would then be no restrictions on the importation of goods 
emanating from Yugoslavia. The Council of Ministers adopted arrangements for 
imports of certain textile products originating in Yugoslavia, establishing unilateral 
restrictions.298 
29 5. Kuyper Trade Sanctions p26. 
296. Kuyper Trade Sanctions p26. 
297. Regulation (EEC) No 288/82 of 5 February 1982, OJ 1982 L35/1 of 
9 2.82, as l a s t amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2978/91 (OJ 1991 
L284/1 of 12 10.91) . 
298. Regulation (EEC) No 3301/91 of 11 November 1991, OJ 1991 L315/3 
of 15.11.91. 
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To complete the full withdrawal of trade benefits from Yugoslavia, the 
Socialist Federal Republic was excluded from the Generalised System of Preferences.299 
This is a regime instituted unilaterally by the European Community allowing duty free 
or annually determined reduced rates of duty on imports of certain developing 
countries. Yugoslavia had only benefited to a limited extent under the GSP since the 
conclusion of the 1980 Cooperation Agreement. Yugoslavia would have been able to 
rely on the System had it not been withdrawn.300 
The result of these measures was the complete break in formal institutional 
trading relations between the European Community and Yugoslavia. The first time that 
this has been effected by the Community against a trading partner.301 
By suspending the Cooperation Agreement and then restoring equivalent 
benefits to certain parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,302 the 
European Community had separate trade relations with non-recognised entities. No 
trade treaties were concluded with the republics concerned, but the arrangements 
effected presented an apparent dichotomy of the European Community undertaking 
inter-state relations with entities which its Members did not then recognise as States. 
There are two ways of looking at this situation. 
The first is that the Republics to whom the concessions were granted had in 
fact acquired statehood by that time and that the European Community was merely 
extending trading favours to newly established States although having not yet 
recognised them. Lauterpact's proposition of 1947 that 'recognition of states is not a 
matter governed by law but a question of policy'303 is today 'more accurate than ever 
before'. 3 0 4 The attainment of statehood by the Republics would provide a satisfactory 
answer to an otherwise legally problematic situation. The dissolution of the SFRY has 
been progressive and so it is impossible to ascribe a date on which the Republics 
became States. The invitation of the European Community to the former Yugoslav 
republics to declare whether they wished to be recognised must imply some 
acknowledgement by the European Community that the Republics fulfilled at least 
some of the traditional features of statehood. 
299. Regulation (EEC) No 3302/91 of 11 November 1991, OJ 1991 315/46 
of 15.11.91. 
300. Kuyper Trade Sanctions p24 
301. Lopandic Un Exemple de Sanctions Economiques de la CEE p68 
302. C e r t a i n e q u i v a l e n t trade c o n c e s s i o n s were granted to Bosnia-
Hercegovina, C r o a t i a , Macedonia and S l o v e n i a on 2 December 1991, 
and to Montenegro on 10 January 1992, and f u l l y r e s t o r e d a l l 
concessions to these Republics on 3 February 1992. See chapter 4. 
303. H. Lauterpacht Recognition in International Law (1947) p p l . 
304. R i c h "Recognition of s t a t e s ! The C o l l a p s e of Yu g o s l a v i a and the 
S o v i e t Union" 4 European Journal of International Law 1993 pp36. 
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The second approach is to consider that the SFRY, although 'in the process of 
dissolution,'305 it was still intact at that point and that none of the Republics had 
acquired statehood. This leads to a more complex explanation of the European 
Community measures. For i f this was the case, the European Community accepted 
imports originating from certain parts of one State on different terms to those 
originating from other parts of the same State. The aim of this was to bring influence 
to bear on Serbia and Montenegro, but in the search to isolate two republics in a 
federal state, the European Community had established a legal position which it is 
difficult to appreciate. The explanation may be that the Community has virtual 
competence by virtue of the terms of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, and there is no 
legal requirement for a trade treaty. The other party would be on secure legal ground 
to ensure that the trade concessions continued to operate, but under the present 
situation it is a informal arrangement unilaterally established by the Community. It is 
not absolutely clear that the European Community has the competence to do this under 
the Treaty, but without the option of a trade treaty at that point in time it appears to be 
the best means available of permitting goods of those republics contributing to the 
peace process to enter the territory of the Community at preferential rates compared to 
those from Serbia and Montenegro. It will require a decision of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities to appreciate fully whether such a device is legally valid. 
I I . United Nations Sanctions 
This section involves a subject analysis of the sanctions introduced by the United 
Nations and their implementation by the European Community and the United 
Kingdom. 
1. Embargo on Goods 
Resolution 757 (1992) of the Security Council, adopted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, imposed a general embargo on imports and exports from Serbia and 
Montenegro306. All States were required to prevent the importation of all products307 
originating in Serbia and Montenegro. They had to stop any activities by their nationals 
or in their territory intended to promote the export or transshipment of any goods 
3 0 5 . B a d i n t e r A r b i t r a t i o n Commission Opinion No 1, ILM Vol XXXI No 6 
Nov 1992 p l 4 9 7 . 
3 0 6 . The d e s i g n a t i o n 'Serbia and Montenegro' i s used i n the 
n a r r a t i v e , but the term 'Federal R e p u b l i c (of Yugos l a v i a ) i s to 
be found i n some of the quotations from l e g i s l a t i o n . 
307 . The term 'product' i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s used to i n c l u d e a l l 
commodities and products. 
originating in the Serbia and Montenegro; and any dealings by their nationals or their 
flag vessels or aircraft or in their territories in any goods originating in the Republics 
and exported from it after the date of the resolution, including any transfer of funds to 
the Serbia and Montenegro for the purposes of such activities or dealings. States were 
obliged to prevent the sale and supply by their nationals or from their territories or 
using their flag vessels or aircraft of any products, except for those required for strictly 
medical purposes notified to the Committee, to any person or body in the Republics, or 
to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from 
Serbia and Montenegro and any activities by their nationals or in their territories 
designed to promote such sale or supply. 
These measures did not apply to the transshipment through the Serbia and 
Montenegro of goods originating outside of it and temporarily present in its territory 
for the sole purpose of such transshipment, in accordance with guidelines established 
by the Security Council Committee established under Resolution 713 (1991) ('the 
Committee'). As with all the relevant Security Council resolutions none of these 
measures applied to activities related to UNPROFOR, to the Conference on 
Yugoslavia and the European Community Monitor Mission. 
The European Community implemented its legislation on 1 June 1992. 
Regulation (EEC) 1432/92308 prohibited the introduction into the Community of all 
products originating in Serbia and Montenegro, and the exportation of goods to those 
republics of any products originating in the Community. It proscribed any activity 
whose object or purpose was to promote, directly or indirectly, such imports or 
exports. The Regulation established exceptions to these prohibitions. These did not 
cover exports to Serbia and Montenegro of products intended for strictly medical 
purposes and foodstuffs notified to Security Council Committee (subject to the prior 
authorisation of the competent authorities of the Member States); products entering 
the Community which were exported from Serbia and Montenegro before 31 May 
1992; any activity designed directly or indirectly to promote either of these foregoing 
transactions; the transshipment through Serbia and Montenegro of products originating 
outside these Republics and which were temporarily in their territory for the purpose 
of transshipment only; and the activities of UNPROFOR, the Conference on 
Yugoslavia and the European Community monitor mission. 
Implementation of Resolution 757 (1992) was initially achieved in the UK by 
the introduction of secondary legislation under the Import, Export and Customs 
Powers (Defence) Act 1939. Section 1(1) of the Act empowers the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry'09 to make such provisions as he thinks expedient for 
308. OJ 1992 L151/4 of 3.6.92. 
309. The Act o r i g i n a l l y i n v e s t e d the power i n the Board of Trade. The 
S e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e f o r Trade and In d u s t r y order 1970 ( S I No 
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prohibiting or regulating the importation into and the exportation from the UK 
(including the Isle of Man) of all goods or of specified goods. The Export of Goods 
(Control) (Serbia and Montenegro Sanctions) Order 1992 (hereafter the Export of 
Goods Order) entered into force on 31 May 1992 by virtue of the Act. The Export of 
Goods Order provided that, unless a licence was granted under the Order by the 
Secretary of State and its conditions complied with, all goods were prohibited to be 
exported from the UK to any destination in Serbia and Montenegro or to any 
destination in any other country for delivery, directly or indirectly, to a person for the 
purposes of any business carried on in or operated from either of those territories 
(Article 2(1)). Any licence granted by the Secretary of State under any other Order 
relating to the control of exports adopted under si of the 1939 Act and any licence 
granted pursuant to any other enactment prohibiting or restricting export was made 
subject to Article 2(1) of the Order. The provisions of the Export of Goods (Control) 
Order 1991 on customs powers for demanding evidence, on offences related to 
licences and on declarations as to goods and powers of search applied to the 1992 
Order. The Export of Goods Order was revoked310 on 12 June 1992 after the entry into 
force a week earlier of an Order in Council under the provisions of the United Nations 
Act 1946. 
The 1946 Act enables measures passed by the Security Council under Article 
41 of the UN Charter to be applied by way of Order in Council. Her Majesty may 
make such provision as appears necessary or expedient for enabling those measures to 
be effectively applied. It was by this enabling legislation that the greater part of 
Resolution 757 was applied in national law by Her Majesty's Government. 
The Serbia and Montenegro (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1992311 ('the 
1992 UN Sanctions Order') came into force on 5 June 1992. Its relevant provisions 
applied to any person within the UK (which for the purposes of the Order includes the 
Isle of Man) and to any person elsewhere who was a British citizen, a British 
Dependent Territories citizen, a British Overseas citizen, a British subject or a British 
protected person, or a body incorporated or constituted under the law of any part of 
the UK (hereafter 'British persons'). It would automatically cease to have effect or its 
operation would be suspended if the Security Council decided to cancel or suspend the 
operation of Resolution 757, and notice of that decision would be published in the 
London, Edinburgh and Belfast Gazettes. 
1970/1537) t r a n s f e r r e d the f u n c t i o n s of the Board to the 
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e to be e x e r c i s e a b l e c o n c u r r e n t l y with the 
Board. 
310. The Export of Goods ( C o n t r o l ) ( S e r b i a and Montenegro Sa n c t i o n s ) 
(Revocation) Order 1992, S I No 1992/1419 
311. S I 1992/1302. 
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The Order312 prohibited the supply or delivery, agreement to supply or deliver, 
or any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any goods without a licence 
('Article 3 licence') granted by the Secretary of State under this Order or under the 
Export of Goods Order to persons connected with Serbia or Montenegro ('connected 
persons'), namely 
i) the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of Serbia and of 
Montenegro 
ii) any other person in, or resident in, Serbia or Montenegro 
iii) any body incorporated or constituted under the law of Serbia or Montenegro 
iv) any body, whether incorporated or constituted, which is controlled by any of these 
Governments, any other person in, or resident in, Serbia or Montenegro, or any body 
incorporated in or constituted under the law of Serbia or Montenegro; and 
v) any person acting on behalf of any of the above mentioned persons. 
A licence ('Article 4 licence') granted by the Secretary of State under the 1992 
UN Sanctions Order or the Export of Goods Order was required for the exportation of 
any goods from the UK to anywhere in Serbia or Montenegro or to any destination for 
the purpose of delivery, directly or indirectly, to one of the above. 
The importation into the UK of goods originating in Serbia or Montenegro by 
any person was prohibited except under the authority of a licence granted under the 
1992 UN Sanctions Order ('Article 5 licence') or the Import of Goods (Control) Order 
1954. I f neither of these licences had been obtained, any act calculated to promote the 
exportation of goods from Serbia and Montenegro and any dealings313 in goods 
exported from those Republics after 30 May 1992 were prohibited unless authorised by 
separate licences. 
Any ship or aircraft registered in the United Kingdom or chartered to any 
British person and any land transport vehicle (including barges) within the UK could 
not, without a licence, be used to carry goods to any destination in Serbia or 
Montenegro or to any connected person (unless the supply or delivery or exportation 
312. The order c o n t a i n s p r o v i s i o n s on offences c r e a t e d by the Order; 
proceedings brought f o r and p e n a l t i e s f o r co n t r a v e n t i o n of those 
o f f e n c e s ; defences to those o f f e n c e s ; and powers of the Customs 
and E x c i s e a u t h o r i t i e s i n r e l a t i o n to i n v e s t i g a t i o n and 
enforcement of the order. 
313. Dealings covered 'by way of trade or otherwise f o r gain, the 
a c q u i s i t i o n or d i s p o s a l of such goods or of any property or 
i n t e r e s t i n them or any r i g h t t o or charge upon them, the 
p r o c e s s i n g of them, or the commission of any a c t by a person 
c a l c u l a t e d to promote any such a c q u i s i t i o n , d i s p o s a l or 
p r o c e s s i n g by him or any other person.• 
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has been authorised by an Article 3 licence or an Article 4 licence). Nor without 
authorisation could they carry goods exported from Serbia or Montenegro after 30 
May 1992 unless the importation of the goods was authorised by an Article 5 
licence).3'4 
Resolution 787 (1992) was passed by the UN Security Council on 16 November 1992. 
The measures in the Resolution on the enforcement on the embargo were adopted 
under the provisions of Chapter VI I . The Resolution was passed to overcome the 
reported diversion of goods transshipped across Serbia and Montenegro from their 
proper destinations such as Greece. The Security Council called on all States to take 
all steps necessary to ensure that none of their exports were diverted to Serbia and 
Montenegro and imposed a partial ban on the transport of goods through the 
Republics. This affected the transshipment of crude oil, petroleum products, coal, 
energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tyres, vehicles, 
aircraft and motors of all types unless specifically authorised by the Committee on a 
case-by-case basis under its no-objection procedure. 
No UK domestic legislation was introduced since implementation was effected 
through the European Community. The European Community Council of Ministers 
adopted Regulation (EEC) No 3 5 34/92315 on 7 December to give effect to Resolution 
787 by amending Regulation 1432/92. It had retrospective effect to 17 November 
1992. It prohibited the transshipment across Serbia and Montenegro of crude oil, 
petroleum products, omission energy-related equipment, metals, chemicals, rubber, 
tyres, vehicles, aircraft and motors of all types, unless authorised by the Security 
Council Committee as provided in Resolution 787. 
The implementation of Resolution 787 in relation to ECSC products was 
achieved by Decision 92/555/ECSC of 7 December. It subjected the transshipment of 
products covered by the ECSC Treaty originating outside the Republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro and temporarily present in the territory of these Republics solely for the 
purpose of transshipment to authorisation by the Committee in accordance with 
Resolution 787. Its provisions also had effect retrospectively to 17 November 1992. 
Resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993 of the Security Council plugged the final holes 
in the embargo. The prohibitions in place were extended to cover the import to, export 
from and transshipment through the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia and 
those areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina under the control of Serb forces ('the specified 
territories'), with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies including medical 
3 1 4 . The of f e n c e s , p e n a l t i e s and defences f o r v i o l a t i o n of these 
p r o v i s i o n s were p r e s c r i b e d i n the 1992 UN Sanctions order. 
3 1 5 . O J 1992 L 3 5 8 / 1 6 of 8 . 1 2 . 9 2 . 
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supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian agencies unless proper 
authorisation was obtained from the Government of Croatia or of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
respectively. States were required to take steps to prevent the diversion to Serbia and 
Montenegro of products said to be destined for other places, particularly the UNPAs 
and areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina controlled by Serb forces. The transshipment of 
goods through Serbia and Montenegro on the Danube was permitted only on the 
specific authorisation of the Committee, and each vessel had to be subject to effective 
monitoring while passing along the Danube between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs. The 
transport of goods across the land borders or to or from the ports of Serbia and 
Montenegro was prohibited with the exception of the importation of medical supplies 
and foodstuffs into Serbia and Montenegro (as provided for in Resolution 757); the 
importation of other essential humanitarian supplies into the Republics approved on a 
case-by-case basis by the Committee; and strictly limited transshipments through its 
territory when authorised by the Committee. States neighbouring Serbia and 
Montenegro were required to prevent the passage of all freight vehicles and rolling 
stock into or out of the Federal Republic, except at a strictly limited number of road 
and rail border crossings whose location were to reported to and approved by the 
Committee 
Regulation (EEC) No 990/93316 had the effect of implementing Security 
Council Resolution 820 and of codifying the existing European Community measures 
against Serbia and Montenegro. It revokes Regulations (EEC) No 1432/92, (EEC) No 
2656/92 and (EEC) No 2655/92, but repeated their provisions in its Articles, thereby 
codifying the EEC sanctions. In addition new measures were added to implement 
Resolution 820, and only these additions are considered to avoid repetition. The 
Regulation was adopted on 26 April 1993 and entered into force on the same day. It 
applied within the territory of the Community, including its air space and in any aircraft 
or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State, and to any person elsewhere who 
was a national of a Member State and any body elsewhere which was incorporated or 
constituted under the law of a Member State. But the prohibitions were not applicable 
to the activities related to UNPROFOR, the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia or 
the European Community Monitoring Mission. 
The Regulation prohibited the transit through Serbia and Montenegro of all 
products originating in, coming from, or having transited through the Community, and 
the export to Serbia and Montenegro of all products which had been transited through 
the Community were prohibited and any activity whose object or effect was, directly or 
indirectly, to promote these transactions. 
316. D e c i s i o n 93/235/ECSC was adopted and entered i n t o f o r c e on the 
same day i n s t i t u t i n g e q u i v a l e n t measures i n r e l a t i o n to goods 
f a l l i n g under the ECSC T r e a t y . 
106 
The Regulation prohibited from 26 April 1993 the importation into the 
Community of all products originating in, or having transited through the specified 
territories and the export to or transit through these areas of all products originating in, 
coming from or transiting through the Community unless properly authorised by the 
Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina or the Government of Croatia respectively. This 
did not apply to the export to, import from or transit through these areas of essential 
humanitarian supplies, including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by 
international humanitarian agencies. All such importation, exportation and transits are 
also made subject to the prior authorisation by the competent authorities of the 
Member States. 
The new exceptions to the original and additional prohibitions were the transit 
through the Community to Serbia and Montenegro of medical supplies and foodstuffs 
notified to the Committee; the export from (subject to the prior authorisation of the 
competent authorities of the Member State), or transit through, the Community to the 
Republics of essential humanitarian supplies approved by the Committee on a case-by-
case basis; the introduction into the territory of the Community of products which 
originate or come from the Federal Republic and were exported from it before 31 May 
1992 or which had entered legally for transit through the Republic before 26 April 
1993; transits through Serbia and Montenegro authorised by the Committee and, in 
case of transit on the Danube, each vessel involved was subject to effective monitoring 
while passing along the Danube between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs (subject to the 
prior authorisation of the competent authorities of the Member State); and any activity 
whose direct or indirect object or effect was to promote any of these activities. The 
export of products from the Community of medical supplies and foodstuffs notified to 
the Committee were also rendered subject to the prior authorisation of the competent 
authorities of the Member State. 
HM Government granted authorised officials enhanced powers over ships, 
aircraft and road vehicles to enforce the embargo on goods. These are examined under 
the restrictions on transport section below. 
The Export of Goods Order (Control) (Croatian and Bosnian Territories) 
Order 1993,317 which entered into force on 26 April 1993, prohibited the exportation of 
all goods from the UK to any destination in the UNPAs in Croatia and those areas of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces (the specified territories) 
or for transit through the specified territories unless authorised by a licence granted 
under the Order.318 It rendered any licence issued by the Secretary of State under any 
317. S I 1993/1189. 
318. A l i c e n c e f o r importation would not normally be allowed, as a 
matter of p o l i c y , s u b j e c t to c e r t a i n exceptions, u n l e s s proper 
auth o r i s a t i o n - has been obtained from the governments of C r o a t i a 
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Order relating to the control of exports made under si of the Import, Export and 
Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 or issued under any other enactment prohibiting 
or restricting the exportation subject to these provisions. The Order did not apply to 
goods exported in connection with the activities of UNPROFOR, the International 
Conference on the former Yugoslavia or the European Community Monitor Mission. 
The effect of the Export of Goods Order (Control) (Croatian and Bosnian 
Territories) Order 1993 was that the dual licensing system for the whole of Bosnia-
Hercegovina ceased to apply on 26 April „ 3 1 9 A licence would not normally given, as a 
matter of policy, subject to certain exceptions, unless proper authorisation had been 
granted by the governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and authorisation had 
been given by the Secretary of State.320 
The Open General Import Licence was amended such that from 26 April all 
goods originating, consigned from or transmitted through the specified territories 
require an individual import licence issued against proper authorisation from the 
governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Any licence issued prior to that date 
which authorised the import of such goods was rendered subject to the requirement of 
a new licence. 
2. Prohibition on Services 
Resolution 757 of the Security Council contained no restrictions on the provision of 
services. However the European Community in Regulation (EEC) 1432/92 banned the 
provision of non-financial services intended, directly or indirectly, to promote the 
economy of Serbia and Montenegro, and particularly those non-financial services 
provided:321 
i) for the purpose of any activity carried out in or from Serbia and Montenegro 
ii) to one of the following persons: 
a) any natural person in Serbia or Montenegro, 
b) any legal person so constituted or incorporated under the law of the Republics of 
Serbia and Montenegro, 
and Bosnia-Hercegovina and a u t h o r i s a t i o n has been i s s u e d by the 
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e - DTI Pr e s s Notice P / 9 3 / 2 3 1 of 29 A p r i l 1 9 9 3 . 
3 1 9 . DTI Pr e s s Notice P / 9 3 / 2 3 1 of 29 A p r i l 1 9 9 3 . 
3 2 0 . I b i d . 
3 2 1 . The p r o h i b i t i o n on the p r o v i s i o n of n o n - f i n a n c i a l s e r v i c e s i s 
s u b j e c t to the same exceptions l i s t e d i n the d i s c u s s i o n of 
Regulation (EEC) 1 4 3 2 / 9 2 on the embargo on goods. 
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c) any organisation, wherever located, exercising an economic activity controlled by 
persons resident in Serbia or Montenegro or by organisations constituted or incorporated 
under the law of these Republics. 
Surprise may legitimately be expressed at the inclusion of this provision in the 
Regulation without a preceding Security Council resolution to that effect. As 
previously mentioned the European Community is not endowed by its constituent 
treaties with the power to impose sanctions of its own. There was no established 
internationally wrongful act and so counter-measures were not justified. 
The Security Council did not make reference to services until Resolution 820. 
The Resolution precluded the provision of financial and non-financial services to any 
person or body for purposes of any business carried on in Serbia or Montenegro. 
Telecommunications, postal services, legal services, those services approved on a case-
by-case basis by the Committee, and services whose supply may have been necessary 
for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes were excepted from this prohibition. 
Regulation (EEC) No 990/93 modified the scope of the ban on the provision of 
non-financial services to cover their provision to any person or body for purposes of 
any business carried out in Serbia or Montenegro. Exceptions to this prohibition were 
made for telecommunications, postal services, legal services consistent with the 
Regulation and services which may have been necessary for humanitarian or other 
exceptional purposes and which were approved on a case-by-case basis by the 
Committee, and any activity whose direct or indirect object or effect was to promote 
any of these activities. 
The Serbia and Montenegro (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1993322 ('the 
1993 UN Sanctions Order') was adopted to give national effect to Resolution 820 and 
came into force on 1 May 1993. It would automatically cease to have effect or its 
operation suspended under the same circumstances as the UN Sanctions Order. It 
prohibited the provision by British persons of any services to any person or body for 
the purposes of any business carried out in Serbia and Montenegro unless a licence had 
been granted by the Secretary of State. Again telecommunication and postal services 
were exempted.323 
3. Non-Release and Freezing of Assets 
322. S I 1993/1188. 
323. A l i c e n c e to provide l e g a l s e r v i c e s was granted from 1 May 1993 
pe r m i t t i n g l e g a l s e r v i c e s to be provided f o r any business c a r r i e d 
on i n S e r b i a and Montenegro where i n doing so i t i s c o n s i s t e n t 
w ith UN r e s o l u t i o n s imposing the s a n c t i o n s . 
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Resolution 757 had the dual effect of preventing the provision of resources - both 
previously contracted and potential future supply - to the Serbian government and 
business, and of restricting access to assets belonging to Serbian entities located within 
the jurisdiction of other States. Paragraph 5 of the Resolution provided: 
. . . all States shall not make available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility 
undertakings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), any 
funds or other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and 
any person within their territory from removing from their territory or otherwise 
making available to those authorities or to any such undertaking any such funds or 
resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except payments exclusively for 
strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs. 
Within the European Community implementation of this measure was left to the 
Member States due to the lack of competence of the Community in financial matters. 
This was initially achieved in the United Kingdom by the application of the 
Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964. The Treasury may issue 
general or special directions under s2 of the Act when it is satisfied that action to the 
detriment of the economic position of the United Kingdom is being, or is likely to be, 
taken by the government of or persons resident in any country or territory outside the 
UK. The Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits (Serbia and Montenegro) 
Directions 1992 entered into force on 1 June 1992. They provided that, except with 
the permission of the Treasury, any order of the government of or any person resident 
in Serbia and Montenegro requiring any payment or any parting with gold or securities, 
or requiring a change in the name under which any sum, gold or securities were held 
was not to be carried out. Any branch of a business in the country concerned is treated 
for all purposes as if it were a body corporate resident in that country. 
It is difficult to identify the particular action of the Serbian and Montenegrin 
authorities or persons resident in the Republics which was to the detriment of the UK 
economy which might have caused some doubt about the vires of the Order. The 
Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits (Serbia and Montenegro) Directions 
1992 were revoked on 13 June 1992324 since the 1992 UN Sanctions Order contained 
provisions to the equivalent effect.325 
The 1992 UN Sanctions Order superseded these Directions, although any 
permissions granted under them remained valid. It provided more thorough regulation 
3 2 4 . The Co n t r o l of Gold, s e c u r i t i e s , Payments and C r e d i t s ( S e r b i a 
and Montenegro) (Revocation) D i r e c t i o n s 1 9 9 2 , S I No 1 9 9 2 / 1 3 8 1 . 
3 2 5 . S I 1 9 9 2 / 1 3 0 2 , A r t i c l e 1 0 . 
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and was supplemented by the Bank of England Notice (the Notice) of 8 June 1992 
which provided details of the application of the provisions of the Order. The 1992 UN 
Sanctions Order repeated the provisions of the Directions on payments gold and 
securities, and extended its effects to investments. The Notice stated that permission 
was required, but would not normally be given, for British persons to do anything 
which involved parting with any gold coin or gold bullion wherever located and held 
for the account of a connected person, or making any change in the persons to whose 
order any gold coin or gold bullion was to be held. It stated that permission had to be 
obtained for British persons to do anything which involved parting with any securities 
or investments to connected persons or making any change in the persons to whose 
order any securities or investments were to be held. Where securities were registered in 
the name of, or investments were held by, a connected person or where British persons 
held bearer securities for account of connected persons, no payment of capital monies, 
dividends or interest could be made to any person outside the UK; but permission 
would be granted for such payments to be made to Serbian Accounts.326 No 
permissions needed be sought for transfers of securities or investments issued by 
connected persons unless a connected person was a counterparty to the transaction. 
For the purposes of the UN Sanctions Order and of the Notice, 'securities' bore 
the meaning given in s2 of the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals Act) 
1964, and included 
(a) shares, stocks, bonds, notes (other than promissory notes), debentures, debenture 
stock, certificates of deposit and Treasury and other government bills; 
(b) a deposit receipt in respect of the deposit of securities; 
(c) a unit or a sub-unit of a unit trust; 
(d) an annuity granted under the Government Annuities Act 1929 or to which either 
Part I or Part II of that Act applies, and a life assurance policy or other contract 
entered into with an assurance company for securing the payment in the future of any 
capital sum or sums or of an annuity; 
(e) a warrant conferring an option to acquire a security 
(f) share in an oil royalty 
but excludes bills of exchange. 
326. 'Serbian Accounts* are de f i n e d i n the n o t i c e as the s t e r l i n g , 
f o r e i g n currency and gold b u l l i o n accounts of connected persons 
h e l d i n the UK with i n s t i t u t i o n s a u t h o r i s e d under the Banking Act 
1987 or the B u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s Act 1986. Banks, stockbrokers, 
s o l i c i t o r s , accountants e t c holding funds of connected persons 
must p l a c e those funds i n a separate account designated as a 
Serb i a n Account. 
I l l 
'Investment' meant any asset, right or interest falling within any paragraph of Part I of 
Schedule 1 of the Financial Services Act 1986, which was not a security. 
The necessary permissions were given by the Notice to make any payment or 
part with gold, securities or investments, and to make any change in the person to 
whose credit any sums to stand or to whose order any gold, securities of investments 
were to be held, to or on behalf of any natural person in the UK who was resident in 
Serbia or Montenegro provided that if that person was not so resident, such action 
would not otherwise be prohibited by the UN Sanctions Order. All necessary 
permissions were thereby also granted for exactly the same transactions to or on 
behalf of AY Bank Ltd (formerly Anglo Yugoslav Bank Ltd) provided that i f that 
Bank was not a connected person, such action would not otherwise be prohibited by 
the Order. 
The Treasury was given substantial powers over any action which was likely to 
make available to a connected person any funds or other financial or economic 
resources, whether or not by their removal from the UK, or otherwise transfer funds or 
resources to a connected person. Where the making of a payment or parting with 
gold, securities or investments,327 or the making of a change in the names under which 
any sum, gold, securities or investments were held constituted such action, the 
permission of the Treasury was required before they were made. Such permission 
could be granted absolutely or made subject to conditions, and could be varied or 
revoked at any time. 
As regards money held in the UK by banks and building societies, the Bank of 
England Notice designated sterling, foreign currency and gold bullion accounts of 
connected persons held in the UK with institutions authorised under the Banking Act 
1987 or the Building Societies Act 1986 as 'Serbian Accounts.' Banks and Building 
Societies holding such Accounts could not make payments to the holders of them 
without the permission of the Bank of England. The Notice provided guidelines on 
such payments. It granted express permission in paragraph 9 for the payment from 
Serbian Accounts of: 
(a) charges, including interest, to banks in the United Kingdom; 
(b) payments to reimburse banks in the United Kingdom who have made payments in 
respect of trade with Serbia or Montenegro under irrevocable letters of credit provided 
327. For the purposes of t h i s p r o v i s i o n , "gold", "payment" and 
" s e c u r i t i e s " have the same meanings they bear i n s e c t i o n 2 of the 
Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964; and 
"investments" means any a s s e t , r i g h t , or i n t e r e s t f a l l i n g w i t h i n 
any paragraph of P a r t I of Schedule I of the F i n a n c i a l S e r v i c e s 
Act 19 86 which i s not a s e c u r i t y . 
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the letter of credit was opened, and the export of goods took place, before 1 June 1992, 
and the letter of credit is otherwise in order; 
(c) sums due to the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise, provided no 
overdraft is thereby created on a Serbian Account; 
(d) salary and pension payments to persons living in the United Kingdom. 
The Notice stated that The Bank of England would consider applications for 
permission for payments in respect of goods dispatched to the UK on production of 
any necessary documentation; other payments of a current nature; and payments for 
charitable or humanitarian purposes. 
The Notice advised that permission would not normally be granted for any 
payment to a connected person which involved payment to an account held outside the 
UK. The Notice gave permission for sterling and foreign currency payments to Serbian 
Accounts provided they were not payments covered by the provisions of the UN 
Sanctions Order on aircraft insurance and bonds and indemnities. Payments or transfers 
from one Serbian Account to another Serbian Account could only be made with 
permission, which would not normally have been given. Permission would be unlikely 
to have been given for any change in the person to whose credit any sum held in a 
Serbian Account was to stand. 
Paragraph 9 of the Order was deleted by Supplement No 1 to the Notice, 
issued by the Bank of England on behalf of the Treasury on 26 June 1992, and 
permission was granted for the following payments from Serbian Accounts provided 
that they were not payments to be made directly or indirectly to any connected person 
or to any other person in any part of the territory of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia328: 
(a) the payment represents charges, including interest, to banks in the United Kingdom, 
or 
(b) the payments is to reimburse a bank in the United Kingdom who has made a 
payment in respect of trade with Serbia or Montenegro under irrevocable letters of 
credit provided the letter of credit was opened, and the export of goods took place, 
before 1 June 1992, and the letter of credit is otherwise in order, or 
(c) the payment is in respect of salary and pension payments to persons living in the 
United Kingdom, or 
(d) where the payment is in respect of a transaction requiring authorisation by a licence 
issued by the Department of Trade and Industry, such a licence has been issued, or 
328. Permission w i l l normally be given f o r payments to t e r r i t o r i e s 
other than S e r b i a or Montenegro 
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(e) in respect of any other payment, the institution making payment is satisfied that it is 
not a payment in respect of the provision of goods or services, either directly or 
indirectly, to a connected person. 
Supplement No 1 stated that the Bank of England would consider applications for 
permission to debit Serbian Accounts for other purposes, including payments between 
connected persons, payments to any part of the territory of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, excluding Serbia and Montenegro, and payments for 
charitable or humanitarian purposes. 
Supplement No 1 to the Notice also granted automatic permission for 
payments by British persons to a connected person whether in sterling or foreign 
currency to a Serbian Account provided it was not a payment covered by the 
provisions of the 1992 UN Sanctions Order on aircraft insurance and bonds and 
indemnities. 
Under the Serbia and Montenegro (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1992 
obligations under bonds329 given in respect of a contract the performance of which was 
rendered wholly or partly unlawful by the provisions of the 1992 UN Sanctions Order 
or of the Export of Goods Order were made subject to prior authorisation. Unless 
authorised by a licence granted by the Secretary of State, payments330 to any connected 
person in respect of such a bond, and all acts to obtain payment or the making of a 
payment under a right to indemnity in respect of any such bond, where payment under 
the bond was unlawful, or would have been i f paid by a British person, were 
prohibited. 
The Notice provided guidelines on payments under particular agreements. 
Permission would not normally be granted to enable existing lenders who were British 
persons to make any further payment by way of credit, loan or overdraft to connected 
persons, and no new drawings could be made without permission under existing 
facilities. No new arrangements could be entered into, no bills of exchange drawn by a 
connected person could be accepted, and no credits, discount or acceptance facilities 
of any sort could be issued, confirmed or advised for a connected person. The Notice 
authorised the payment by the acceptor on the maturity of a maturing bill of exchange 
329. 'Bond' f o r the purposes of the A r t i c l e i s defin e d as 'an 
agreement under which a person ("the o b l i g e r " ) agrees t h a t i f 
c a l l e d upon to do so, or i f a t h i r d party f a i l s t o f u l f i l 
c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s owed to another, the o b l i g e r w i l l make 
payment to or to the order of the other party to the agreement.• 
330. 'Make any payment*, f o r the purposes of t h i s p r o v i s i o n , means 
'make payment by any method, i n c l u d i n g but not r e s t r i c t e d t o the 
grant, or any agreement to the e x e r c i s e , of any r i g h t to s e t o f f , 
accord and s a t i s f a c t i o n and adjustment of any account, or any 
s i m i l a r means.' 
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drawn by a connected person and accepted before 1 June 1992 by a British person. But 
Serbian Accounts could not be debited in reimbursement without permission. 
Banks acting as agents for syndicated loans and credits to connected persons 
would normally be granted any permission necessary to distribute capital repayments 
and interest payments to participants in the syndicates provided that the necessary 
funds were received from outside the UK. British persons who had made loans to 
connected persons before 1 June 1992 and who wished to roll-over such loans in 
accordance with the terms of the loan agreement had to refer to the Bank of England. 
Authorisation would not normally be given to enable the drawn down amount of the 
loan or credit to be increased on roll-over. 
The Notice gave all necessary permissions for any bargains entered into in the 
money, foreign exchange, commodities (other than physical oil) and securities markets, 
including derivatives, or any payment instructions received for immediate execution, 
involving counterparties connected with Serbia and Montenegro, prior to 0.01 am BST 
on 1 June 1992, to be completed. The permissions did not extend to the repayment of 
term or other deposits. 
Resolution 820 included a provision, which was an unprecedented step for the Security 
Council, going beyond the measures taken to freeze Iraqi assets. Prior to this 
Resolution the assets could not leave the jurisdiction in which they were located, but 
the owners still had access to them within that jurisdiction. Resolution 820 went the 
step further by barring even that limited access: 
States in which funds, including any funds derived from property, (a) of the authorities 
in the Federal Republic, or (b) of commercial, industrial or public utility undertakings 
in the Federal Republic, or (c) controlled directly or indirectly by such authorities or 
undertakings or by entities, wherever located or organised, owned or controlled by such 
authorities or undertakings, are compelled to require all persons and entities holding 
such funds to freeze them to ensure that are not made available, directly or indirectly, 
to or for the benefit of the authorities in the Federal Republic or to any commercial, 
industrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic. 
This provision was implemented by Supplement No 2 to the Bank of England 
Notice issued on 26 April 1993. Permission for certain payments out of Serbian 
Accounts without reference to the Bank of England and permissions given in respect 
of pre-zero transactions and in respect of AY Bank were withdrawn. The amended 
paragraph 9 of the Notice was again deleted and replaced with permission for 
payments from Serbian Accounts of: 
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(a) charges, including interest, to banks in the United Kingdom, 
(b) salary and pension payments to persons living in the United Kingdom, 
(c) sums due to the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise, provided no 
overdraft is thereby created on a Serbian Account, 
(d) payments in respect of the export of humanitarian goods to Serbia and Montenegro 
from the United Kingdom provided that: 
(i) authorisation by a licence issued by the Department of Trade and Industry, and 
(ii) the written approval of the UN Sanctions Committee, 
are exhibited to the Bank making the payment. 
Permission would not normally be given to debit Serbian Accounts with banks in the 
UK in payment for the export of goods of any description from a third country. 
4. Restrictions on Transport 
The measures on transport were in addition to the restrictions placed on the transport 
of goods. Resolution 757 required all States to: 
[d]eny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or fly over their 
territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of the 
Federal Republic . . . unless the particular flight has been approved, for 
humanitarian or other purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the 
Council, by the Committee . . . 
The prohibition on non-financial services in Regulation (EEC) No 1432/92 
applied to air transport. But the legal basis of the Regulation, stated to be Article 113 
of the EEC Treaty, provided problems in this regard. The terms of prohibition on the 
provision of air services were set out in the Annex to the Regulation: 
Permission shall be denied to any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly, 
the territory of the Community if it is destined to land in, or has taken off from, 
the territory of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. 
The problem was not of lack of competence, but of possible incorrect legal basis. 
Articles 75 and 84 empowers the Council to lay down common rules applicable to 
international transport to or from the territory of a Member State or passing across the 
territory of one or more Member States. This, prima facie, appeared to be the proper 
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basis for the prohibition defined in the Annex rather than the common commercial 
policy. Community practice shows that Article 84(2) is the basis which is used for 
measures relating to the regulation of international air transport services.331 Kuyper 
suggests that there was no 'viable alternative' and that time pressure made consultation 
with the European Parliament, which is required under Article 84 but not under Article 
113, impracticable.332 It is regrettable that the Council of Ministers saw fit to ignore 
procedures laid down in the Treaty especially given the existence of an emergency 
procedure for consultation with the European Parliament. 
The Serbia and Montenegro (United Nations Prohibition of Flights Order) 
1992, adopted under the United Nations Act 1946, entered into force on 5 June 
designed to apply the air transport restrictions of Resolution 757. No aircraft, 
wherever registered, could, without the permission of the Secretary of State, take off 
from, land in or fly over the territory of the UK (including the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man), i f its destination was Serbia or Montenegro, or it had taken off from the 
Republics. I f this prohibition was violated both the airport operator and the 
commander of the aircraft were guilty of an offence. The Order required the airport 
operator to take such steps as might have been necessary to prevent an aircraft from 
taking off if he knew or had reason to suspect that the destination of the aircraft was in 
Serbia or Montenegro or that the aircraft had taken off from those Republics since 30 
May 1992 unless the required permission had been granted for take off. 
In addition the provision of engineering and maintenance services to aircraft 
registered in the Serbia or Montenegro or operated by or on behalf of entities in the 
Republics, or the provision of components, airworthiness certificates, payment of new 
claims against exiting insurance contracts or new direct insurance for such aircraft by 
the nationals or from the territory of UN Members was prohibited by Resolution 757. 
The Serbia and Montenegro (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1992 prohibited 
any person from providing engineering or maintenance servicing for any aircraft of 
Serbia or Montenegro or for any component of such aircraft unless authorised by a 
licence granted by the Secretary of State. The Order regulated contracts of insurance, 
other than one of reinsurance, on aircraft of Serbia or Montenegro or on machinery, 
tackle, furniture, or equipment of such an aircraft. It proscribed payment in full of any 
claim under such a contract of insurance in respect of an incident occurring after the 
3 3 1 . The Community has adopted l e g i s l a t i o n on the b a s i s of A r t i c l e 
8 4 ( 2 ) concerning the noise of c i v i l subsonic j e t a i r c r a f t (of any 
S t a t e ) ( D i r e c t i v e 9 2 / 1 4/EEC of 2 March 1 9 9 2 , O J 1992 L 7 6 / 2 1 of 
2 3 . 3 . 9 2 ) ; on the s e t t i n g up of a c o n s u l t a t i o n procedure on 
r e l a t i o n s between Member s t a t e s and t h i r d c o u n t r i e s i n the f i e l d 
of a i r t r a n s p o r t and on a c t i o n r e l a t i n g to such matters w i t h i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s ( D e c i s i o n 8 0 / 5 0/EEC of 20 December 
1 9 7 9 , O J 1980 L 1 8 / 2 4 of 2 4 . 1 . 8 0 ) . 
3 3 2 . Kuyper Trade Sanctions p p 9 . 
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entry into force of the Order, or the conclusion of any such new contract of insurance 
or agreement to any variation or extension of any such existing contract unless 
authorised by way of licence. For the purposes of the Order an 'aircraft of Serbia or 
Montenegro' meant any aircraft registered in Serbia or Montenegro and any other 
aircraft for the time being chartered to a connected person. 
The 1992 UN Sanctions Order provided the means for the enforcement of the 
embargo on goods. It granted powers to authorised officers who had reason to suspect 
that any ship registered in the UK was being, had been, or was about to be used to 
carry goods to any destination in Serbia or Montenegro or to a connected person or to 
carry goods exported from Serbia or Montenegro after 30 May 1992 in breach of its 
provisions. In such a case the official could board and search the ship and demand to 
inspect documents relating to the ship and its cargo. The official was given powers to 
require that cargo was not landed at any specified port. He could request the master of 
the ship to cause his vessel not to continue on its current or proposed voyage until 
allowed to proceed, to keep the ship from leaving a port in the UK without permission 
(if the ship was already in port), to take the ship to a UK port and cause her to remain 
there if not already so located, and to take her to any other destination with the 
agreement of the master. If any of these requests were not adhered to, steps, including 
entrance onto the ship concerned and the use of reasonable force, were authorised to 
secure compliance. 
In the same circumstances, an authorised official could demand to be provided 
with information on and be shown documents relating to an aircraft registered in the 
UK or chartered to a British person and to its cargo. He was empowered to board and 
search the aircraft using reasonable force if required. Officials could request the 
charterer, operator and commander of an aircraft in the UK to remain in the country 
until authorised to leave, and could detain the aircraft and use reasonable force to 
ensure compliance with the request. 
The 1993 UN Sanctions Order extended these powers to ships or aircraft in the 
United Kingdom which the authorised official had reason to suspect had been or was 
being operated in violation any of the Security Council resolutions concerning 
sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. 
As well as banning the transshipment of goods across Serbia and Montenegro 
in Resolution 787 to prevent the diversion of goods, the Security Council addressed 
the problem of sanction busting, which was particularly prevalent on the Danube, by 
imposing a blockade on the river and authorising the inspection of all shipping. All 
States, acting individually or through regional agencies or arrangements, were 
required, by virtue of the invocation of Chapter VI I , to use such measures 
commensurate with the specific circumstances as may have been necessary to halt all 
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inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and 
destinations, and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 713 
and 757. The Security Council reaffirmed the responsibility of riparian States to ensure 
that shipping on the Danube was in accordance these resolutions, including the halting 
of ships for inspection and verification of cargoes and destinations. States were 
requested to provide such assistance as was required by those States acting nationally 
or through regional agencies to implement the above two paragraphs. 
For the purpose of the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, 
any vessel in which a majority or controlling interest was held by a person or 
undertaking in or operating from the Serbia or Montenegro was to be considered as a 
vessel of those Republics regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails.333 
Resolution 820 confirmed that no vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic 
or (b) in which a majority or controlling interest was held by a person or undertaking in 
or operating from the Federal Republic or (c) suspected of having violated or being in 
violation of resolutions 713, 757 and 787 or the present resolution were to be 
permitted to pass through installations, including river locks or canals within the 
territory of UN Member States. Riparian States were called on to ensure adequate 
monitoring was provided to all cabotage traffic involving points that were situated 
between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs. The Security Council repeated the responsibility of 
riparian States to take necessary measures to ensure shipping on the Danube was in 
accordance with Council resolutions, and reiterated its request334 for all States to 
provide such assistance as was required, notwithstanding the restrictions on navigation 
set out in the international agreements which apply to the Danube. 
By virtue of Resolution 820 all States were to impound all vessels, freight 
vehicles, rolling stock, and aircraft found in their territories in which a majority or 
controlling interest was held by a person or undertaking in or operating from Serbia or 
Montenegro, and such carriers could be forfeited to the seizing State upon a 
determination that they had violated Resolutions 713, 757, 787 or the present 
resolution. 
States were obliged to detain, pending investigation, all vessels, freight 
vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in their territory and suspected of 
having violated or been in violation of the same resolutions, and upon determination of 
violation, such carriers or cargoes were to be impounded and, where appropriate the 
3 3 3 . Regulation (EEC) No 3 5 3 4 / 9 2 d e f i n e d a v e s s e l of the Republics of 
S e r b i a and Montenegro, f o r the purposes of implementing 
Regulation (EEC) 1 4 3 2 / 9 2 , i n t h i s way. 
3 3 4 . The request was p r e v i o u s l y made i n paragraph 15 of R e s o l u t i o n 
787 . 
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cargo forfeited to the detaining State. The costs of impounding could be charged to the 
owners. 
Regulation (EEC) No 990/93 required the competent authorities of the 
Member States to impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in 
which a majority or controlling interest was held by a person or undertaking in or 
operating from Serbia and Montenegro. The expenses of the impounding could be 
charged to their owners. In addition, all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft 
and cargoes suspected of having violated, or been in violation of, Regulation (EEC) 
No 1432/92 or of the present Regulation had to be detained by the authorities pending 
investigation. Member States were to determine the penalties for contravention of the 
terms of the Regulation, and any vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and 
cargoes found to have violated it could be forfeited to the Member State whose 
authority impounded or detained them. 
The 1993 UN Sanctions Order placed a duty on harbour authorities to 
implement the impounding provisions of Resolution 820. The authority concerned had 
to take all necessary steps to impound any ship at its harbour which the authority had 
reason to believe was either majority owned or effectively controlled by a connected 
person, or in respect of which one of the above requests had been made and which the 
Secretary of State determined has been used or operated in breach of UN resolutions. 
The impounding of goods vehicles was the responsibility of the traffic commissioner 
for any traffic area in Great Britain and of the Department of the Environment for 
Northern Ireland for that country. The traffic commissioner could impound any goods 
vehicle which he had reason to believe was either majority owned or effectively 
controlled by a connected person or which had been detained under Article 3 and 
which the Secretary of State determined has been used in violation of UN resolutions. 
Aircraft operators had the responsibility to impound any aircraft at their airport 
which the aircraft operator had reason to believe was either majority owned or 
effectively controlled by a connected person, or which had been detained in accordance 
with the above powers and which the Secretary of State determined is in violation of 
UN resolutions.335 
The Secretary of State could order that any ship which was impounded and any 
cargo which had been the subject of a direction as to landing and which he had 
determined had been carried in violation of UN resolutions be forfeited to him. It had 
to be sold for the price which could reasonably be obtained. The Order provided for 
the application of the proceeds of sale. Impounded goods vehicles and aircraft and 
detained cargo carried on goods vehicles and aircraft which the Secretary of State 
335. A c e r t i f i c a t e given by the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e i s c o n c l u s i v e 
evidence of such.a determination. 
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determined had been carried in violation of UN resolutions could equally be forfeited 
by him. 
All commercial maritime traffic was prohibited by Resolution 820 from entering 
the territorial sea of Serbia and Montenegro, except when authorised on a case-by-case 
study by the Committee or in case of force majeure. This was translated into 
Community law by Regulation (EEC) No 990/93, which equally prohibited any activity 
whose object or effect was, directly or indirectly, to promote this transaction. 
The Serbia and Montenegro (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1993 prohibited 
any ship registered in the UK or any ship which was not registered in any country but 
was majority owned by a British citizen or a body corporate incorporated in the UK 
and which in either case was being used for commercial purposes from entering the 
territorial sea of Montenegro unless authorised by a licence issued by the Secretary of 
State. It was a defence that either that the ship owner, operator or master did not 
know or could not reasonably have known that the ship was entering the territorial sea 
of Montenegro, or that the ship only entered it by reason of stress of weather or other 
case offorce majeure. 
5. Arms Embargo 
Resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 imposed 'a general and complete 
embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia' under 
Chapter VI I of the UN Charter. This was applied in the UK by revocation and 
modification of licences granted under the Import, Export and Customs Powers 
(Defence) Act 1939. 
6. Other Measures 
Resolution 757 also contained diplomatic, sporting and cultural measures. States had 
to reduce the level of their staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts in Serbia and 
Montenegro.336 The requirement to prevent the participation in sporting events on their 
territories of groups or persons representing the Republics led to the exclusion of the 
Yugoslav national football team from the European Championships in Sweden in 1992. 
States were also required to suspend scientific and technical cooperation and cultural 
exchanges with the Federal Republic. 
336. The UK e x p e l l e d the Yugoslav ambassador from B r i t a i n on 1 June. 
A 'Yugoslav m i s s i o n s t a f f e d by 'Yugoslav' diplomats continued to 
operate i n London i n an u n c e r t a i n l e g a l c a p a c i t y : Warbrick 
"Recognition of s t a t e s P a r t Two" 42 I n t e r n a t i o n a l and comparative 
Law Quarterly (1993) pp433, a t pp439. 
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7. Effects on Contracts 
The Security Council followed its precedent in the Iraq sanctions of dealing with the 
consequences of its decisions on the obligations of parties to contracts affected by the 
resolution. Paragraph 9 of Resolution 757 stated that: 
all States, and the authorities in the Federal Republic shall take the necessary measures 
to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the authorities in the Federal 
Republic . . . or of any person or body in the Federal Republic . . . or of any person 
claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any 
contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the 
measures imposed by this resolution and related resolutions. 
At the time of writing neither the European Community nor HM Government had 
taken any measures to give effect to this provision. However such legislation is very 
likely to take the form of Regulation (EEC) No 3541/92 on prohibiting the satisfying 
of Iraqi claims with regard to contracts and transactions the performance of which was 
affected by United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 (1991) and related 
resolutions. It was adopted on the basis of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty which 
empowers the Community to adopt measures in fields not covered by the Treaty 
provided the measures are agreed unanimously following consultation of the European 
Parliament. The Regulation provides an interesting development in the competences of 
the Community. The Member States have employed the European Community to deal 
with the private law consequences of the trade measures. As a result Community 
legislation determines the effects on transactions the subject-matter of which is not 
necessarily even within Community competences. For the Regulation covered 
any transaction of whatever form and whatever the applicable law, whether comprising 
one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different 
parties; for this purpose 'contract' includes a bond, financial guarantee and indemnity 
or credit whether legally independent or not and any related provision arising under or 
in connection with the transaction. 
The Regulation defined 'claims' made on contracts as any claim, whether asserted by 
legal proceedings or not, made before or after 7 December 1992, under or in 
connection with contracts covered by it. Person or body in Iraq* meant (a) the Iraqi 
State or any Iraqi public authority, (b) any person in, or resident in, Iraq, (c) any body 
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having its registered office or headquarters in Iraq, and (d) any body controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by one or more of these persons or bodies. 
The Regulation prohibited, subject to certain exceptions such as insurance and 
employment contracts, the satiating or the taking of any step to satisfy a claim made by 
(a) a person or body in Iraq or person acting through a person or body in Iraq; 
(b) any person or body acting, directly or indirectly, on behalf of or for the benefit of 
one or more persons or bodies in Iraq; 
(c) any person or body taking advantage of a transfer or rights of, or otherwise 
claiming through or under, one or more persons or bodies in Iraq; 
(d) any other person or body referred to in paragraph 29 of UN Security Council 
Resolution 687(1991); 
(e) any person or body making a claim arising from or in connection with the payment 
of a bond or financial guarantee or indemnity to one or more of the abovementioned 
persons or bodies 
under or in connection with a contract the performance of which was affected, directly 
or indirectly, wholly or in part, by the measures decided on pursuant to Resolution 661 
and related resolutions. 
The prohibition applied within the Community and to any national of a Member 
State and any body which was incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member 
State. The major advantage of such legislation was that it established exactly the same 
mandatory rules for the purposes of the Rome Convention in all the Contracting 
States. This prevented any claimant under a contract covered by the Regulation from 
forum shopping in attempt to bypass the effects of the sanctions. 
Claims under contracts to which Paragraph 29 did not apply would be 
unsuccessful since the agreement would become unenforceable on the grounds of 
illegality (for contracts purportedly made after the relevant Security Council 
resolution), or force majeure and frustration (for contracts concluded beforehand).337 
337. Fox and wickremasinghe " B r i t i s h Implementation of UN: Sanctions 
Against I r a q " 41 International and comparative Law Quarterly 
(1992) pp920-938, pp935. 
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CONCLUSION 
The exercise of the powers of the UN Security Council in the post Cold War era is no 
better illustrated than in the increase in the use of economic sanctions as a tool for 
restoring or maintaining international peace and security. The application of Article 41 
of the Charter in this manner is an important development in any reassertion of .the 
authority of the United Nations to enable it to act as an effective universal 
organisation. The pyramidical system of the application of sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro illustrates the transformation of international obligations into domestic 
law. The necessarily general statements of the Security Council are been given more 
effective application with the increase in the use of sanctions as an instrument in the 
field of international peace and security. 
The economic effectiveness of the range of sanctions imposed against Serbia 
and Montenegro is undeniable. Following their introduction by December 1992 
unemployment had increased by 60%, inflation was at 50% per month, industrial 
output was down 75% since 1989, and trade down by 50-75%.338 The political success 
of the measures is open to much questioning. The Serb intransigence towards the 
Vance-Owen plan was not overcome, the human rights abuses were not curbed and the 
conflict continued unabated. HM Government has publicly accepted the lack of total 
effectiveness of sanctions.339 Commentators generally agree that the effectiveness of 
sanctions is restricted and that examples of outright success in achieving the objective 
pursued by their imposition are rare. In the Yugoslav crisis they have been coupled 
with other political carrots, such as promises of recognition and economic assistance, 
to secure peace. 
It is undeniable that the machinery at the international level has gained greater 
efficiency in the choice of measures and implementation of sanctions. The increase in 
the instances of the imposition of comprehensive trade sanctions has enabled more 
gaps to be filled and so lessens are learnt for the next occasion. The implementation of 
the UN resolutions has become smoother and the monitoring by the Committee of the 
Security Council has developed into an extensive state reporting system. The 
resolutions have also brought about unprecedented co-operation between international 
organisations and States to ensure effective implementation. Examples may be cited of 
the CSCE Sanctions Assistance Missions and NATO and WEU patrols in the Adriatic 
Sea to enforce the measures taken against Serbia and Montenegro. 
338. Douglas Hogg, M i n i s t e r of S t a t e of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
O f f i c e , F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Committee, The Expanding Role of the 
United Nations and its Implication for UK Policy, Minutes of 
Evidence, 2 December 1992 p94 para 153. 
339. I b i d para 153. 
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For the European Community the field of sanctions has enabled it to develop its 
competence in international relations. The passage of the Single European Act in 1986 
led the way to closer consultations in foreign policy and to a more uniformed response 
through the adoption of Community Regulations. This in turn has brought about a 
demise in reliance on Article 224 EEC. An examination of the development of the 
implementation of sanctions and counter-measures by the Community reveals less 
resort is had to Article 224 EEC and the adoption of a Community Regulation has 
become the standard means of applying Security Council resolutions in the Member 
States. This has enabled the response of the EC and its Members to be more efficient. 
The constitutional arrangements by which the European Community presently 
implements sanctions will be considerably transformed by the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU). This change will take place on a number of fronts. 
The first is in the development of a common foreign policy. Included in the 
objectives of the foreign and security policy is the preservation of peace and 
strengthening of international security, in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of 
the Paris Charter.340 The objectives are to be pursued by 'systematic cooperation' 
involving consultation and adoption of common positions341, or by the gradual 
implementation of joint action.342 The Treaty does not institutionalise common foreign 
policy within the EC structure but provides the mechanism for the inclusion of agreed 
areas within the framework.343 Following guidelines of the European Council, the 
Council will be able to decide by unanimous agreement to make a matter the subject of 
joint action and when doing so determine the specific scope, the general and specific 
objective of the action, i f necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and 
conditions for its implementation. When it adopts the joint action and at any stage in its 
development the Council act by qualified majority. Member States will be committed 
to the joint action in their positions and in the conduct of their activities. Member 
States may take national measures only in cases of imperative need arising from 
changes in the situation and failing a Council decision. 
The balance which the TEU strikes in maintaining inter-governmental 
cooperation but providing the means for an institutionalised foreign policy initially 
leaves the decision to impose sanctions outside the Community structure. But the 
Treaty provides a procedure for their application within the Community system. It 
introduces into the Treaty of Rome Article 228a which states. 
3 4 0 . A r t i c l e J . l TEU. 
3 4 1 . A r t i c l e J . 2 TEU. 
3 4 2 . A r t i c l e J . 3 TEU. 
3 4 3 . A r t i c l e J . 3 TEU. 
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Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted according to the 
provisions of the Treaty on the Union relating to the common foreign and security 
policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, 
economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the 
necessary urgent measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission. 
This has the effect of changing the legal base on which the European Community will 
implement UN sanctions or apply its own counter-measures. This is a most welcome 
development. The entry into force of this provision will eliminate the strained leal 
reasoning previously required to justify Article 113 EEC as the basis for measures such 
as restrictions on air services. Article 228a will be used to cover all fields falling within 
EC competences. It is an indication of the growth in the importance and recognition of 
sanctions as tools of foreign policy and law enforcement that an international body has 
amended its constituent treaty to provide for their application against non-member 
States. 
A further ground of development is the considerable increase in competence 
which the TEU confers on the Community in the field of monetary affairs culminating 
in economic and monetary union. It does not, however, remove the competence of 
Member States to freeze foreign assets within their jurisdiction. One can envisage a 
greater degree of supervisory conduct by the EC in this matter. For the Central Banks 
of the Member States344 comprise the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
together with the European Central Bank (ECB).345 jfe primary objective of the 
ESCB will be to maintain price stability.346 Its basic tasks are to define and implement 
the monetary policy of the Community, to conduct foreign exchange operations, to 
hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States and to promote the 
smooth operation of payment systems.347 The ESCB is required to 'contribute to the 
smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.348 
This supervisory role is the extent of the EC's competences in freezing foreign financial 
assets located within the Community. The power of freezing remains within the control 
of national central banks which may perform functions other than those specified in the 
Statute of the ESCB and ECB unless the Governing Council of the ECB finds by a 
3 4 4 . A r t i c l e 1 0 6 ( 1 ) EC. 
3 4 5 . Both the ESCB and the ECB are e s t a b l i s h e d by A r t i c l e 4A EC. 
3 4 6 . A r t i c l e 1 0 5 ( 1 ) EC. 
3 4 7 . A r t i c l e 3 s t a t u t e of the ESCB and ECB. 
3 4 8 . A r t i c l e 1 0 5 ( 5 ) EC. 
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majority of two thirds of the votes cast that they interfere with the objectives and tasks 
oftheESCB. 
The Community is given the express power in Article 73g in the cases set out 
in Article 228a, to take the necessary urgent measures on the movement of capital and 
on payments as regards the third countries concerned. This does not, however, 
increase the competence of the Community in relation to freezing assets. 
It is pertinent to consider the possibility that the freezing of foreign financial 
assets might be sought to be based on the new Article 228a EC. The ability of the 
Community to claim competence under that provision will rest on the interpretation of 
'economic relations with one or more third countries.' But this does not confer greater 
competences on the Community merely because urgent measures are to be taken. It 
will be restricted to measures within the areas it has competence, which do not include 
regulation of foreign bank accounts. 
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